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Trading companies have played and continue to play significant and strategic roles in 
international trade, supporting the export of manufacturers and the import of 
purchasing companies. The transaction costs economics, indicated that the role of 
trading companies is reducing the transaction costs during export. However, the rise 
of transition economies, such as China, which has become one of the most important 
players in international trade, leads to two gaps in existing studies. First, the trading 
companies from these countries and regions have been kept as a “black box”, 
compared with relative numerous studies on developed countries. Second, the local 
institutions, which are considered as main determinants on business models in 
transition economies, are most likely to affect the transaction costs during export, 
and trading companies’ characteristics and their methods of reducing transaction 
costs.   
 
Therefore, the aims of this study were to explore these institution-related transaction 
costs in China’s export market, and how Chinese ETCs operate one more efficient 
indirect export market compared with one direct market between domestic 
manufacturers and foreign buyers. Correspondingly, the main research questions 
were: 1) what are the institutions, which generate transaction costs for domestic 
manufacturers and foreign buyers, in China’s export market? And 2) how do Chinese 
exporting trading companies respond to such institution-related costs as an 
intermediary between domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers. 
 
A qualitative multiple-case approach was chosen. Six Chinese ETCs were selected, 
with their export processes as embedded units. The main sources of data included 
semi-conducted interviews and in-depth field observation. In addition, secondary 
data, such as newspapers, industrial reports, also contributed to the context of the 
cases.  
 
With one integrative analytical framework, this study identified a couple of 
institutional constraints in China’s export markets, including the bureaucratic 
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procedures and administrative approvals, inefficient legal system and informal 
contract obligation, and long-term OEM trading methods. These institutions were 
involved in the whole procedure of export transaction, from the manufacturing by 
domestic manufacturers to the purchase by the foreign buyers and generated 
additional transaction costs in different steps, ranging from search, negotiation, to 
enforcement. 
 
Even though the transaction costs were greatly increased because of the export-
related institutional constraints, the findings further reveal that Chinese ETCs can 
reduce these institution-related transaction costs by a series of effective methods, 
such as acquirement of knowledge on administrative procedures, collection of 
information on production, vertical integration, offering supplementary functions for 
dysfunctional domestic manufacturers and so on. The relevant explanations are 
twofold. As explained in traditional economic theories, Chinese ETCs’ also relied on 
economies of scale to reduce institution-related transaction costs. Moreover, Chinese 
ETCs adopted some approaches affiliated to export-related institutions, such as long-
term reselling system and monopoly of export authority in history in China’s export 
market, and this is the first time that institutional perspective were applied to explain 
the transaction behaviour of trading companies.   
 
To sum up, this study extends our understanding of Chinese export trading 
companies and export-related institutions in China’s export market, enhances 
traditional transaction costs analysis on trading companies by adding the perspective 
from foreign buyers, and integrates institutional perspective into transaction costs 
analysis to better explain ETCs’ business model in transition economies. Last but not 
least, the findings in this study are also helpful for practitioners and policy-makers 
from transition economies in order to improve their export performance and local 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Background to the study  
 
According to the WTO’s International Trade Statistics 2012 , China, with a total of 
$1898 billion in exports and making up 10.4% of global exporting trade, became the 
top largest exporter, with a growth rate what is more of 20%. This attractive outcome 
is attributed to 30-years’ economic reform and export-oriented developmental pattern 
(Child, 2009). In China’s Statistical Yearbook (SSB, 2011) of the same year, 44.07% 
of this huge sum of exports comes from local manufacturers in China, rather than 
foreign-funded enterprises. However, many researchers argue that local 
manufacturers from these developing countries, like China, are suffering from many 
competitive disadvantages for their export strategy at the level of firms, industries 
and institutional infrastructure (Gao, Murray, Kotabe, & Lu, 2009). Therefore, the 
question is how do these local manufacturers achieve such success in exporting?  
 
Trading companies could provide the answer. The limited literature points out that 
the export volume operated by trading companies in China made up 94.4% of the 
activity before 1986 due to their possession of monopolistic export authority, and 
then reduced to 34% in 2000 after the gradually easing of access to export authority 
(Yao & Chen, 2001). Nonetheless this means that the trading companies still largely 
dominate and support China’s local exports. However, their business model and 
characteristics, particularly their methods for facilitating domestic exports, remain 
unknown.  
1.2 Importance of trading companies in export   
 
Trading companies are the earliest and most efficient facilitators for supporting local 
export (Jones, 2002a; Perry, 1992a). The most famous Japanese General Trading 
companies (JGTCs) are identified as the key determinant for Japan’s previous 
success in an export-oriented economy. The nine largest JGTCs almost make up half 
of Japan’s total exports from the 1970s to 1990s (Kojima and Ozawa 1984; Jones 
1996). Meanwhile other various trading companies also play a similarly significant 
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role in local exports in US, EU and worldwide (Balabanis and Baker 1993; Jones 
1998; Peng 1998). For instance, it is estimated that European export intermediaries 
(main forms of trading companies in EU) made up 25-60% of exports in different 
European countries in the 1990s (Balabanis & Baker, 1993b). 
 
Being the “merchant” between domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers, trading 
companies are playing a significant role in international trade (Jones, 1998b), 
supporting  manufacturers’ exports (Peng & Ilinitch, 1998) and foreign companies’ 
imports (Quintens, Matthyssens, & Faes, 2005). They help domestic manufacturers, 
especially small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), to search for and negotiate 
with foreign buyers (Peng, 1998). They offer various services and supports to 
facilitate exporting. Small export intermediaries normally can offer several 
specialized export services according to different demands from clients, such as 
export documentation, packaging and marking, international market research, 
advertising and promotion, freight forwarding and so on, which are classified as 
transaction-creating services and physical fulfilment services (Balabanis, 2005). 
Large trading companies are able to provide more comprehensive and complex 
export services, such as “one-stop” export services (Shao & Herbig, 1993) and 
export finance services (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984; Sheard, 1989). In addition, these 
trading companies are able to flexibly operate different trading methods, including 
reselling, brokering and 3
rd
-countries trade, according different situations (Casson, 
1998).   
 
In short, trading companies have played and continue to play significant and strategic 
roles in international trade by offering various methods and services effectively and 
efficiently. Therefore studies on trading companies are important for academic 
understanding and practice improvements.   
1.3 The significance of this study  




Transition economies are defined as some countries and regions where formal and 
informal institutions are comprehensively and fundamentally changing, particularly 
from central planning to market-based economic reforms (Peng, 2003, p275). They 
contain around 30 countries (IMF, 2000), and affect the lives of at least 1.65 billion 
people (Roland, 2004, p17). These countries and regions have been emerging as the 
most important group in current international trade. The three largest transition 
economies, China, Germany (former East Germany) and Russia, are respectively 
listed first, third, and ninth as leading exporters and making up a total of 21.4% of 
exports worldwide, according WTO’s International Trade Statistics 2012 (WTO, 







) and Vietnam (40
th
), also have rather good exporting 
power (WTO, 2012).  
 
However, trading companies from these transition economies have been ignored by 
academics for a long time. Compared with their practical contributions to 
international trade, the lack of the knowledge on trading companies from these 
economies is becoming more obvious. Moreover, one original study in this field also 
offers potential for more relevant academic studies.  One original study on unfamiliar 
economic phenomena always offers one platform for more relevant studies. In the 
field of trading companies, such a situation is extremely true. According to literature 
reviews in this study, it is indicated that several original studies always lead to a 
mushrooming of subsequent ones focused on certain underdeveloped sorts of trading 
companies. The Japanese GTCs is one typical example. There are almost no relevant 
studies on Japanese GTCs before 1980s, though they have dominated Japan’s 
international trade since the 17
th
 century (Yoshihara, 1982).    After several Japanese 
researchers’ pioneering contributions in the 1980s (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984; 
Yoshihara, 1982; Yoshino & Lifson, 1986), extensive subsequent research was 
undertaken on Japanese general trading companies (Amine, Cavusgil, & Weinstein, 
1986; Dicken & Miyamachi, 1998; Jones, 1996; Kim, 1986; Meyer-Ohle, 2004; 
Roehl, 1998; Sarathy, 1985; Sheard, 1989). Therefore, this study, as one original 
study on trading companies in these transition economies is expected as to be an 




Furthermore, the update of relevant knowledge on trading companies in these 
economies is also significant for practitioners in this field. The interviews with the 
practitioners from domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers, and even from trading 
companies in this study, indicate the urgent demand for such knowledge. Specifically, 
these practitioners from domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers seem to have no 
clear plans as to when and how to use trading companies’ assistance during their 
export/import businesses in China. In addition, as the lack of clear recognition of 
their roles in exporting and logistics for the efficient processing of export 
transactions, the practitioners from Chinese trading companies are also confronted 
with many troubles, and fail to improve export performance. The continuous 
downturn in the global economy worsens this situation for these practitioners. 
Therefore, this study will be of benefit to current and would-be practitioners involved 
in exports in China and other transition economies.  
1.3.2 Theoretical challenge  
 
In contrast to developed economies with stable and matured institutions, transition 
economies unavoidably experience a special period of mixed institutions (Nee, 1992), 
where institutional voids (Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le Breton-Miller, 2009), 
uncertainty of institutional change (Child & Tse, 2001), misalignment between 
institutional supply and firm demand (Witt & Lewin, 2007), and reactions between 
this institutional environment and organizations (Peng, 2003) jointly construct a 
distinctive institutional environment. Therefore, the institutional perspective becomes 
a relatively suitable and mainstream approach in extant studies on transition 
economies (Meyer & Peng, 2005; Peng, 2003, 2005; Peng & Heath, 1996; Peng & 
Khoury, 2008; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). As 
a result, two theoretical challenges related to institutional perspectives have emerged 
in this study. Firstly, the concepts, terminology and classifications related to 
institutional perspectives in these studies, are disorganized, ambiguous and 
overlapping. Such problems seem to be inherited from higher-level institutional 
research. Scott (2008) has found that  institutional research in social science, 
economics and political studies shows large discrepancies and conflicts, and are 
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lacking in a general framework. Therefore, this study is looking forward to clarifying 
such conflict and developing one universal institutional perspective framework for 
studies on transition economies.  
 
Furthermore, such an institutional environment definitely and considerably impacts 
on domestic and international firms in these transition economies, and further on 
extant theoretical studies, which are normally developed in western countries with 
more matured institutions (Child & Tse, 2001; Meyer & Peng, 2005). As Peng stated, 
these extant theories need modification when they apply to transition economies, like 
China (Peng, 2006). Specifically, transaction costs economics (TCE) which is the 
most important and dominant theory in the field of trading companies, has been 
argued to be largely influenced by local institutions in these transition economies 
(Meyer, 2001a; Meyer & Peng, 2005). Thus, this study is confronted with another 
theoretical challenge of seeking one suitable approach to integrate the institutional 
perspective into extant theories in this field, given each of them is able only to 
partially explain Chinese trading companies.  
 
Last but not least, there is one theoretical challenge in extant TCE analyses on 
trading companies. TCE is the dominant theory in the field of trading companies due 
to its powerful explanation of trading companies’ existence and business (Casson, 
1998). It clearly indicates the transaction-costs-economizing role of trading 
companies during international trade. However, the extant TCE analysis on trading 
overlooks the perspective from the foreign buyer, which is reported as one important 
stakeholder during export transactions by many export-related articles (Perdue & 
Summers, 1991; Quintens et al., 2005). Therefore, this study is faced with the 
challenge of modifying such deficiencies in extant studies.   
 
1.4 Research aims and research questions 
 
The main purpose of this study through consideration of multiple case studies is the 
development of one comprehensive understanding of Chinese export trading 
companies, relevant institutions in China’s export market and their interaction with 
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each other together with the interaction between ETCs and institutions, from both an 
institutional perspective and a transaction costs economics perspective. Specifically, 
two objectives and relevant questions arise as follows: 
 
Firstly, this study aims to explore and investigate the export-related institutions, 
which generate costs for domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers in exporting 
activities in China. Second, it aims to explore and investigate Chinese ETCs’ 
responses to such institution-related transaction costs as an intermediate between 
domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers. Therefore, two research questions are: 1) 
what are the institutions, which generate transaction costs for domestic 
manufacturers and foreign buyers, in China’s export market? And how do Chinese 
exporting trading companies respond to such institution-related costs as an 
intermediate between domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
 
The general structure of the thesis is shown in figure 1-1. Following the introduction 
in Chapter one, Chapter two presents an overview of trading companies in extant 
literature, including their history, characteristics and methods for facilitating exports 
as reflected in three main countries and areas, and three related theories. Based on 
the literature review, the deficiencies in these studies and research questions are 
listed. Then one new analytical framework is developed in Chapter three, based on 
the TCE and institutional perspective in international business, in order to guide the 
subsequent explanation of institutional constraints in China’s export market and 
Chinese ETCs. Chapter four is an overview of the history of Chinese trading 
companies since 1949. This chapter offers one original introduction of unknown 
Chinese trading companies. Within it, the main developmental periods, significant 
events, and relevant institutions are described in detail.  In Chapter five, a detailed 
research strategy and methodology is designed to make logical links between the 
evidence and research questions in this study. It concludes with the philosophical 
stance in this study, the justification for the use of qualitative case studies, and the 
detailed case study design. Chapter six is the first part of the pilot study (pilot study 
A), which offers a chance to pre-test the previous integrative framework, and to 
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specify the institutional constraints on China’s export market. Then the main within 
case analysis takes place in Chapter seven. Four different cases are selectively 
presented out of a total six cases (the details of the last two cases are presented in 
appendix 3 to save space). The first case is a pilot case study (Pilot study B). 
Moreover, the Chapter eight offers cross-cases analysis to further generate patterns 
between China’s export-related institutions and ETCs in this study. Finally the 
Chapter nine concludes this study.  
 
    
 




Chp 1 Introduction 
Chp 2 Literature review 
Chp 3 Analytical framework 
Chp 4 Overview of Chinese trading companies 





Chp 7 Within case analysis-Case A (pilot 
studyB), and Case B,C,D 
Chp 8 Cross-cases analysis-Case A,B,C,D,E,F 







Chapter 2  Literature review  
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to identify the gaps and research questions from extant literatures. 
In section 2.2 an overview of trading companies worldwide is provided, especially 
their methods for facilitating exports. Also the research objective (the export role of 
trading companies) and the first gap in the literature are identified. Then several main 
theoretical analyses/models, particularly from the perspective of transaction costs 
economics, are reviewed in section 2.3. As a result, the second and third gaps in the 
literature, and two further research questions are identified.  
2.2 Overview of trading companies worldwide 
 
Trading companies are the earliest economic organizations involved in international 
trade (Perry, 1992a), and can be traced back to “colonial time” (Jones, 2002b, p2). 
As the “merchant” between domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers (both of 
whom  lack the resources to transact directly), trading companies have played and 
continue to play significant and strategic roles in past and current global business 
(Jones, 1998b). Most importantly, they are international trade facilitators and 
mediators through marketing, distributing and selling products overseas for 
manufacturers and through searching for and organizing supplies for buyers. They 
offer clients a series of trading services, such as export documentation, freight 
forwarding, warehousing, etc (Balabanis, 2005). At the same time, they are also trade 
initiators and generators (Balabanis & Baker, 1993a), as they proactively search for 
or design competitive products, and potential markets, negotiate with manufacturers 
and buyers, and enforce the export transactions. In addition to traditional trade, some 
trading companies widely participate in other business activities, which could be 
trade-related, like shipping and manufacturing, or trade-unrelated, like FDI and 
finance. Corresponding to such diversified functions, these trading companies vary in 
terms of characteristics and business modes. For instance, the sizes of trading 
companies are quite different from each other, ranging from individual middlemen to 
large general trading companies (Perry, 1992a, p2). The most successful ones, such 
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as the Japanese general trading companies with their successful diversification 
strategies, became leading companies in the Japanese and the global economy over a 
long period of time, while others, notwithstanding varied forms worldwide, also 
greatly facilitate international trade.  
 
In a word, trading companies have complex backgrounds, and diversified 
characteristics and functions. Therefore, this section initially aims to explore two 
basic questions: what kind of trading companies and what kind of function of trading 
companies will be studied in this study? To answer these questions, I have sought out 
extant literatures on trading companies from the fields of international business, 
business history, international marketing and strategy. I hope to clarify three 
confusing points in this field: the typology of trading companies; the main 
function/roles of trading companies in international business;, and the main 
mechanisms of trading companies for achieving such functions (to facilitate 
exporting) from extant literatures. At the end, one gap will be illustrated after the 
review of the empirical studies. 
2.2.1 Typology of trading companies  
 
Given that they appear in various forms, the typology of ‘trading companies’ are 
always amorphous and difficult to perceive (Amine, 1987; Jones, 2002b, p1; Peng, 
1998; Perry, 1992a). They are called different names in different countries, such as 
export trading companies, export management companies, export intermediaries, 
trading agents (shown in Table 2-1). Jones (1998b) concluded several reasons for 
such a situation. First of all, trading companies can be  brokers or resellers with 
different risk-taking capability, and the difference is that resellers purchase and then 
resell products (Casson, 1998). In the U.S., for instance, the trading companies that 
take title to products are termed export trading companies (ETCs), while the others 
without doing so, are termed export management companies (EMCs) (Peng & York, 
2001; Perry, 1992a). In the same way, Balabanis (2001) European export 
intermediates (EIs) are divided into merchants-EIs and agent-EIs. Yet the boundary 
between these two groups has been ambiguous, as their areas of work overlap in 
practice (Perry, 1992a, p18). Thus some scholars have used more universal term, like 
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international trade intermediaries (ITIs) (Perry, 1990, 1992a, b) and export 
intermediaries (Peng, 1998), to bypass the difficulty of differentiating trading 
companies in practice. In addition, the fact that trading companies undertake varied 
functions increases the difficulty of distinguishing between these companies, since 
they might be categorised in other ways if they are highly participative in other 
businesses beyond trade (Jones, 1998a). Casson (1998)  classified trading companies 
into pure trading companies with simple trading functions and hybrid trading 
companies when they undertake other functions. These functions are not always 
exclusive and fixed, and even represent an evolutionary path in the development of 
trading companies (Visvabharathy, 1984). For instance, one trading company might 
start out from exporting, and then turn to or diversify into importing, manufacturing 
and other functions (Amine, 1987). In this way a pure trading company is 
transformed into to a hybrid trading company with its own productive function. In 
extreme cases, they can change into another company. Jones (1998a) illustrated how 
“Shell” transferred from being trading companies into an oil company. Thirdly, 
trading companies vary according to their specialised products or export regions. 
Since some trading companies only specialize in some products and markets, Sarathy 
(1985) distinguished them as special trading companies (STCs), compared with 
GTCs that have numerous products and global markets. Finally, diverse trading 
companies presented as independent entities or affiliated enterprises in a large group 
(like sogo shosha in Japanese MNEs) also contribute to this implicit situation (Jones, 
2002b). In spite of these differences, “trade” and “export” became the most common 
key terms in these types, as they had been the most significant characteristics and 
business for these companies (Balabanis, 2005).  
 
Table 2-1  Typology of trading companies. 
Name of trading companies Criteria 
ITIS/ EIs 












Trading companies have received massive attention from academic, practical and 
political fields due to their significant in international business. As these trading 
companies have multiple roles, their main businesses are usually classified into 
trading businesses, such as export, and non-trading businesses such as FDI. These 
roles will be specified below. 
2.2.2.1 Facilitating International trade 
 
The first important role of trading companies is to facilitate international trade, 
including export, import and complex trade (such as third-country trade). As core 
businesses of trading companies, such trading functions exist in almost all trading 
companies mentioned in the last section. Among these trading businesses, export is 
the most important and common role of trading companies. By bridging different 
political, economic and cultural environments, trading companies link domestic 
manufacturers and foreign buyers by offering professional exporting services and 
information. This holds absolutely true and obvious for supporting and enhancing 
exports from small and medium size manufacturing companies that lack exporting 
capabilities and are more vulnerable to export barriers than large ones (Balabanis & 
Baker, 1993b).  In this case, trading companies usually undertake two major groups 
of activities: physical-fulfilment and transaction-creating (Balabanis & Baker, 1993a). 
In the former one, trading companies usually help manufacturers to process export 
documents, to arrange shipping with the freight forwarder, to apply for quotes and 
licences to officials, to deal with payment and financial issues with domestic and 
international banks, etc. In the latter one, they undertake a series of activities to 
increase trading opportunities, such as advertising and promotion, international 
market research and so on (Balabanis, 2000).  
 
Second, some trading companies also play dramatic roles in import business, the 
other side of international trade. Similarly, they can offer a series of import-related 
services to facilitate foreign manufacturers and domestic buyers. Or they can, when 
importing some products such as raw materials, natural resources and high-tech 
equipment, support their export, where these imported materials are used to create 
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export products. In particular, these importing services are quite important for the 
manufacturers and countries, which lack these resources and capabilities to purchase 
them independently. In practice, JGTCs played an important role in the import of 
materials and equipment, which offer essential inputs for relatively weak domestic 
manufacturers. At some peak times, such as the 1970s, these JGTCs accounted for 
half of the imports into Japan (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984).   
 
Thirdly, some trading companies also participate in more complex international trade, 
like third-country trade, etc. Third-country trade, also called offshore trade, refers to 
trade that does not involve the home country of a trader as a buyer and a supplier 
(Yoshino & Lifson, 1986, p77). Casson (Casson, 1998) has illustrated how trading 
companies extend simple bilateral trade into complex multilateral trade, like third-
country trade, in multiple countries and products (Shown in Figure 2-1). This kind of 
international trade is also important for some trading companies. For instance, third-
country trade processed through Mitsui, one major JGTC, once made up 30 % of its 
total sales. And most of these JGTCs undertook extensive third-country trade from 
the 1970s onwards (see the Table 2-2)  (Yoshino & Lifson, 1986, p77-78).  
 
Additionally, trading companies also indirectly facilitated international trade by 
offering a series of trade-related, trade-supporting and trade-complementary services, 
such as shipping, export credit, export insurance, etc. They also organized production 
of tradeable products, and coordinated with different organizations within the 
production system. Sometimes, they completed some key units on their own 
throughout the whole supply chain. Thus trading companies fit into the physical 
functions in trade, and create trading opportunities.   
 
Table 2-2 Third-country trade as a percentage of total sales.  
 1973 1978 1983 1984 
Mitsubishi 6.2 6.1 8.9 11.7 
Mitsui 6.3 1.9 14.8 16.0 
C.Itoh 6.3 12.0 15.1 17.7 
Marubeni 5.1 13.3 15.7 16.9 
Sumitomo 9.9 5.2 8.2 11.5 
Nissho-Iwai 10.1 9.9 22.5 21.1 





Figure 2-1 An example of mangular trade involving two colonies 
and their home country.  
Source: (Casson, 1998) 
 
2.2.2.2 Facilitating Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 
The second role of trading companies is to facilitate FDI, which are normally trading 
companies’ non-trading businesses. This role is normally found in large trading 
companies, like GTCs in Japan and Europe CTCs, and can be exemplified in two 
An example of mangular trade involving two colonies 
and their home country 
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Figure: Geographical diversification: the use of multiple connected routes to 
support multinational trade 
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main ways. First, the trading companies help other business partners’ FDI by 
offering consulting services. It mainly relies on their information and experience, 
which have been accumulated from previous international businesses. Second, some 
trading companies also undertook FDI on their own account. For instance, the JGTCs 
participated extensively in FDI overseas, such as mining, manufacturing, real estate, 
etc (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984). Jones (Jones, 2002a) also reports that early British 
trading companies made up a significant component of the British FDI in the 19
th
 
century. These trading companies started with trade and related activities, and then 
diversified into other non-trading functions, such as plantations and mining.  
 
The motivations for trading companies’ participating in FDI are varied. Jones (Jones, 
2002a) believes that British trading companies’ FDI activities could be for the 
pursuit of new profitable opportunities and to make up for the inadequate business 
supportive functions in underdeveloped/developing countries. Kojima et al. argue 
that Japanese GTCs’ FDI activities show twofold motivation. The FDI in developing 
countries are commonly resource-seeking FDI, while those in developed countries, 
like the US, (mainly in manufacturing) aim to bypass some export barriers or 
strategic objectives (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984; Sarathy, 1985).  
2.2.2.3 Other functions  
 
Historically, trading companies also have participated extensively in other non-
trading businesses, apart from FDI. But such non-trading businesses usually aim to 
support their trading business. For instance, Jones (Jones, 2002a, p26) reported that 
early multinational trading companies had to undertake many “complementary  
businesses needed for their trading business”, like financing and insurance, 
especially when their  trade extended to underdeveloped countries. Yoshino & Lifson 
(Yoshino & Lifson, 1986) also indicate that most of non-trading businesses, such as 
warehousing, shipping, finance, manufacturing, and mining, undertaken by JGTCs 
are developed to support their core trading business. For instance, these warehousing 
and shipping functions directly facilitate JGTCs’ trading services, while the finance 
and manufacturing businesses are intended to make up for some drawbacks and to 
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increase the efficiency of domestic production systems in Japan, thereby benefitting 
JGTCs’ exports.  
2.2.3 The trading companies’ history, characteristics and approaches 
to facilitate export 
 
The main role of trading companies is that of exporting in international business. The 
next question is how they facilitate exports, since they show dramatic variance 
according to different countries and regions in relation to such a question. In this part, 
I will illustrate different trading companies’ history, characteristics and methods for 
facilitating exports, from three main regions and countries, which are covered by 
almost all existing literatures.  
2.2.3.1 European Countries  
2.2.3.1.1 History of trading companies in Europe-Chartered trading companies 
and Exporting Intermediaries  
 
European trading companies are normally considered to start from “chartered trading 
companies” (CTCs). For a long time, from the 16th to 18th centuries, these European 
CTCs experienced unparalleled ascendancy in the global economy (Jones, 1996). 
These CTCs were then the most successful large multinational enterprises, such as 
the English and Dutch East India companies (the two largest), and the Hudson’s Bay 
Company (the smallest one). They had a monopoly of trading charters in specific  
regions and products issued by home governments, which then became entry barriers 
for private traders, and also ensured their exclusive returns from high risk long-
distance trade and other investments overseas at that time (Carlos & Nicholas, 1996). 
They handled most of the international trade between their home countries (Europe 
was then the centre of international trade) and their colonies in developing countries, 
such as Asia, India, America, and Africa. Examples include the export of textiles 
from the UK, the import of local resources from Africa, such as gold, ivory and even 
slaves, and the trade in opium from India to China (Jones, 2002a). They normally 
owned one head office in Europe, and numerous forts, factories and plantations 
worldwide, kept long-term contracts with lots of foreign suppliers, and other 
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middlemen, all of which constructed global trading networks (Carlos & Nicholas, 
1996).   
 
Most of the CTCs faded out from international trade by the mid-19th century for 
many reasons, including the dismissal of government monopolies, the rise of MNEs 
which preferred owned distribution, and institutional and technological change 
(Balabanis & Baker, 1993a). At the same time, the new generation of private trading 
companies, like Jardine Matheson (based in HK) and Inchcape, had gradually 
emerged and replaced CTCs’ position in trade between Europe and the rest of the 
world. These trading companies started from individual merchants or merchant 
partnerships, and focused on certain local products and foreign markets during the 
early 1800s. Their businesses initially started from simple import/export and broker 
jobs based on one main export and entrepot hub either in the home countries or 
postcolonial regions. Then they developed relatively small business networks into 
several main regions (normally previous colonies) around the world by operating 
agency relationship with business partners overseas.  
 
As the founders and employees of these new trading companies came from previous 
CTCs, or some of these trading companies had previously been the agency houses 
for previous CTCs, the business modes and characteristics of these trading 
companies were quite similar to previous CTCs during 1800s. For instance, they 
were deeply involved in international trade and other businesses in former colonies, 
participated in shipping and insurance, undertook massive investments overseas and 
third-country trade. After continuous “re-invention” and modification to their 
business modes from the 19th through to the 21st centuries, including corporate 
organizational structure, core markets and products, level and scale of diversification. 
In this way, some of them survived the fluctuations of international and domestic 
environments and the threats of integration by manufacturers, evolving into 
successful general trading companies with less diversification. For instance, 
“Inchcape operated in forty-four countries and marketed the products of 2,750 
manufacturers. Apart from general merchandising, its activities included shipping,  
travel agents, port  operators,  timber  sawmills,  tea producers, commodity  dealing, 
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and local  manufacturing, though  40 per  cent  of  its  profits  were  derived  from 
automobile  distribution, and 60 per cent came from Hong Kong, Malaysia, and 
Singapore”. In general, these large European trading companies are not as large as 
the Japanese GTCs in terms of size, scale, performance, importance and influence 
(Jones, 2002a) .  
 
In modern Europe, the trading companies are commonly small-sized and specialized 
in some products and regions. Balabanis & Baker (1993b) calculated that 90% of 
European TCs now only have 9 to 20 staff. These European TCs normally 
concentrate on the trade of certain industrial products. They could be merchants, who 
take title of products, and agents, who work on behalf of principals (manufacturers or 
buyers) without taking title of products (Balabanis, 2000). They are willing to 
establish agency relationships with other domestic TCs in order to increase trading 
opportunities, instead of establishing many subsidiaries in their home countries. 
Their relationships with manufacturers are neither long-term nor close. In addition, 
unlike early CTCs, who diversified both upstream and downstream, these small TCs 
are likely to offer more specialized agency services for clients, buyers and 
manufacturers (Balabanis & Baker, 1993a). They are usually specialized in several 
services, and even have to collaborate with other facilitators, like freight forwarder 
and insurance companies, in order to complete the entire export task. Meanwhile, 
they pay more attention to collaboration with other members, such as manufacturers, 
in the same export channel (Balabanis, 1998). In two surveys, Balabanis (Balabanis, 
2000, 2005) listed two major groups of services: transaction-creating and physical 
fulfilment, which are shown in Table 2-3, offered by British export intermediaries, 
and indicated that the EIs usually offer some combination of these services as a 
consequence of some internal and external limitations. 
 
Table 2-3 Services offered by British export intermediaries. 
transaction-creating services physical fulfilment services 
International market research Export documentation 
Product research and design Provision of cost, insurance and freight quotes 
Development of marketing strategies and plans Export packaging and marking 
Advertising and promotion Warehousing 
Selection of foreign distributors Freight forwarding 
Training of distributors’ staff Quality control of exported goods 
After sales services Financing and credit of export transactions 
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The negotiation of collaborative agreements on 
behalf of suppliers  
 
Source: (Balabanis, 2005).  
 
Although the emergence of modern MNEs and the decline of trade capitalism have 
weakened these European TCs, they still play a very important role in im-/ex-porting 
in the EC, especially in supporting SMEs’ im-/ex-porting. Balabanis&Baker (1993b) 
indicated that these TCs on average make up more than one quarter of exports and 
almost half  of the imports in the EC. 
2.2.3.1.2 European CTCs and EIs’ approaches to facilitate export  
 
The early trading companies in Europe, such as CTCs, played the most important 
role in the international trade between European countries and the rest of the world. 
First of all, they acted as pioneers for considerably extending European trade to 
worldwide before the 19
th
 century. These CTCs initially exported European products 
into the rest of the world, especially into those new and undeveloped markets, such 
as Latin America, Asia and Africa, which are unknown and full of risk for most of 
other companies in Western Europe due to their distinct cultures and poor 
communication links (Carlos & Nicholas, 1996). Therefore a great deal of local 
tradable products were found and brought back to Europe by them (Balabanis & 
Baker, 1993a). At the same time, the global trading networks were constructed by 
these trading companies and their business partners overseas to facilitate numerous 
third-country trading ventures (Jones, 2002a). Thus these early trading companies 
largely increased trading opportunities through continuously expanding foreign 
markets and tradable products.   
 
In addition, these CTCs also facilitated international trade by offering trade-
complementary services on their own, such as financing, shipping, insurance and 
even manufacturing. This was particularly important for trade in underdeveloped 
countries as they emerged and became important markets for industrialized European 
countries whilst at the same time lacked these complementary businesses and 




Thirdly, CTCs and their successors reduced the risk and increased the efficiency of 
undertaking international trade before the 19
th
 century, based on their creative 
mechanisms for handling high numbers of recurrent transactions, processing a great 
deal of trading information systematically, and reducing private opportunism inside 
owned trading organizations. International trade carried a great deal of political and 
economic risk and uncertainty from the environment, and similarly high private 
opportunism inside trading companies prior to the time before the 19
th
 century, due 
both to distance (physical and culture) and inadequate information (Carlos & 
Nicholas, 1988, 1996; Jones, 2003). Correspondingly, these trading companies 
effectively reduced these risk and uncertainty, and reduced transaction costs in 
international trade. Through a series of creative ways of organizing businesses, such 
as  massive vertical integration through the whole supply chain, efficient hierarchies 
of salaried managers, comprehensive and timely trade reporting and recording 
systems operation on their global trading networks, these trading companies replaced 
inefficient external markets with owned administrative hierarchies and more efficient 
external contracts (spot  market,  long-term contracts, and vertical  integration), and 
then enhanced trading efficiency (Carlos & Nicholas, 1988, 1996).   
 
With the withdrawal of CTCs from the stage of history, a great number of small and 
specialized export intermediaries (9-20 employees in term of size) continue to play 
an important role in international trade. They now make up 25-60% export  in 
different European countries (Balabanis & Baker, 1993b). These small trading 
companies or export intermediaries continue to facilitate export, but in different ways, 
which means they are more specialized and collaborative. First, though they do not 
undertake as diversified trade and non-trade functions as the early European CTCs 
did, these EIs are able to offer more professional export service for clients, including 
buyers and manufacturers. It is extremely important in an advanced export market. 
According to Balabanis’s description of the services offered by British EIs, it is 
obvious that the whole trading companies sector constructed by various EIs, 
facilitates the export more efficiently and specialized by offering the various service-
mix for clients with different requirements (Balabanis, 2000, 2005).  At the same 
time, as they do not dominate the whole export channel; EIs are more likely pursue 
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the close collaboration with other units, like manufacturers, on the export channel 
(Balabanis, 1998). In the end, these diversified, flexible, and compatible services 
offered by various trading companies, plus other facilitators, construct one more 
efficient export collaborative network. 
2.2.3.2 Japan  
2.2.3.2.1 History of trading companies in Japan-Japanese General Trading 
Companies 
 
The Japanese General Trading Companies (JGTCs), the total number of which could 
only be fewer than 16 (Shao & Herbig, 1993), have dominated Japan’s international 
trade since the 17th century, though there are also great numbers of small trading 
companies and specialized trading companies in Japan (Sarathy, 1985; Shao & 
Herbig, 1993; Yoshihara, 1982). These JGTCs are considered to be the most 
important economic organizations in both Japan and the world, given their 
significant contributions to the domestic economy, international trade and business in 
Japan (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984; Yoshihara, 1982, p6; Young, 1974), and their 
considerable influence on the global economy (Amine et al., 1986; Daniel C. Bello, 
1985; Herbig & Shao, 1997; Kim, 1986). It is estimated that the JGTCs made up 10% 
of global trade in the 1990s (Shao & Herbig, 1993). Earlier studies calculated that the 
nine largest JGTCs almost made up half of Japan’s import and export and around 30% 
of the GNP during the 1970s (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984). Another study by Jones 
(1996) indicated that  these nine GTCs still accounted for 76% of imports and 43% 
of exports in 1991 in Japan.  
 
These JGTCs have a long history, and some of them can be traced back to the 17th 
century. But their rise as an important economic organization in Japan started from 
the early Meiji period (1868-1912), when the Japanese government began the 
reforms leading towards industrialization and modernization. Therefore, the history 
of JGTCs parallels the modernization of Japan. Due to the increase of international 
trade in Japan after the Meiji restoration, several Japanese trading companies, such as 
Mitsui Busan (now Mitsui Co.) and Mitsubishi Shoji (now Mitsubishi Corporation), 
quickly grew up as the main indigenous trading institutions and replaced the then 
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dominant place of foreign traders in Japanese international trade. Due to the weak 
industrial foundation in Japan, JGTCs undertook multiple roles during the 
international trading process. For instance, before WWII, Mitsui took charge of not 
only the import of spinning machinery and raw cotton, but also the export of cotton 
products (MITSUI, 2011). Therefore, these trading companies gradually expanded 
their affiliates, such as  suppliers and banks, to most regions of Japan, and developed 
into the famous Zaibatsu groups, which were family-based industrial and financial 
conglomerates in the pre-war period in Japan (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984; Yoshino & 
Lifson, 1986, p9-36) 
 
After WWII, the Occupation Authorities attempted to dissolve the previous Zaibatsu 
groups (large holding companies). Under this policy, the JGTCs, including previous 
and current ones, were broken up into many companies. But with the gradual 
discontinuation of the “dissolution” to Zaibatsu due to political, economic and 
cultural reasons, JGTCs quickly self-restored and became the sales and procurement 
agents for the new generation of Japanese business groups. These JGTCs turned out 
to be the most important institutions for Japan's post-war economic recovery (Kojima 
& Ozawa, 1984; Yoshino & Lifson, 1986).  
 
The 1960s and 1970s, Japan’s economy experienced a period of super-growth, and 
witnessed the JGTCs’ rapid growth and expansion. With its prompt industrialization 
and export-oriented economic policy, Japan became globally the largest importer and 
exporter.  Nine of the largest JGTCs almost made up half of Japan’s total imports 
and exports and around 30% of the GNP during 1970s. The import products of the 
JGTCs mainly focused on overseas resources and raw materials for domestic 
production, while the export products developed initially from steel, chemicals and 
textiles, which were the most competitive products in Japan during the early ages of 
industrialization, to hundreds and thousands of various items, the process of which 
was described as “from noodles to satellites” (Dicken & Miyamachi, 1998; Kojima 
& Ozawa, 1984; Yoshino & Lifson, 1986, p9-36).  
 
With the oil crisis and the slowing down of the growth of Japan from the middle of 
1970s, the JGTCs entered into a “wintry period” with many problems, such as a 
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receding domestic economic, strong currency and hence the decline of domestic 
exports,  manufactures’ own distribution channel, etc. (Marubeni, 2012). Under these 
circumstances, the JGTCs changed their strategies. They entered into more complex 
contracts and projects: for instance  plant export, international constructions, third 
country trade (Yoshino & Lifson, 1986; Young, 1979). Moreover, they also 
undertook many unrelated businesses, such as real estate, retailing, power industry, 
for new businesses opportunities, which became important sources of profit for 
JGTCs from 1980s. The trend of diversification in non-trade businesses became 
more dramatic during 1990s. Many JGTCs, like Mitsui and Itochu, invested in 
resources overseas (MITSUI, 2011). Marubeni and Itochu jointly established 
Marubeni-Itochu Steel INC in 2001(Itochu, 2012). All these developments further 
extended JGTCs’ business empire, starting from traditional trade, expanding into 
broader areas, and eventually turning these large trading companies into MNEs, like 
the western ones, up to the present day. 
2.2.3.2.2 JGTCs’ approaches to facilitate export  
 
JGTCs have multiple options for facilitating export.  First of all, the JGTCs are able 
to process numerous products based on their considerable global trading networks. 
The considerable level of diversification in both product and market is the key 
characteristic of the JGTCs (Cho, 1984). The products processed by JGTCs were    
extremely varied, ranging “from noodles to satellites” (Dicken & Miyamachi, 1998). 
Their auxiliary trading companies and regional offices were all over the  world, 
which established their global trading networks (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984). In 1973, at 
least 5000 employees were employed in 800 offices overseas (Young, 1974). Huge 
amounts of information on markets, trade, and even politics and culture were 
gathered through these networks. Apart from offering support to other business 
activities, this activity smoothed out  any information asymmetry, thereby reducing 
uncertainty and risks of international trade  (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984). For instance, 
Mitsubishi owned 232 offices overseas, which communicated at least 30,000 pieces 




In turn, their clients, manufacturers and purchasers, could enjoy the more efficient 
distribution system offered by JGTCs with lower costs. By only transacting with one 
GTC, a manufacturer might sell one item to many purchasers from different markets, 
while one purchaser could buy several products from different manufacturers at one 
time. In addition, these extensive trading networks also facilitated third-country trade 
(Kojima & Ozawa, 1984; Young, 1974). Thus, JGTCs indeed achieved economies of 
scale, largely reduced cost per transaction for their clients, and created more trading 
opportunities, including third-country trade (Yoshino & Lifson, 1986).  
Second, JGTCs were  able to offer clients a “one-stop” service by integrating a series 
of export-supporting services, including export documentation, warehousing, freight 
forwarding, shipping, offering letters of credit and insurances, and so forth (Shao & 
Herbig, 1993). These services obviously extended beyond those offered by simple 
trading companies or other independent exporting facilitators, like freight forwarders, 
shippers and banks, which only offered single service. These were attributed to 
JGTCs’ diversified functions, and capabilities of coordinating with other related 
organizations. In turn, their clients, notably the SMEs, benefited from these efficient 
distribution channels and other services, at a low cost.   
 
Third, as organizers/coordinators of production systems, JGTCs reduced the 
obstacles during production and exporting, as well as any resulting uncertainty from 
other units in whole production systems, enabling domestic manufacturers to focus 
on their specialized role in production, and further increase trading opportunities 
(Kojima & Ozawa, 1984; Yoshino & Lifson, 1986). Unlike pure trading companies, 
JGCTs organized and coordinated whole production and sale systems, apart from 
simply buyout products from manufacturers or agency for manufacturers. According 
to different products, JGTCs may be involved in several different stages of 
production, such as purchase of raw materials, sale of products, logistics, finance, 
marketing and so on (Yoshino & Lifson, 1986). These organizational and 
management functions undertaken by JGTCs largely supported inexperienced 
domestic manufacturers and supplemented the relatively weaker business systems at 
that time in Japan. As Kojima & Ozawa report, whether in the Meiji or the post-war 
period, domestic manufacturers and business systems were not strong enough to 
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support the economic and political requirements of rapid industrialization and the 
"export-or perish" ethos (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984, p21).  
 
In turn, JGTCs, as the most experienced and advanced large business organizations, 
at least in the international trade of Japan, quickly developed production systems and 
competitive products by importing technology, equipment and raw materials, 
offering business information, organizing and coordinating production of semi-
finished or finished products, representing market intermediaries and so forth. In this 
way, JGTCs considerably increased trading opportunities and the amount of tradable 
products for those weaker manufacturers and subcontractors, enhancing the 
competitive advantage of Japanese products in international trade.  
 
In addition, these organization also worked effectively reducing the uncertainty of 
the whole production system and risks for each unit in system (Sheard, 1989). Due to 
the fluctuation of the markets of raw materials and finished products, together with 
the high investments in equipment, political risks overseas, exchange risks, and so on, 
the involvement in exports lead to high fixed costs and resulted in  high risks and 
uncertainty for manufacturers, particularly for SMEs. The JGTCs effectively reduced 
these risks and uncertainty by their global trading networks, massive information 
resource about markets, accumulated experience, great financing capability, and 
linkages with the members in business groups. At the same time, domestic 
manufacturers were able to reduce fixed costs, focus on production, and enjoy lower 
transaction costs for each export transaction, regardless of inputs and sale. In 
conclusion, by organizing whole production system, JGTCs achieved economies of 
scope, and reduced the total costs and sub costs for each unit (Yoshino & Lifson, 
1986).   
 
As main exporting supplements, the financial functions and services of JGTCs are 
worth mentioning separately due to their significance and uniqueness to export 
activity. The financial functions had become another main feature of JGTCs, which 
were therefore called “quasi-bankers” or “quasi-insurance agencies” for the Japanese 
economy and trade (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984; Sheard, 1989). These financial services 
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contained “the extension of ordinary trade credit, advance payments, short-and long-
term loans, loan guarantees, and even leasing of properties and equipment” and so on, 
which considerably furthered the trade (Yoshino & Lifson, 1986, p50). Due to their 
large scale and linkages with banks, it is relatively easier for JGTCS to obtain 
financial support from banking systems in Japan (Roehl, 1983, 1998). Then these 
financial capitals were used to finance trade-intermediating activities through short- 
and long-term loans, to developed suppliers by equity investment (Kojima & Ozawa, 
1984, p24-25), and finally to support intermediate product markets (inputs) for 
domestic manufacturers’ export (Sheard, 1989) (Such process is illustrated in the 
Figure2-2 in details).  
These financial credit and investments were based on their information and 
experience on export process, international markets, partner enterprises, products and 
industries, etc. Thus JGTCs efficiently leveraged their information and experience to 
finance export (Shao & Herbig, 1993).  In return, JGTCs obtain the trading rights of 
the products from these domestic manufacturers (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984; Yoshino 
& Lifson, 1986). In the end, by directly financing export procedure and indirectly 
offering credits to production, JGTCs substantially helped domestic manufacturers 
and suppliers, notably the SMEs, which struggled to get financial support from the 
banking system in Japan, and further international trade through their coordination 




Figure 2-2  The role of the general trading company as a trade 
intermediary in interfirm transactions.  
                                                            Source: (Sheard, 1989) 
2.2.3.3 US 
2.2.3.3.1 History of trading companies in the U.S. - Exporting Intermediaries  
Before the 20th century the Yankee traders were the earliest trading companies in US. 
They replaced previous European trading companies, which dominated the 
international trade of America during the colonial period. Due to European trading 
companies’ monopoly of existing markets at that time, such as India, these American 
trading companies initiated their trade from certain new markets, such as the Pacific 
Northwest, Far East and Latin America. Then their geographic scope gradually 
extended to the rest of the world, even back to Europe. Their characteristics were 
similar to early European traders (Peng, 1998, p30-32) . From 1900, however, the 
international trade had gradually been dominated by the emerging MNEs, which 
Bank 
Discounts bill (B) to 
obtain immediate 
finance 
Pays bill (B) when 
becomes due 


























FIG 1.  The role of the general trading company as a trade intermediary in interfirm transactions. Figures indicate the temporal sequence of 
events.  Source: Compiled on the basis of company interviews. Sheard illustrated how JGTCs provided and arranged trade credit among 
suppliers, purchasers and banks, with the assistance of their “inside” information and organizer position of such trades, and therefore 
facilitated whole transaction among suppliers and manufacturers, and diversify the interfirm risks (of trade credit).  
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relied on their in-house FDI distribution channel, while most American small- and 
medium-sized manufacturers only concentrated on domestic consumers. Thus fewer 
tasks were remained for the trading companies. Unlike the prosperous development 
of JGTCs at the same period in Japan, these trading companies had a minimal 
influence on and development in the American economy (Peng, 1998, p30-32).  
 
The boom in modern trading companies in the US started from 1982, when the 
American Export Trading Company Act (AETC) of 1982 was issued. In order to 
increase exports, the AECT of 1982 loosened the anti-trust laws and encouraged 
financial institutions’ participation in exporting. This initiative in essence attempted 
to establish large JGTC-like “exporting intermediary organizations” in US by 
combining manufacturers (especially SMEs), export trading companies and banks 
(offering financial support for export). However, the emerging trust-like trading 
companies such as Sears, General Electric, and Control Data, quickly faded out of 
market after 1982 (Peng, 1998, p41), due to  the lack of institutional background of  
the JGTCs (Amine et al., 1986; Herbig & Shao, 1997; Peng, 1998, p32).     
 
After that, the American trading companies developed into pure export 
intermediaries from the 1990s, called export management companies (EMC) and 
export trading companies (ETC). Their number is great, as Perry stated the number 
could be up to four thousand (Perry, 1992a, p2-3). They are small-sized companies 
with limited product lines (Perry, 1992a). Despite the lack of a large-scale survey, 
there were  two empirical investigations on International Trade Intermediaries(ITI) in 
the US by Perry (1990, 1992b) and on Export Intermediaries (EIs) in the US by Peng 
(1998), which represented the scale of modern American trading companies in terms 
of the number of employees, sales amount, and product diversification. In Perry’s 
survey, 33/35 ITIs owned fewer than 50 employees, and 20/35 handled less than $10 
million in sales (Perry, 1992b),  and in Peng’s postal survey, 163/195 owned fewer 
than 50 employees , and 132/195 recorded less than $10 million in sales (Peng, 1998, 
p114). According to Perry’s survey (Perry, 1992b), 2/3 ITIs undertook  moderately 
diversified product lines (6 product categories made up 200%, as “several” firms 
handled a number of product categories simultaneously”, which meant that one firm 
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handled 2 product categories on average). Similarly, a total of 300% in 8 dealing 
areas means slightly diversified areas. 
 
2.2.3.3.2 American EIs’ approaches to facilitate export  
 
The trading companies did not play an important role in most of the US international 
trade history, even after the issue of a supportive policy by government in 1982. It 
reflected that the dominance of large MNEs in the US economy minimized the 
importance of independent trading companies within the international trade (Peng, 
1998). But the American EIs, such as EMCs and ETCs, became one of the most 
efficient export channels for domestic manufacturers, particularly the SMEs (Peng, 
1998; Peng & Ilinitch, 1998; Peng & York, 2001).  
 
Similar to European EIs, American EIs also offer various brokerage services related 
to international trade for manufacturers, such as a search for new markets and buyers, 
negotiation with buyers, and enforcement of the contracts. In some cases, they also 
offer reselling functions, by taking title of some products from the manufacturers, 
and then reselling them to potential buyers. These flexible services are important for 
domestic SMEs with limited exporting resources and capabilities and for the 
companies at the initial period of export involvement. For instance, the reselling 
methods reduce manufacturers’ risk and monitoring costs (Peng, 1998). These 
services are largely contributed to through their knowledge of international markets, 
experience of export processes and financial capital (Peng, 1998). However, their 
businesses mainly focus on certain products, markets and relatively specialized 
functions in whole export process, referred to as a “specialist” or niche strategy 
(Peng, Hill, & Wang, 2000; Peng & Ilinitch, 1998). Thus these American trading 
companies are a group of trading facilitators with various specialized capabilities in 
the field of international trade. The domestic manufacturers are able to choose the 
most suitable one as their distribution channel (Peng, 1998).   
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Table 2-4  Overview of trading companies worldwide. 
Name Country Characteristics Authors  
General Trading 
Companies (GTCs)  (Sogo 




Conglomerate-like trading organizations with numerous product lines, domestic 
and foreign subsidiaries, and diversified businesses.  
(Cho, 1984; Dicken & Miyamachi, 
1998; Kojima & Ozawa, 1984; 
Roehl, 1982; Sheard, 1989; 
Yoshihara, 1982; Yoshino & Lifson, 




“Uniquely American institutions” which transitionally serve as manufacturers’ 
distributors, normally small and undercapitalized(Perry, 1992a) 
(Howard & Maskulka, 1988; 
Williamson & Bello, 1984) 
Export Trading Companies 
(ETCs) 
U.S. 
The new formation of trading companies after the Export Trading Companies Acts 
of 1982, therefore called ETCAs. Some of them acquired GTCs’ characteristics, 
such as  the involvement of manufacturers and banks, say MNC-ETCs and Bank-
ETCs  
(Amine, 1987; Amine & Cavusgil, 





Including “EMCs, AETCs and ACT-firms-In other words, to all indirect international 
trade vehicles that engage in international marketing activities on behalf of US 
manufacturers and that make up the US industry of international trade 
intermediation” (Perry, 1992a, p19) 
(Perry, 1990, 1992a, b) 
Export intermediaries (EIs) U.S. 
Export intermediaries are agents whose resources and capabilities help lower 
export-related transaction costs for their manufacturing clients(i.e. 
principals)(Peng, 1998, p75). Generally including “EMCs, ETCs and other 
intermediary firms that are involved in facilitating U.S. exports.”(Peng, 1998, p18) 
(Peng, 1998; Peng et al., 2000; 
Peng, Ilinitch, & Hill, 1998; Peng & 




In contrast to GTCs, they have “specialized product lines, often requiring 










. They are normally large, 
trading products between home countries and colonies, with a government 
monopoly charter, such as the English and Dutch East India companies. 
(Carlos, 1992; Carlos & Nicholas, 
1988, 1996; Jones, 1998a, 2002a) 
European International 
Trade Intermediary (ITIs) 
ECs 
“A class of intermediaries(ie., agents or merchants) whose main business is to 
(re)sell domestic products to overseas markets(Balabanis, 1998)” 
(Balabanis, 1998) 
British Export UK Including export merchants and export agents. The former “take title to their (Balabanis, 2000, 2001, 2005) 
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Intermediaries goods, buying and selling at their own risk”, while the latter do not. Both of them 




The surviving large trading companies and numerous small trading companies in 
ECs. The former inherited from CTCs, but have continuously “re-invented” their 
business mode till recently, and developed into a handful of GTC-like European 
multinational trading companies with relatively less diversification. But the later 
ones vary from each other, and like American EIs 





The firms “that engage in trade intermediation between countries, and own assets 
in more than one country(Jones, 2002b, p1)” . Generally including all large trading 
companies in history, like CTCs in ECs and JGTCs 
(Casson, 1998; Jones, 1996, 







2.2.4 Summary of the overview of trading companies worldwide-first 
gap 
In general, trading companies show considerable variance in term of typology, 
characteristics and roles in extant literatures (the details is shown in Table 2-4 
overview of trading companies worldwide).  
 
First of all, most of the studies indicate that international trade, especially exporting 
businesses, represents the most significant characteristic and function of these 
companies (Balabanis, 2005; Balabanis & Baker, 1993a, b; Jones, 1998a, 2002a; 
Peng, 1998). As Balabanis & Baker stated “The trade of products manufactured by 
other firms” is always the main function of trading companies (Balabanis & Baker, 
1993b). Therefore the export trading companies (ETCs) and their exporting 
businesses became the target in this study. 
 
Then, the reviews lead to one gap in extant literatures: the lack of information about 
the trading companies from transition economies. Compared with relatively 
numerous literatures about trading companies from developed countries, research on 
trading companies from transition economies is rare. But these transition economies, 
such as China, have become the most important players in international trade. To 
take China as example, in 2011, China, with $1898 billion export total, marking up 
10.4% of global exporting trade, became the first largest exporter, while the growth 
rate is 20 % as well (WTO, 2012). And other main transition economies, such as 
Germany (former East Germany) and Russia, are also leading exportes in global 
trade. Considering their importance in global trade, therefore, one original study on 
trading companies from these countries and regions is demanded.  
 
In addition, two main reasons indicate that such study become more important as it is 
different from previous studies on trading companies. On one hand, the review of 
literatures has indicated that trading companies’ characteristics and methods for 
facilitating export show considerable differences according to countries, especially 
their background institutional factors (Balabanis & Baker, 1993a; Peng, 1998, p28). 
On the other hand, many studies have stated the reality that the business model and 
48 
 
institutional environment, in particular exporters’ characteristics and exporting 
channels, are different in these transition economies (Child, 2009; Child & Tse, 2001; 
Das, 1994; Peng, 2005; Tesfom, Lutz, & Ghauri, 2004), Thus these distinctions from 
transition economies, plus the heterogeneity of trading companies make one original 
study on trading companies from one transition economy more significant.  
 
Last, the history reflects that the trading companies, their trading business at least, 
always experience diminishing trends with the development of institutions. Such 
phenomenon implies that the previous institutions create the opportunity for 
prosperity of trading companies, which are swept away with institutional change. As 
Balabanis (1991) indicates, the GTCs can only vigorously develop in the 
environment with inadequate resources, including institutions. Balabanis & Baker 
(1993a) further explain that the “highly munificent environments (refers to the 
availability of environmental resources to support growth) encourage firms to use 
other modes to enter foreign markets”.  
 
The prosperity of Chartered Trading Companies (CTCs) is partially resulted from 
then unsupported institutional environment in colonies, which create high risk and 
the system of trading charters to counter such risk (Carlos & Nicholas, 1988, 1996). 
Then the improving institutions reduces the difficulties and risk to allow small 
companies to participate in international trade, and finally dismantles CTCs’ 
monopolies (Jones, 2002b). Those remaining CTCs, like Jardines and Swires, have to 
“reinvention” themselves in emerging markets, such as East and South East Asia 
(Jones, 1998, p16; 2002a), where institutional environment is  still weak. In addition, 
the developmental path of Japanese GTCs also supports such explanation. Generally 
speaking, GTCs initially develop from trading business, then through other trade-
related activities and finally to diversified business conglomerate (Amine, 1987; Kim, 
1986). Such developmental path implies that GTCs diversification strategy towards 
more advanced business is one solution facing with improved domestic institutions, 
which enables domestic manufacturers to finish export on their own. Finally, the 
history of trading companies in the U.S. also supports our statement. The relatively 
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less importance of trading companies for export in US proves that the relatively more 
efficient institutions discourage the development of trading companies. 
2.3 Theoretical literatures on trading companies  
The transaction costs economics (TCE) is the most dominant theory in the field of 
trading companies, apart from a few application of the resource-based view (RBV), 
in existing literatures. In this section, hence, the TCE is mainly reviewed. At the end, 
the critics of these theoretical analyses are set out.  
2.3.1 Transaction costs economics approach  
The TCE is the most important theory on the topic of TCs, as it has been applied and 
systematically discussed in the field of International Business (Hennart, 2010).  As 
Casson (1998) states, there is no neoclassical theory for trading companies before the 
emergence of transaction cost theory, as the transaction between workers and 
consumers or among the consumers can happen directly without costs.   
2.3.1.1 Transaction costs economics  
As the founder of transaction costs economics, Coase initially indicates the existence 
of transaction costs in his seminal work on the nature of the firm in 1937 (Dietrich, 
1994, p15). In it, Coase (1937) indicates the emergence of the firm arising from the 
costs of marketing transactions, and that firm’s make-or-buy decision (or the 
boundary of the firm) depends on the comparison between the costs of organizing the 
transaction within the firm and the costs of accomplishing the same transaction 
through an exchange on the market or the costs of running it in another firm. He 
further stated that 1) the transaction costs are the costs of using the price mechanism; 
2) the market organizes transactions by contracting, while the firm does so by 
authority; 3) the market and firm can substitute for each other (Coase, 1937, 1960). 
The origin of the firm comes from the substitution of markets and reduction of the 
transaction costs. Afterwards, Williamson (1979, 1985, 1988, 1996) further 
systematically build up TCE as a paradigm for analysing economic organizations by 
synergizing relative theories of economics, law and organizations. He concludes 
several important issues in TCE. First, bounded rationality and opportunism are two 
basic behavioural assumptions. The former, coming from Simon’s (1961, p.xxiv) 
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“intendedly rational, but only limitedly so”, indicates the inevitable and incomplete 
contract. The latter reflects the necessity of ex ante screening of agents and ex post 
governance. Second, following Commons (1932)’s approach, the transaction 
becomes the basic unit of analysis. The purpose of economic organization is 
economizing on transaction costs. Third, any transaction can be oriented to 
contracting. Frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity construct three dimensions 
(asset specificity is the most important) of the transaction or contracting, and jointly 
determine different contracts and correspondingly different governance structures. 
The last point is the comparative approach (economizing transaction costs) to 
different transactions and governance structures (firm, market and hybrid modes). 
The above construct constitutes the paradigm of the TCE. Among these 
characteristics, bounded rationality, opportunism, frequency, uncertainty and asset 
specificity mainly determine the level of transaction costs. Therefore, the next sector 
provides a detailed explanation and description of these five aspects.  
2.3.1.1.1 Bounded rationality  
 
As one of the important behavioural assumptions, bounded rationality is the 
cognitive assumption on which transaction cost economics relies (Williamson, 1985, 
p45). It refers to “behaviour that is intendedly rational but only limitedly so; it is a 
condition of limited cognitive competence to receive, store, retrieve, and process 
information. All complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete because of bounds 
on rationality” (Williamson, 1996, p377). The assumption of “economic man”, or 
perfect individual rationality, from classical economic theory, refers to “all decision 
makers possess consistent and stable preferences-whether they are consumers, 
entrepreneurs, or bureaucrats “. In other words, it is “possible to conceive of an ideal 
case in which individuals display purposeful, rational behaviour of a very high order” 
(Furubotn & Richter, 2005, p3-4). Nevertheless, bounded rationality, as “imperfect 
individual rationality” (Furubotn & Richter, 2005), is “a semi strong form of 
rationality in which economic actors are assumed to be intendedly rational, but only 
limitedly so" (Williamson, 1985, p45). In other words, transaction costs economists 
admit both the rationality that humans’ pursuing maximizing utility rooted in 
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classical economics, and particularly emphasize the limits on such rationality.  
(Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996).  
 
Bounded rationality mainly contains the limits of neurophysiological approach and 
language. The physical limits are often displayed in the form of “rate and storage 
limits on the powers of individuals to receive, store, retrieve, and process information 
without error”. Then language limits refer to “the inability of individuals to articulate 
their knowledge or feelings by the use of words, numbers, or graphics in ways which 
permit them to be understood by others” (Williamson, 1975).  
 
The major problem is that bounded rationality leads to incomplete contracting, and 
subsequently governance structure and resulting transaction costs. Bounded 
rationality makes it impossible to generate “comprehensive ex ante contracting”, and 
“all contracts within the feasible set are incomplete”. As a result, the ex post 
governance of contracts, such as gapfilling, dispute settlement and adaptation, will 
play more significant role in contracting. These ex post governances represent 
varying and sophisticated contracting structures, or governance structures in 
Williamson’s transaction costs economics, which incurs main transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1996).  
 
Particularly, environmental uncertainty introduced in later section enables bounded 
rationality to become more obvious and outstanding, and vice versa. Without the 
bounded rationality, uncertainty’s extent will not influence contracting methods and 
all contracting will end up with contingent contracting. Under a relative simple 
environment, conversely,  bounds on rationality become useless and so do the trade-
off of comparative governance structures between markets and hierarchies 
(Williamson, 1975, p22-23).   
  
2.3.1.1.2 Opportunism 
As second behavioural assumption, opportunism is “self-interest seeking with guile”, 
and it refers to, broadly speaking, “the incomplete or distorted disclosure of 
information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, 
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or otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 1985, p46-47). It is different from “simple self-
interest seeking, accordance to which individuals play a game with fixed rules that 
they reliably obey” (Williamson, 1996, p378). Opportunism behaviours may take 
place ex ante transaction, including adverse selection, and ex post transaction, such 
as moral hazard. Correspondingly, the ex ante screening of agents and ex post 
governance, all of which incur transaction costs, become inevitable. Williamson 
believes that the cooperative modes of economic organization in neoclassic 
economics, where “trust and good intentions are generously imputed to the 
membership is too ideal” (Williamson, 1985, p46-47).  
 
Opportunism is as important as bounded rationality. Incomplete contracts led by 
bounded rationality would be accepted and reliant if economic agents were wholly 
trust-worthy (Furubotn & Richter, 2005, p5). In the case without opportunism 
behaviours, ex ante planning become unnecessary, and transaction partners will 
jointly act towards profit-maximization if unanticipated events happen. A general 
clause for potential problems in contracts is to issue ex ante insistence: “I agree 
candidly to disclose all relevant information and  thereafter to propose and cooperate  
in  joint  profit-maximizing courses of action during the contract execution interval, 
the benefits of which gains will be divided without dispute according to the sharing 
ratio herein provided.” (Williamson, 1985, p48) 
 
Moreover, the opportunism assumption also relies on bounded rationality. If 
economic agents are able to design appropriate safeguards in advance, ex post 
opportunism will not affect  transactions, then ex post governance structures will not 
be as important as in practice (Williamson, 1985, p49).   
 
2.3.1.1.3 Specificity 
Among five main determinants on transaction costs discussed in this section, asset 
specificity is the most important and most distinctive for transaction costs economics 
(Williamson, 1996, p45). Asset specificity refers to “a specialized investment that 
cannot be redeployed to alternative uses or by alternative users except at a loss of 
productive value.”  Specific assets play an important role in transaction costs analysis. 
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It becomes inevitable for transactions as it is able to considerably reduce production 
costs or increase revenue. However, it also leads to “bilateral (or, sometimes, 
multilateral) dependency”, which require more complicated contact relations and 
resulting governance structures (Williamson, 1996, p26, p377).  
 
Asset specificity mainly contain six  types: (1) site specificity, which refers to the 
situation that successive stages/stations, such as buyers and sellers, are located in 
close proximity to each other, in order to minimize inventory and transportation costs; 
(2) physical asset specificity, which refers to “one or both parties to the transaction 
make investments in equipment and machinery that involve design characteristics 
specific to the transaction and which have lower values in alternative uses”. One 
example is the specialized dies that are required to produce a component; (3) human 
capital specificity, which is “a consequence of learning-by-doing, investment, 
transfer of skills specific to a particular relationship”; (4) brand name capital; (5) 
dedicated assets, which indicate the “general investments that would not take place 
but for the prospect of selling a significant amount of product to a particular 
customer. If the contract is terminated prematurely, it would leave the supplier with 
significant excess capacity”; and (6) temporal specificity, which “is akin to 
technological nonseparability and can be thought of as a type of site specificity in 
which timely responsiveness by on-site human assets is vital has been added.” 
(Furubotn & Richter, 2005, p142; Williamson, 1985, p95 ; 1996, p105) 
 
In general, these specific assets strengthen the reliance on trading partners. Such 
reliance is increasingly enhanced along with the degree of specificity and the value 
of specific assets, as opportunistic behaviours from trading partners will considerably 
threaten continuous partnership and vast previous investments on specific assets, 
which would be less used in other transactions. In other words, the specific assets 
increase firms’ costs on marketing transactions. As a result, the alternative solutions 
and governance structures, such as hierarchies and/or other hybrid forms, become 
more complicated and costly. Therefore, specific assets play an important role in 
transaction costs analyses, especially those on the case of firms’ vertical integration 




Transaction frequency is another important dimension of transactions. The greater 
the frequency is, the more widely spread the fixed costs of establishing a nonmarket 
governance  system is (Furubotn & Richter, 2005, p372). As stated in previous part, 
the governance structures involved in transactions with investment of specific assets 
require specialized design. Following the same logic of assumption of scale/scope 
economies, the higher frequency of transactions will reduce the costs of establishing 
such specialized governance structures. As a result, firms tend to internalize 
transactions with higher frequency. For instance, recurrent market transactions would 
be left in-house, as they will incur trading partners’ repeatable bargaining costs 
(Williamson, 1985).  
2.3.1.1.5 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is the third important dimensional element which considerably 
influences transactions and contracting. Tackling uncertainty is the core problems for 
economics organization, as the decrease of uncertainty can create mutual gains 
(Williamson, 1985, p57; 1996, p60). Williamson (1975, p23) indicates that 
uncertainty is a circumstance, “in which event it is very costly, perhaps impossible, 
to describe the complete decision tree.” Similarly, North (1990, p126) defines 
uncertainty as “a condition wherein one cannot ascertain the probability of an event 
and therefore cannot arrive at a way of insuring against such an occurrence.”   
 
In general, uncertainty comes from two aspects: individual behaviour and 
environment. Koopmans (1957, p147) classifies uncertainty as primary and 
secondary kinds, with perspective causes of state-contingency and lack of 
communication. Then Williamson absorbs and extends Koopmans’s secondary 
uncertainty into “behavioural uncertainty” by adding opportunism behaviours 
characterized by “strategic features”, such as strategic nondisclosure, disguise, or 
distortion of information. Such strategic features inevitably take place when parties 
are joined in a condition of bilateral dependency. (Williamson, 1975, p24; 1985, p56-
59; 1996, p60-61) In other words, the behavioural uncertainty generated by 
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opportunism will exist in transactions involved in different parties. In response, the 
ease on such uncertainty requires sophisticated governance structures with 
transaction costs.  
 
Compared with behavioural uncertainty, the uncertain environment also leads to 
increase of transaction costs and is in fact more important. Williamson (1985, p59) 
stated that the behavioural uncertainty will not  affect transactions, if exogenous 
disturbances are non-existent. The reason is that trading partners will not adapt the 
changes and attempt to alter contracts and the original terms will be insisted. It is the 
existence of uncertain environment that needs trading partners for adaptation after 
transactions, increases difficulties on contract enforcement. As a result, complicated 
and costly governance structures to ease such uncertainty turn out to be inevitable 
(Williamson, 1985, p59-60).  
 
In addition, the transactions including specific assets will be more vulnerable to 
uncertainty, as the investment in specific assets increases difficulties of freely 
changing trading partners (Williamson, 1985, p60).   
2.3.1.2 Theoretical explanations of trading companies from 
transaction costs economics 
 
The TCE is one of the most important theories in international business (Foss & 
Roemer, 2010; Hennart, 2010). Such a situation has been taking place in the studies 
of international trade and trading company. Casson (1998) states that international 
trade incurs numerous transactions and contracting issues among sellers, buyers and 
intermediaries, large risks and uncertainty, great information asymmetry due to 
different time zones, location and culture. All of them are related to the transaction 
costs, and certainly offer TCE the potential experimental field.  In terms of trading 
companies, transaction cost economics explains their rationale in a practical 
economic world with “friction”. Under the TCE, the existence of trading companies 
in international trade relies on whether it can lower the transaction costs and create 
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transaction efficiency in international trade. It answers two questions on trading 
companies in extent literatures: to identify the different kinds of transaction costs, 
which are reduced by trading companies during international trade, and to explain 
how they reduce these various transaction costs.  
 
However, such transaction costs-minimizing activities vary among extant literatures 
on trading companies, especially from three main destinations: EU, US and Japan. 
The next section will respectively review these different transaction costs-
minimizing activities according to these three regions.  
 
2.3.1.2.1 TCE on European CTCs 
 
Carlos and Nicholas (Carlos, 1992; Carlos & Nicholas, 1988, 1996) have analysed 
CTCs by using TCEs. They reveal two main transaction costs in international trade 
that are liable to being reduced by the CTCs. The first one was raised by risk and 
uncertainty related to the lack of knowledge, information and experience on foreign 
markets and the underdeveloped technology used in international trade. International 
trade contained a great deal political and economic risks and uncertainty from the 
environment, during the time preceding the 19
th
 century, both owing to distance 
(physical and culture) and inadequate information on foreign markets. (Carlos & 
Nicholas, 1988, 1996; Jones, 2003). This situation became more serious considering 
the then main trading destinations were all in the new world, like Asia and America. 
These kinds of international trade from/to these areas were called long-distance trade, 
which are the main domain of CTCs. Therefore, all of these raise great transaction 
costs on external markets of international trade for individual traders.  
 
The second one was agency costs generated by the opportunism of the manager and 
other employees (like overseas agents), by asymmetric information and uncertainty 
inside the trading companies. In the CTCs’ administrative organization, the 
headquarter offices were usually located in one European city, while numerous 
salaried managers conducted concrete work independently overseas. This 
organizational structure is compatible with their diversified business activities, 
57 
 
massive transactions and global trading network. However, the headquarters of CTCs, 
with asymmetric information, were confronted with the difficulty of monitoring at a 
distance any opportunism on the part of overseas managers. Then the principal-agent 
relationship between headquarters and its managers in the CTCs generated high 
agent costs (Carlos, 1992; Carlos & Nicholas, 1988).  
 
In turn, the CTCs effectively reduced these two main transaction costs in then 
international trade. First of all, these CTCs replace the external market with their 
internal managerial hierarchy, which incurs lower transaction costs. The volume of 
transactions processed through the CTCs was high due to their large size, vertically 
integrated business and global networks. When transactions are frequent and 
recurrent, “the teams of salaried managers can coordinate the flow of goods and 
information more cheaply than the market”, as the latter were highly imperfect and 
costly for the lack of information on market, and supply and demand, at that time. 
(Carlos & Nicholas, 1988, 1996). In this case, CTCs, which are considered as “a 
nexus of internal contracts  (between  owners and  managers and between managers 
and overseas agents)”, replace a series of “external  contracts (including spot market, 
long-term contracts, and vertical integration) for the purchase and sale of 
intermediate and final goods and services” in international trade in order to 
economize on transaction costs (Carlos & Nicholas, 1996).  
 
In addition, CTCs also devise a series of internal managerial mechanisms to manage 
to solve agency problems from managers overseas. For instance, some elaborately-
structured contracts, like incentive salary structures, compensation mechanisms and 
efficiency wages terms, used by CTCs with their managers effectively improve the 
moral hazard and adverse selection, which are two main agency problems inside 
CTCs (Carlos, 1992). Furthermore, some regulations, like oaths, were issued to avoid 
private trade by mangers; the internal auditing mechanisms, like checking the 
amount between the order list and actual delivery, inventory list, return orders, and 
internal surveys, were also effective methods for evaluating and monitoring 
managers’ performance.   
2.3.1.2.2 TCE on Japanese GTCs 
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To the best of my knowledge, Roeh initially applied TCE to the analysis of JGTCs 
trading companies. During his studies on JGTCs (Roehl, 1983, 1998; Roehl, Chee, & 
Cho, 1984), the transaction costs, which can be reduced by JGTCs, initially come 
from the trading industry, according to the product characteristics and diversified 
characteristics of JGTCs. Initially JGTCs usually choose the exported products, 
which incur lower transaction costs through their trading mechanism. He indicates 
that the products handled by JGTCs are usually standardized, in a large volume and 
recurrently transacted, such as JGTCs are able to achieve economies of scale through 
reducing the costs of each transaction of these products. In particular, the 
standardized products, with simple characteristics, require less idiosyncratic 
investment on trading structure design and quality control systems in order to avoid 
opportunistic behaviour, and therefore achieve scale of economies on transactions 
earlier compared with complex products. Similarly, the products with a large volume 
of or repetitive trading can also spread the cost of per transaction.  
 
JGTCs also reduce the uncertainty of recurrent transaction, or long term transaction, 
for manufacturers, as JGTCs behave less opportunistically under such transactions in 
the marketplace. In these transactions, JGTCs are likely to invest transaction-specific 
capital, as their aims are to pursue commission by completing transactions. Second, 
the overall costs of trading some products, like steel, will be decreased, when JGTCs 
participate in different stages of production, because they reduce the opportunistic 
behaviours, with regard to like quality, timing of delivery, etc., in each exchange 
among different tiers of the production cycle. In the same way, JGTCs’ trade-related 
functions, like warehousing, shipping, etc, are also explained. The large volume of 
transactions and market information make these functions less risky, while 
transaction orientation allows JGTCs to make substantial transaction-specific 
investment.  
 
In addition, he also believes that the information cost and mechanism to reduce 
information costs is another main problem for JGTCs. First, the information-
gathering is one main function of the JGTCs (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984; Young, 1974). 
These knids of information on foreign markets, international trade, domestic firms, 
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related industries, etc. are collected through their huge investment on information-
gathering structures, like global business networks. The characteristic of public good 
of this information, however, makes the difficulty and diseconomy of trading them in 
the external market. In turn, JGTCs effectively reduce these information costs by 
sharing, transferring and trading the information among their clients within same 
industrial group. The GTCs’ non-transaction functions, like financing, are well 
explained in this way. For instance, by long-term trading commitment, JGTCs obtain 
important information on certain manufacturers, which are lax but necessary for 
banks to offer credit. But JGTCs are able to offer these manufacturers financial 
support, while they relatively earlier obtain banks’ credit due to their large size and 
close connection with banks.  In this way, they achieve their function of “quasi-
bankers” (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984).  
2.3.1.2.3 TCE on American IEs  
Peng et al (Peng, 1998; Peng & Ilinitch, 1998; Peng & York, 2001; Peng, Zhou, & 
York, 2006; Trabold, 2002) established a TEC-based model with assistance from 
agency theory and RBV, to explain modern American EI’s performance.  First of all, 
EIs’ performance relies on their efforts to help manufacturers to minimize export-
related transaction costs, given that manufacturers can choose direct or indirect 
export entry mode. Second, the agency theory describes the principal-agent 
relationship between manufacturers and EIs, and the resulting agency costs for 
principals (manufacturers) to employ agents (EIs). Only if the agency costs are less 
than transaction costs, EIs can be the effective export channel choice for 
manufacturers. Finally, the involvement of RBV further highlights “export 
intermediaries' performance depends on their possession of valuable, unique, and 
hard-to-imitate resources which help minimize their clients' transaction and agency 
costs” (Peng & York, 2001). Therefore, this model concluded that EIs’ performance 
stems from their abilities to lower client firms’ searching, negotiation and 
monitoring/enforcement costs. These three abilities are operationalized into four 
testable hypotheses: h1, h2, h3, h4. (Shown in table 2-5) 
Table 2-5  The perspective of Peng et al integrated model is shown below. 
Definit Export intermediaries are agents whose resources and capabilities help lower 
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Manufacturers tend to use direct, integrated channels when export-related 




Manufacturers tend to use export intermediaries when export-related transaction 




Export intermediaries have the incentive to improve their organizational resources 




The greater their ability to lower export-related transaction costs for manufacturers, 




The more credible the threats imposed by manufacturers and/or the stronger the 





The stronger the valuable, unique, and hard-to-imitate resources and capabilities 




The more knowledgeable it is about foreign markets and export processes, the 




The greater its ability to undertake export-related negotiations, the more likely the 




The better its ability to take title to the goods, the more likely the export 




The more willing it is to specialize in commodity products, the more likely the export 
intermediary will be successful. 
                                  Source: adopted from (Peng, 1998, p75) 
   
Therefore, it was found that three main transaction costs, which can be reduced by 
modern American EIs, are searching, negotiation and monitoring/enforcement costs 
respectively according export process. First, the lack of information, experience and 
knowledge of foreign markets and export practice generate difficulty and high costs 
of finding potential buyers for tradable products. Second, international negotiations 
have the reputation of being time-consuming and costly, and therefore require 
specialized personnel. When they happen between unfamiliar partners from different 
countries, the potential hazard and risks, and mutual adaptation jointly create higher 
costs in export negotiations. Third, the relationship between American manufacturers 
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and EIs is described as the principal-agent relationship. Under this, the EIs will 
perform opportunistically, conflicting with the manufacturers’ interests. In the end, 
the resulting agent costs, or manufacturers’ monitoring costs of EIs’ performance 
will rise during exporting agency process.  
 
In turn, the American EIs show a series of capabilities to reduce these transaction 
costs. The EI’s knowledge and information on foreign markets, experience of export, 
and special connections with certain countries enable them efficiently find tpotential 
foreign buyers and reduce searching costs in export. Moreover, the specialized 
personnel in EIs with negotiation experience and specialized skills, like fluency in 
foreign languages and understanding of foreign cultures, together with their networks 
overseas, jointly ease the difficulties in international negotiation. Then when the EIs 
are able to take title of tradable products, or choose the ones, like commodity 
products and low-tech products, which require less transaction-specific investment 
from manufacturers to monitor agents’ activities, the relative transaction costs are 
also lower.  
2.3.1.3 Summary of TCE analysis on trading companies-second and 
third gaps 
 
The TCE will explain the significance of trading companies in international business. 
Due to uncertainty, complications and information absence, the resulting various 
transaction costs create difficulty and reduce the efficiency of international trade and 
business. The trading companies, as the intermediaries for linking different players 
involved in these businesses, effectively reduce these transaction costs, and facilitate 
international trade.     
 
The extent TCE analyses on trading companies mainly answer two questions: 1, what 
kinds of transaction costs during international trade can be economized by trading 




From the three TCE analyses, it is found that the kinds of transaction costs and the 
means by which trading companies can reduce these transaction costs are different 
from each other. It confirms our previous discussion on trading companies’ different 
characteristics and mechanisms for facilitating export found in the empirical 
literatures. Given the economic explanation of the role of trading companies in 
economizing transaction costs, the distinct characteristics and functions of trading 
companies are used to reduce the different transaction costs. This situation alerts this 
study to the potential discrepancy between the sorts of transaction costs, and 
mechanisms by which Chinese trading companies can reduce them.  
 
However, these three TCE analyses are confronted with different limitations. Carlos 
and Nicholas’ TCE analysis on CTCs has the difficulty of explaining modern trading 
companies with the disappearance of TCTs, advances in technology and 
improvement of information in international trade. For instance, the popularity of the 
internet largely reduces the information absence and asymmetry, and resulting 
uncertainty; the utility of modern financial tools decrease the risk related to 
international trade. Therefore, those resulting risks and uncertainty would not be the 
main sources of transaction costs for modern international trade. In addition, the 
TCTs and their internal organization structures have been replaced by those modern 
trading companies and more efficient administrative hierarchies with less agent 
trouble inside the trading companies respectively. For instance, neither American EIs 
nor Japanese GTCs use similar corporate structures with headquarter office and 
numerous salaried managers overseas.  
 
Roeh’s TCE analysis focuses on JGTCs, and there is a lack of generalization to other 
trading companies. This difficulty mainly results from the considerable difference 
between JGTCs and other trading companies. For instance, Peng et al (Peng, 1998; 
Peng & York, 2001) empirically tested American EIs’ performance and trading 
products, and found a lower correlation between performance and commodity 




Peng’s model on American EIs mainly concentrates on the simple exporting agent 
service, and fails to include many other export-related services, like trading credit, 
and non-trade functions, like manufacturing, which are usually undertaken by trading 
companies as well. This is because this model focuses on the agent’s role in trading 
companies, rather than main reseller role.    
 
More importantly, three kinds of TCE analysis only focus on manufacturers and 
trading companies, and fail to pay enough attention to other players, especially 
foreign buyers or importers, involved in international trade, which is also the second 
gap from extant literatures. The foreign buyers or importers are usually considered as 
an equally important stakeholder in the practice of export and import (Perdue & 
Summers, 1991; Quintens et al., 2005). Some studies, mainly from the marketing 
perspective, have mentioned these buyers’ significance to trading companies’ service 
offerings (Balabanis, 2000).  In fact, the use of intermediaries or trading companies 
is a common method for international purchasers, particularly where buyers are small, 
engaging in simple or lower-purchasing-risk products or unfamiliar markets. One 
study of American purchasers (Ciancarelli, 1999) reports at least 13% of them use 
the trading companies during international purchases (Quintens et al., 2005). Thus it 
is hard to make the decision to employ trading companies without a purchasers’ stake.  
 
This ignorance could come from the traditional assumption of “agent relationship” 
between manufacturers and trading companies. For instance, in the Peng et al model, 
the manufacturers and serving trading companies are defined as principals and agent 
respectively under the agency theory. However, the manufacturer can be the agent as 
well, while the intermediary is a principal in practice (Balabanis, 1998). In this 
situation, the manufacturers can behave opportunistically as well as EIs acting in 
previously assumed situations (Chintakananda, York, O'Neill, & Peng, 2009). In 
some literatures on RBV analysis, some capabilities of trading companies, such as 
the capabilities for searching for and monitoring qualified suppliers (Feenstra & 
Hanson, 2004), also indicates the  opposite principal-agent relation. Therefore the 




Last but not least, the studies in the international business and strategy indicates the 
analyses are generally from three basic perspective, namely firm perspective, 
industrial perspective and institutional perspective (Peng, 2006; Peng & Khoury, 
2008; Peng et al., 2009; Peng et al., 2008). The existing TCE analyses on trading 
companies are mainly from first two perspectives, and miss the analysis from an 
institutional perspective, which is the third gap in this study. Specifically, the 
scholars focus on the transaction costs from firm perspective, like CTCs’ agent costs, 
JGTCs’ information costs, American EIs’ searching, negotiation and monitoring 
costs, and from industrial perspective, like the costs related international markets, 
tradable products, relationship between manufacturers and trading companies. The 
recent literatures have already highlighted institution-related transaction costs. For 
instance, Orr & Scott (2008) found huge institution-related transaction costs in 
international projects. They believe that these “institutional transaction costs” differ 
from the traditional understanding of transaction costs, and are ignored but very 
important for international business. Furthermore, many studies have emphasized 
that the studies on transition economies need more attention from an institutional 
perspective, as the business is considerably influenced by local institutions (Meyer & 
Peng, 2005; Peng et al., 2008).Thus this study on trading companies from developing 
countries obviously needs additional concerns from the institutional perspective.  
2.4 Gaps and research questions in this study  
 
Following the literature review, three research gaps are identified:  
1. While most studies are about the trading companies from developed countries, 
less attention is paid to the transition economies, like China, which has 
become one of the most important players in international trade.  
2. The extant literatures using TCE analysis, which is considered the most 
significant theory on trading companies, fail to pay enough attention to other 
players involved in international trade, especially foreign buyers or importers.  
3. These literatures using TCE analysis ignore concerns from an institutional 
perspective, which have been proved the most important determinant for the 




Finally, according to these three gaps in the extant literatures on trading companies, 
the research questions in this study are： 
1) What are the institutions, which generate transaction costs for doemstc 
manufacturers and foreign buyers, in China’s export market?  
2) How do Chinese exporting trading companies respond to such institution-
related costs as an intermediate between domestic manufacturers and foreign 
buyers? 
2.5 Chapter summary  
 
This Chapter reviews the main literatures in the field of trading companies. It 
initially introduces the different trading companies worldwide, including typology, 
their roles in international business, and their history, characterisitcs and approaches 
to facilitate export in three main countries and regions. Then one detailed review is 
undertaken on theoretical literatures on trading companies, which contains 
introduction of theory, empirical explanation on trading companies and critiques on 
extant studies. Among of them, the TCE, as core theory on trading companies, is 
mainly discussed, while RBV, as supplementary theory, is berifly analysied. In the 
end, three gaps are identified from extant literatures. Corespondingly, two research 




Chapter 3  An integrative analytical framework of trading 
company 
 
This chapter aims to develop corresponding analytical frameworks for the purpose of 
exploring such questions, in order to response to the gaps and research questions 
developed in Chapter 2. Therefore, this chapter is organized around the institutional 
perspective and integration of an institutional perspective and transaction costs 
economics analysis. In section 3.1, the institutions and institutional theories are 
introduced as the foundation of an institutional perspective on business study. Then, 
the characteristics of institutions in transition economies are stated in 3.2 to highlight 
the distinct institutions related to the location of this study, China.  Afterwards, the 
section 3.3 reviews and discusses one workable institutional perspective, which is 
suitable for the business study on transition economies. Finally, one new integrative 
framework, which will guide this study, is developed in section 3.4, by combining 
transaction costs economics analysis and the institutional perspective. In the end, the 
section 3.5 summarizes this chapter. 
3.1 Institutions  
3.1.1 Why use institutional perspective in this study?  
The institutional perspective, has been dominant in recent literatures in international 
business(Peng et al., 2008), as the lens through which IB’s traditional characteristics 
for studying transactions across different nations, and certainly in distinct institutions 
(Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008). The studies on transition economies require more 
attention from the institutional perspective, because existing theories in IB emerged 
from western countries with sound marketing institutions (Peng, 2001, 2006). 
Moreover, China, as one of the most representatives among transition economies 
(Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000), needs special consideration from an 
institutional perspective (Child, 2009; Peng, 2005).  
3.1.2 What are institutions?  
 
North (1990, p3-4) indicates “institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. 
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These institutions contain formal rules, such as political, judicial and economic rules, 
and informal ones, like cultures, customs, traditions, and codes of conducts, which 
“come from socially transmitted information”. (North, 1990, p37) Likewise, from the 
sociological perspective, Scott (Scott, 2008, p48) defines as “institutions are 
comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together 
with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life”.  
 
The extant research on institutions mainly refers to three mainstream fields: 
economics, political science and sociology. There are many different viewpoints in 
each field (Scott, 2008). Scott’s study on institutions, the book, Institutions and 
Organizations offer some review the their viewpoints on institutions and relavent 
theory (Scott, 2008). This study brifly concludes these viewpoints according Scott’s 
work (shown in the table 3-2). From this review, it is found that these institutionalists 
focus on different perspectives of institutions, particularly when they come from 
three distinct main academic fields. As Yiu & Makino claim, the institutional 
theories in economics and sociology seem to present divergence: the former is based 
on efficiency criteria, while the sociological perspective focuses on the “legitimacy” 
criteria (Yiu & Makino, 2002). Certainly there are some overlapping parts, especially 
with regard to the new institutionalism parts. For instance, the rational choice theory 
in new institutionalism in political science is close to the new institutionalism in 
economics (Scott, 2008, p33). In addition, Peng (Peng, 2006) states that there are few 
difference between North’s formal and informal classification on institutions, and 
Scott’s regulative, normative and cognitive pillars (shown in Table 3-1). In short, the 
researches on institutions in general remain undecided about which school to favour, 
given the differences between them.  
Table 3-1 The classification on institutions. 
Dimensions of Institutions 
Degree of Formality (North, 
1990) 
Examples Supportive Pillars (Scott, 
1995) 
Formal institutions Law Regulative (coercive) 
 Regulations  
 Rules  
Informal institutions Norms Normative 
 Cultures Cognitive 




Source: (Peng, 2006; Peng et al., 2009)
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Table 3-2  General summary of different scholars and their standpoints on institutions and relavent theories. 
 Main standpoints in academics Scholars studies 
Early institutional 
theory  in 
Economics  
Individual’s behaviour is limited by habits and conventions, 
rather than by hypothesis of the rational man in neoclassical 
economics 
Thorstein Veblen The Theory of the Leisure Class, 1899 
The transaction, as the mechanism and rule of conduct, limits 
individual and firms’ behaviours. Therefore, the reset of 
transaction as the analytical unit introduces the institutions to 
economic analysis 




The transaction costs exist and are important in economics.  
 
Institutions, trading mechanisms and market mechanisms, 
influence the economic transactions. 
 
The institutions are changing and have the characteristics of 
path dependence.  
Ronald Coase 
The nature of the firm, 1937; The 
problem of social cost, 1960; etc 
Oliver Williamson 
Markets and hierarchies: analysis and 
antitrust implications, 1975; The 
Economic Institutions of Capitalism: 
Firms Markets, Relational Contracting, 
1985; The mechanisms of governance, 
1996; etc 
Douglass North 
Institutions, institutional change and 
economic performance, 1990; 
Institutional change and American 
economic growth, 1971; etc  
Early institutional 
theory  in political 
science  
These studies focus on the detailed explanation (mainly 
configurative description) of specific formal legal systems, 
rules and procedures, without the standpoints of 
characteristics of changing institutions.  
 
These studies are mainly nontheoretical.  
John William 
Burgess 
Reconstruction and the Constitution 
1866-1876, 1902 
Woodrow Wilson 
The State and Federal Goverments of 
the United States: A Brief Manual for 
School and Colleges, 1889 
Westel Woodbury 
Willoughby 
An examination of the nature of the 
state: A study in political 
philosophy..1896; The American 
constitutional system: an introduction to 




These studies belong to historical institutionalism. 
 
They believe that institutions conclude "both formal structures 
and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct" 




March and Olsen (1984, 1989), Krasner 
(1988), Hall (1986), Skocpol (1985) 
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(Thelen and Steinmo 1992:2).  
 
In these studies, political systems are not the result of rational 
choice, but of the unexpected and bounded choice.  
In addition, history is underdetermined and context-
dependent    
Skocpol (1985) 
These studies belong to rational choice theory, where 
institutions are governance or rule systems: “Institutions 
represent rationally constructed edifices established by 






theory  in 
sociology 
“Spencer (1876, 1896, 1910) viewed society as an organic 
system evolving through time. Adaptation of the system to its 
context was achieved via the functions of specialized 
“organs” structured as institutional subsystems.” 
Herbert Spencer 
Spencer (1876, 1896, 1910) 
 
For Sumner (1906: 53), “an institution consists of a concept 
(idea, notion, doctrine, interest) and a structure.” The 
“concept” defines the purposes or functions of the institution, 
whereas the “structure” embodies the idea of the institution 
and furnishes the instrumentalities through which the idea is 
put into action. Societal evolution progresses from individual 
activities to folkways, to mores, to full-fledged institutions. 
Such institutions are “crescive”—evolving slowly through 
instinctive efforts over long periods of time—although 
institutions can also be “enacted”—the products of rational 




Institutions are “a set of interwoven folkways, mores and laws 
built around one or more functions.” And the conception of 
institutions as functionally specialized arenas.  
Kingsley Davis Human Society, 1949 
The relation between individuals and institutions is 
interdependent. For instance, the institutions are constructed 
through interaction among individuals  
Thomas Cooley,  Social organization, 1902/1956 
Everett Hughes 
The ecological aspects of institutions, 
1936 
Institutions, like capitalism, contain the activities and social 
structures, including the beliefs, norms, power relations and 
so on 
Karl Marx  
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
of 1844, 1844/1972; The German 
Ideology, 1845/1972; etc 
Institutions, as symbolic systems, “although a product of 
human interaction, are experienced by individuals as 
Emile Durkheim 





Institutions, as cultural rules, including customs, rules and 
legal system, “define social structures and govern social 
behavior, including economic structures and behavior.”  
Max Weber 
the theory of social and economic 




“The systems approach tends to regard behaviour as a 
reflection of the characteristics of a social system containing 
a series of impersonal processes which are external to the 
actors and constrain them. In emphasising that action derives 
from the meanings that men attach to their own and each 
other´s acts, the action frame of reference argues that man is 
constrained by the way in which he socially constructs his 
reality.” (Silverman 1983: 141) 
David Silverman The Theory of Organisations, 1983 
Pierre, initially indicates the concept of social field, which 
means social arenas governed by distinctive values and 
approaches. 
Pierre Bourdieu Pierre Bourdieu,  
In these studies, institutions are “complexes of culture rules”, 
which support organisations. 
John Meyer and 
Brain Rowan 
John Meyer and Brain Rowan, 1977 
These two studies indicate three main mechanisms (coercive, 
mimetic, and normative) of institutions’ influence on 
organizational fields. As a result, organizations show 
isomorphism, which is one main contribution.   
 
They also initially identify the organization “field” or sector as 
an analytical level.  
 
In addition, the introduction of “imprinting” effects of 
institutions is also the contribution in thesetwo studies 
DiMaggio and 
Powell, Meyer and 
Scott  
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983 
Meyer and Scott, 1983 
 





3.1.3 Institutional theories in this study?  
This study mainly uses two arguments from the extant researches on institutions. 
First of all, the institutions influence transactions and the level of transaction costs. 
North claims that “institutions provide the structure for exchange that (together with 
the technology employed) determines the cost of transacting and the cost of 
transformation.” (North, 1990, p34) Coase (1998) also states that “the costs of 
exchange depend on the institutions of a country: its legal system, its political system, 
its social system, its educational system, its culture, and so on”. Apparently, 
institutions impinge on the transaction costs in two ways: to raise and reduce them. 
On one hand, most institutions researched are capable of reducing uncertainty and 
transaction costs (North, 1990, p6). On the other hand, others, like “rules that restrict 
entry, require useless inspections, raise information costs, or make property rights 
less secure”, actually increase transaction costs (North, 1990, p61). Finally “because 
that market is imperfect, institutions everywhere are a mixed bag composed of those 
that lower costs and those that raise them.” (North, 1990, p61). Therefore, this study 
believes that local institutions will influence the level of transaction costs in China’s 
export markets.  
 
More specifically, such influence will be shown as institutional effects on main 
characteristics of transaction costs in this study, say bounded rationality, 
opportunism, frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity. Many studies have proved 
that certain institutions enhance or reduce these characteristics. For instance, 
Williamson (1996, p268) highlights that social culture, one informal institutions, is 
introduced in economic organizations for mitigation of opportunism. North (1990, 
p58-59) is also explicit on that the ineffective judicial systems in developing 
countries, including obscure legal framework and uncertain behaviours of agents, 
such as lawyers and arbitrators, increase uncertainty. As this study mainly study 
institutions in transition economies, more detailed discussion on the influence of 
specific institutions on these characteristics of transaction costs in these countries 
will be presented in later part of this chapter. Section 2.3.1.1 Transaction costs 
economics discussed that these five characteristics determine the level of transaction 
73 
 
costs. Therefore, this study argues that certain local institutions, by impacting these 
characteristics, will influence the level of transaction costs in China’s export markets.  
 
Second, such influences on transaction costs are variable for different organizations 
in the same institutional environment. As North indicates, “institutional constraints 
include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what 
conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities.” (North, 
1990, p4). In other words, the institutions constrain certain trading partners, and 
facilitate other transactions at the same time. Such an argument also appears in the 
institutional theory from sociology. Scott (2008, p52) indicates that some regulations 
(or formal institutions) also “enable social actors and action, conferring licenses, 
special powers, and benefits to some types of actors”. Therefore, the institutions, 
including the institutional changes, exert varying effects on organizations in term of 
their forms and position in the institutional environment. This argument has also 
received support from the literatures in international business. Peng (Peng, 2003), 
and Meyer & Nguyen (2005) claim that the institutional effects on different firms, 
such as local firms, foreign firms, SMEs and MNEs, are different.  
 
Although these two arguments apply to all institutional environments, it is still 
necessary to review the specific characteristics of the institutional environment of 
transition economies, in order to specify the institutional framework to guide this 
study. Initially, the researching destination is China, which is illustrated as the 
representative of transition economies (Child & Tse, 2001). The extant literatures 
indicate that these transition economies show distinct and unknown institutional 
environments and characteristics, compared with those well-reported western 
developed countries (Child & Tse, 2001; Peng, 2005). Therefore, one review of the 
literatures on transition economies helps to understand how and what kind of distinct 
institutions influence economic transactions. More importantly, the research on 
institutions, particularly in the field of international business, shows considerably 
diversification. One review helps to develop a specific institutional framework, 
which guides later data collection and analysis. In addition, this study choose North’s 
formal and informal classification on institutions (North, 1990), as such classification 
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is widely aceepted and used in extant institution-related studies in international 
business and strategic management (Peng & Heath, 1996).  
3.2 The characteristics of institutions in transition economies 
3.2.1 What are transition economies?  
In the past century, almost all socialist economies demonstrate a great deal of 
problems and are difficult to maintain, while other capitalist countries show more 
productive economies (Ingram & Silverman, 2002). With the increasing seriousness 
of problems in these economies, the transition from the former to latter is inevitable. 
The transition economies are defined within some countries and region, especially 
some emerging markets, where formal and informal institutions are comprehensively 
and fundamentally changing, particularly from central planning to market-based 
economic reform (Peng, 2003, p275). The transitional process at least affects the 
lives of 1.65 billion people (Roland, 2004, p17).  
 
From 1922, when the Soviet Union, the first socialist country, was established, there 
emerged more than 12 more socialist countries, such as China, Yugoslavia, etc. (See 
the below Table 3-3 ), representing one third of the population of the whole world. In 
these countries the so-called state socialism of “social-political-economic system” is 
run by the ruling Communist Party, while the communist ideology prevails. Two 
typical characteristics of these countries are central planning and bureaucratic control. 
Central planning, like the popular five-year plan in Soviet Union, replaces the market 
in terms of resource allocation, while the bureaucrats and bureaucratic system, like 
the national planning office, become the most dominant planner in these countries. 
Correspondingly, the social-economic system is highly planned, rather than market-
based, while the firms are characterised by administrative agents, rather than 
economic agents.  
 
After a brief economic booming period at the beginning, these countries were 
confronted with considerable problems, like lack of incentive mechanisms and 
coordination. Plus there were some political events, such that these counties had to 
reform previous institutions to survive during huge social and economic crises. 
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During these institutional transitions, “shock therapy” and “gradualist approach” are 
respectively adapted by one group of countries represented by the Soviet Union and 
CEE, and another group of countries represented by China and Vietnam. The former 
means a series of fierce and fast reforms, like the openness of price, liberalized 
market, private ownership shift, etc, most of which happen overnight. The latter 
means the reforms firstly happen in one area experimentally and then gradually 
extend to the rest. Although there are debates and difference of speed and outcome of 
different reforms, the processes are similar: namely, institutional transition from 
central planning to a marketing system (Peng, 2000, p13-39).       
Table 3-3  Socialist Countries and Their Reforms and Transitions. 
 
Source :(Peng, 2000, p15) 
3.2.2 The characteristics of institutions in transition economies 
Thus institutional transition becomes the main social, economic and political 
phenomenon in these countries and regions. In brief, as stated above, the transitional 
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process includes the collapse of previous (formal and informal) institutions under the 
central planning system and the emergence of new (formal and informal) institutions 
corresponding to the marketing system (Meyer, 2001b; Peng, 2003). But the process 
of replacement is gradual (Gelbuda, Meyer, & Delios, 2008), and incremental (North, 
1990, p6; Peng, 2003), due to path dependency and bounded rationality. As Peng 
(2003) argued, institutional transition, especially with regard to the informal, is 
generally incremental, though with some discontinuous transformations sometimes. 
And also the collapse of previous institutions is not necessary in order to accompany 
the emergence of new institutions in the meanwhile. The result turns out to be a 
special period of mixed institutions with some of the previous central planning 
system and of the incomplete emerging marketing system (Nee, 1992).  
 
Correspondingly, a number of problems related to institutional transition also take 
place in these transition economies (one overview of formal and informal 
institutional factors in transition economies is shown in Table 3-4). For instance 
institutional constraints (Child & Yuan, 1996), institutional voids (Miller et al., 2009), 
uncertainty with institutional change (Child & Tse, 2001), misalignment between 
institutional supply and firm demand (Witt & Lewin, 2007), and so on. These jointly 
construct a distinctive institutional environment in these transition economies, which 
is different from previous planning systems, or far from that in developed economies 
with stable and matured institutions, and incur additional transaction costs for local 
and international firms’ business activities. It therefore requires one workable 
institutional framework, which is suitable for the process of institutional transition in 
these countries, and also integrates and structures of these extant institutional 
problems, to guide later data collection and the of process analysis.  
  
3.2.3 How institutions affect transaction costs in transition economies?  
As discussed previously in section 3.1.3, the institutions considerably influence on 
transaction costs by impacting bounded rationality, opportunism, frequency, 
uncertainty and asset specificity. This part further discusses how specific institutions, 
especially those problematic ones, influence these characteristics of transaction costs 
in transition economies. The existing literatures have proved that some dysfunctional 
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institutions obstruct business activities, and increase costs for transactions in 
transition economies (Estrin, Meyer, & Bytchkova, 2008; Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 
1999; Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005; Meyer, 2001a; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Peng, 
2003; Peng & Heath, 1996). Following them, this study mainly discusses four 
specific institutions from formal and informal categories, which are commonly 
reported in studies on transition economies and become the most possible institutions 
involved in this study.  
 
3.1.3.1 Formal institutions  
Formal institutions, representing regulative or coercive pillar, refer to political, 
judicial and economic rules, and contracts (North, 1990). They are normally 
provided by state, some “regulations are enforced by judges, courts, police 
bureaucracy and the like” (Keefer & Shirley, 2000b). However, it is reported that 
formal institutions, like government policy and legal system, in transition economies 
turn out to be problematic and  increase transaction costs for business (Hitt, Ahlstrom, 
Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004).  
 
Unstable government policies    
First, formal institutions continuously change in transition economies, which create 
an extremely uncertain environment (North, 1990; Peng & Heath, 1996) and 
opportunistic behaviours (Peng, Lee, & Wang, 2005). Transition economies are 
characterised as institutional transition from central planning towards market-based 
(Peng, 2003), implying local institutions, especially the formal institutions (Bevan, 
Estrin, & Meyer, 2004) like government policies (Estrin et al., 2008), are unstable 
and changing during both incremental and discontinuous institutional transition (Hitt 
et al., 2004; Peng, 2003). As Peng and Heath (1996) described, “every rule is rapidly 
changing and the only constant is uncertainty.”  
 
Such unstable government policies obstruct business in transition economies. Estrin 
et al (2008) find that unstable government policies, such as the uncertain 
administrative procedures, create series of problems for local entrepreneurs. 
Similarly, Hitt et al (2004) also discover that the changing government policies make 
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local firms tend to short-term relationship, rather than more healthy long-term 
relationship, with business partners in Russia.  
 
Transaction costs analysis believes that such unstable institutions in these transition 
economies will lead to uncertainty and opportunistic behaviours for business 
activities and transactions, and therefore increase transaction costs. After study of 
Entrepreneurship in Russia, Puffer & McCarthy (2001) indicate that the situation that 
Russian government unpredictably passed policies and produced chaotic formal 
institutions significantly increase uncertainty and resulting transaction costs for 
related business. Meyer et al (2005) also express similar statement. They find that the 
changing regulation and rules, as one significant problem for foreign investors in 
transition economies, increase uncertainty and transaction costs. In addition, the 
uncertain environment in transition economies increases the level of information 
asymmetry, and further results in growing possibility of opportunistic behaviours in 
the transactions between unknown parties (Peng, Lee, & Wang, 2005).  As a result, 
the unstable government policies in transition economies raise transaction costs by 
increasing uncertainty and opportunistic behaviours for business there.  
 
Bureaucratic administrative procedures for business  
Second, formal institutions, like administrative procedure for business, in transition 
economies have the reputation of being bureaucratic, which increase uncertainty for 
business activities. The bureaucratic institutions are characterised as being inefficient 
and less transparent (Estrin et al., 2008). Meyer (2001a) identifies that the 
bureaucratic procedures in Eastern Europe, such as the approval for real estate 
acquisition, could generate significant costs in term of time, as these procedures are 
complex and slow. Estrin et al (2008) also reveals a similar finding in the study of 
the institutional environment in transitional economies. They find that some 
administrative barriers obstruct businesses in these economies, such as the lengthy 
timescales and massive procedures for starting up businesses. They further take 
Hungarian for example,  it can take  up to 52 days  to start up a businessSuch 
complex and ambiguous administrative procedures result in uncertain policy 
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outcome, then increase uncertainty and transaction costs for business (Estrin et al., 
2008; Khanna & Palepu, 1997).    
Weak legal system 
Legal system, as one main formal institution, is one of the most concerning issues for 
institutional economists (Coase, 1998; North, 1990), because it directly influence the 
transaction enforcement and related costs (Furubotn & Richter, 2005). Obviously, the 
well-developed legal system effectively limits opportunistic behaviours and reduces 
the enforcement costs of transaction (Peng & Heath, 1996). Nevertheless, the  
ineffective  legal  system,  including  formal  law  and  legal  enforcement  (Meyer, 
2001b),  is  the  most  commonly  reported  obstacle  for  doing  business  in  
transitional economies  (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Khanna et al., 2005; Meyer, 2001a).  
 
The transaction costs analyses explain that weaker legal systems magnify 
opportunism and therefore increase transaction costs, particular the 
enforcement/monitoring costs, in transition economies (Coase, 2008; Peng & Heath, 
1996; Walker, Tilly, & Nelson, 1998). For instance, by investigating IJVs’ contracts 
in  China,  Luo  (2002)  reveals  that  the  commercial  contracts,  as  part  of  the  
inefficient legal system in China, fails to efficiently enforce contracts in China. As a 
result, opportunistic behaviours prevail during transaction enforcement in these 
countries (Choi et al., 1999; Luo,  2007).   
 
From the existing studies on transition economies, the most criticized legal 
framework in transitional economies may refer to protection of property rights 
(Estrin et al., 2008; Peng & Heath, 1996), commercial law and contract enforcement 
(Choi, Lee, & Kim, 1999; Estrin et al., 2008; Khanna et al., 2005; Luo, 2002; Meyer, 
2001b), official   requirements   for   listed  companies  (Peng,  2004)  and  so  on.  
Among them, it is noteworthy to mention the intellectual property, including patents, 
trademarks, copyrights and trade secrets (Hisrich, 2012), as it is considered as one 
main element to determine exporting activities (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995). 
Moreover, this study also finds that the consideration of protection of intellectual 
property becomes determinant for some exporting decision (in case B and D). Plenty 
studies have jointly proved that the legal system fails to define and effectively protect 
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property rights in transition economies (Boisot & Child, 1988; Meyer, 2001b; Peng 
& Heath, 1996; Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010). As intangible assets, intellectual 
property becomes more vulnerable to opportunistic behaviours influenced by weaker 
legal systems (Beata, 2004; Meyer, 2001a; Oxley, 1999).  
 
3.1.3.2 Informal institutions 
Informal institutions usually refer to cultures, customs, traditions, and codes of 
conducts, which “come from socially transmitted information”(North, 1990, p37). 
They are usually enforced by business and social groups, family or private entity and 
can substitute and supplement formal ones (Keefer & Shirley, 2000b, p96). Because 
of bounded rationality, neither formal institutions nor individual contracts are perfect, 
the informal institutions, which usually generate ahead of formal ones, will assist 
here (Furubotn & Richter, 2005, p19) Therefore, informal institutions could be more 
important for business and transaction costs in transition economies, where formal 
ones are dysfunctional.  
 
However, some informal institutions also bring relatively higher uncertainty and 
additional transaction costs for the firms and transactions, which are unfamiliar with 
or unable to use these informal institutions. For instance, it is widely reported that 
many informal institutions in transition economies, like China’s Guanxi and Russia 
blat, are quite unique and hard-to-master for foreign and even domestic firms, as 
their complexity root in local social and cultural factors and have been gradually 
developed for long history (Hitt et al., 2004). Inevitably these informal institutions 
also deeply influence and change business activities related. It is found that some 
informal institutions actually considerably support, mainly by reducing uncertainty, 
business activities in transition economies (Peng, 2003; Peng & Heath, 1996; Xin & 
Pearce, 1996). For instance, Peng and Heath (1996) suggest that the use of network 
contacts and personal relation are able to help reduce environment uncertainty and 
favour firms’ growth in transition economies. Meyer also comes to a similar finding 
in their study on transition economies (Meyer, 2001b).  Meanwhile, other firms, 
usually outside the networks, which are unfamiliar with and/or unable to use these 
network-based strategies, have to confront with relatively higher uncertainty during 
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their transactions in these transition economies. As a result, these informal 
institutions incur uncertainty and additional transaction costs for the firms outside 
networks.  
3.3 The part of institutional perspective in integrative analytical 
framework  
To develop the institutional part of analytical framework, this study uses one  
“institutional frameworks in planned economies in transition” from the study of Peng 
and Heath (1996) (Shown in Figure 3-1). First, it is highly synthesized to 
comprehend formal, informal institutional constraints and resulting resource 
constraints for the firms involved. By doing this, it could conclude all emergent 
constraining items for this explorative research. Moreover, it has been proved by 
Peng and Heath (1996) to support the institutional environment in China, particularly 






Figure 3-1  Institutional frameworks in planned economies in 
transition. 
                                      Source: (Peng & Heath, 1996).  
This framework comprises three main institutional constraints which jointly reflect 
the characteristics of institutions during the institutional transition in transition 
economies.  
3.3.1 Former formal institutional constraints  
The first groups of institutional forces refer to the former formal institutional 
constraints, such as central planning and bureaucratic control (Peng & Heath, 1996), 
which were inherited from the previous planned economy system (Estrin et al., 2008), 
but still exist in many ways in the transition economies. They reflect the first process 
of institutional transition in transition economies: the collapse of previous institutions 
The interaction of institutions and organizations in formerly planned economies 
Planned Economies Transition to Market Economies 
Former Formal Institutional Forces 
-Central planning 
-Bureaucratic control 
Current Formal Institutional Forces 
-Lack of property rights-based legal 
system 
-Lack of strategic factor markets 
-Unstable political structures 
Typical State-owned Enterprise  
-Excess physical resources 
-Limited financial resources 
-Limited managerial resources 
Informal Institutional Forces 
-Residual socialist values 
-Collectivism 
-Networks and personal exchanges 
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under the central planning system. They exited before transition, and are 
characterized by central planning system.  
 
In North’s institutional change theory, institutions are commonly characterized as 
path dependent, which means the institutional changes are incremental rather than 
discontinuous (North, 1990). Thus when the institutional transition is considered as 
one special institutional change from central planning to market-based institutions, 
the path dependence characteristic of institutional change results in the previous 
institutional conditions (central planning system) in transition economies not being 
completely withdrawn and largely influences the entire institutional transition (Hitt et 
al., 2004). For instance, though most marketing-style businesses are nominally 
permitted, the bureaucracy is still popular after transition, like the slow and 
complicated approval and administrative procedures for some projects and licences 
(Estrin et al., 2008; Meyer, 2001a).   
 
In addition, the “gradualism” of reform also leads to such formal institutional 
constraints. The most typical gradualist reform takes place in China. “Cross a river 
by feeling for the stones” is the vivid description of China’s reform by Deng 
Xiaoping, the Chinese reformer and politician. It means the reform firstly takes place 
in some specific aspects, like regions, industries, firms etc., and then is gradually 
extended to others, in order to avoid massive uncertainty and costs of rapid and 
significant transition (like “shock therapy” reform in Russia) (Buck, Filatotchev, 
Nolan, & Wright, 2001; Peng, 2000). As a result, some institutions will gradually 
fade out or be changed into more invisible ones. Buck et al (2001) take China’s 
government regulations to JVs as a example, and illustrate that though the regulation 
of foreign involvement has been gradually dismantled since 1970s, and the majority 
foreign ownership of JVs permitted since 1988 in China, state approval procedures 
were then introduced by central government to “hold back” the foreign levels of 
commitment. They further argue that these unreformed institutions, like the 
limitations on foreign commitment, will potentially affect MNEs’ strategy and long-
term performance, like weak corporate governance, and result in higher risk. Another 
study on MNEs’ FDI strategy towards Vietnam also confirmed that the institutional 
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barriers, like implementation of regulations, local government’s attitude to FDI, etc., 
had been slowly reformed in the long term, and particularly with different steps for  
each region in a single country due to local interests (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005).     
3.3.2 Current formal institutional constraints during transition 
The second sort of institutional forces are current formal institutional constraints, 
which show the lack of market-supporting institutions in transition economies, such 
as the lack of a property rights-based legal system (Peng & Heath, 1996). They 
reflect the second process of institutional transition in transition economies: the 
emergence of new institutions supporting the market-based system. 
 
Roland (2004, p19) states “successful institutions of capitalism are already present in 
advanced economies, and we tend to take them for granted when reasoning about 
economies in transition or about developing economies where such institutions are 
absent.” These “situations, where institutional arrangements that support markets are 
absent, weak, or fail to accomplish the role expected of them” are called 
“institutional voids” (Mair & Marti, 2009), which have become the main problems 
for business and obstruct economic transactions in transition economies (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997, 1999; Khanna et al., 2005), compared with the developed countries, 
where the mature institutions are able to facilitate business activities. For instance, 
Khanna & Palepu (1997) stated three typical institutional voids, namely lack of 
adequate and reliable information, market(ing)-efficiency regulations, and inefficient 
judicial systems, that lead to considerable market failures, among capital markets, 
labour markets, product markets, government regulation, and contract enforcement in 
emerging markets.  
 
On one hand, the new institutions are usually faced wit resistance from previous 
institutions (Oliver, 1992). It is argued, for instance, that as the main agent for 
constructing new institutions, the (bureaucratic) governments (Scott, 2008, p95) in 
transitional countries fail to make great efforts to construct market-supporting 
institutions, like efficient judicial systems and enforcement frameworks (Puffer et al., 
2010).    
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On the other hand, it is hard and slow to establish a series of new market-supporting 
institution in these former central-planning-dominated countries. The market-
supporting institutions contain a series of complex, inter-related, inter-acting, formal 
and informal institutions, which are not able to be constructed in the short term due 
to bounded rationality of institutional designers (Scott, 2008). And the characteristic 
of path-dependence makes new institutions, especially informal institutions, more 
difficult to emerge without the marketing tradition (Meyer, 2001b; North, 1990). For 
instance, some basic market-based institutions, like privation, price liberalization, 
commercial law, enterprise restructuring, etc., have been gradually established in 
some former planning economies. Due to the inconsistency and uncertainty of these 
new institutions, however, the transaction costs of business are not reduced to a level 
similar to developed countries (Meyer, 2001a). Thus there will be a relatively long 
time without complete market-supporting formal institutions in these transition 
economies.  
3.3.3 Informal constraints before and during the transition 
 
Informal institutions, like cultures, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct, “come 
from socially transmitted information”, and are important as well as formal 
institutions, though they “defy, for the most part, neat specification and it is 
extremely difficult to develop unambiguous tests of their significance.” (North, 1990, 
p36-37). “They are they are  (I) extensions, elaborations, and modifications of formal 
rules;  (2) socially sanctioned norms of behaviour; and  (3) internally enforced 
standards of conduct.” (North, 1990, p40). Because of informal institutions, whole 
institutions normally change incrementally(North, 1990, p6).  
 
Due to the path dependence, the informal institutions are apparently more difficult to 
change compared with formal institutions. As North (1990, p6) said, “although 
formal rules may change overnight as the result of political or judicial decisions, 
informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much 
more impervious to deliberate policies.” In addition, the informal institutions can 
both substitute for and supplement formal institutions. In some cases, the informal 
institutions are more entrenched than the formal ones (Keefer & Shirley, 2000a, p46-
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47; North, 1990). In the study of Peng & Heath (1996), they indicate that the 
popularity of some informal institutions in transition economics is indeed the result 
(substitution and supplement of formal institutions) when former formal institutions 
are dismissed and emerging formal institutions are still inefficient. They later 
illustrate three informal constraints as instances of this: residual socialist values, 
collectivism and networks and personal exchanges. In the extant literatures, many 
studies have also noted such informal institutions, most of which generates 
incontinence for marketing transactions. For instance, Meyer (2001a) states that 
workers and managers’ working routines, habits and attitudes, which had been 
developed in previous central-planning regime, such as shirking, will persist during 
transition.    
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Table 3-4  The formal and informal institutional factors in transition economies. 
Formal Institutions  Informal Institutions  
Countries and 
regions 
Literatures & Authors 
 
Continuous effects by previous planning regime and 
bureaucratic control 




The Growth of the Firm in Planned Economies 
in Transition: Institutions, Organizations, and 
Strategic Choice (Peng & Heath, 1996) 
Lack of property rights and relative legal system   Collectivism  
Lack of strategic factor markets  Networks and personal exchanges  
Lack of stable political structures   
 
The institutional transition in  
unpredictable ways  
The popularity of relational networks  
China & Russia 
The institutional effects on strategic alliance 
partner selection in transition economies: China 
vs. Russia (Hitt et al., 2004) Underdeveloped capital market  
Manager seeks short-term investment 
rather long-term. Strategic alliance  
 
The gradually developing financial institutions  





What determines the scope of the firm over 
time-a focus ons institutional relatedness (Peng 
et al., 2005) 
The formal market-supporting institutions e.g. 
government-imposed entry barriers, are gradually 
workable, but uneven in different sectors in short-
term  
Political capital, like political 
connections, increase public 
reputation, social legitimacy & political 
effectiveness 
 
Reputation capital reduces information 
asymmety 
 
Restrictive legislation, regulative entry barrier for 
foreign entrants   





Institutions, transaction costs, and entry mode 
choice in Eastern Europe (Meyer, 2001a)  
Inefficient bureaucratic procedures, administrative 
approval  
 
Inefficient business “negotiation with government 




insufficient protection of intellectual property rights  
 
Lack of strong legal requirements  (regulative) to 
appoint more outside directors in boards of listed 
companies  
Lack of strong cognitive pressures on 
the top managers of newly listed joint-
stock companies to have more outside 
directors 
China 
Outside directors and firm performance during 
institutional transitions (Peng, 2004)  
 
Lack of regulatory systems  





Strategies that fit emerging markets (Khanna et 
al., 2005)  
 
Lack of specialized intermediaries, like 
marketing, logistic & job agents   
 




Learning about the institutional environment 
(Henisz & Delios, 2002) 
 
Lack of institutional mechanisms for adequate and 





Why focused strategies may be wrong for 
emerging markets (Khanna & Palepu, 1997)  
 
Is group affiliation profitable in emerging 
markets? An analysis of diversified Indian 
business groups (Khanna & Palepu, 2000) 
(General emerging markets) 
Lack of marking-efficiency regulations    
Lack of efficient judicial systems   
Lack of effective institutional mechanisms  (judicial systems & resulting confidence) to enforce 
contracts  
 
The powerful effects on business from central and 
local government  
Incumbent firms are lacking in 
financing capability  
China & Russia   
The institutional effects on strategic alliance 
partner selection in transition economies: China 
vs. Russia (Hitt et al., 2004)  
Institutional instability 
Incumbent firms own strong capability 
in relational networking, guanxi in 
China and blat in Russia  
Unsophisticated, insular banking systems and 
undeveloped capital market 
Incumbent firms lack the knowledge 
and capabilities to develop or employ 
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sophisticated manufacturing or product 
technologies 
 
Incumbent firms are lacking in 
managerial capabilities   
 
Incumbent firms are lacking in 
intangible assets, like reputation, 
brands 
 
Incumbent firms lack international 
collaborative experience 
 
Flexible rather restrictive environmental regulation 
for official authorities 
 China 
The Dynamic Between Firms' Environmental 
Strategies and Institutional Constraints in 
Emerging Economies: Evidence from China and 
Taiwan(Child & Tsai, 2005)  
 
Financial barriers, such as less individual and family 
saving, and financial assets due to lack of private 
property rights in previous planned economy, and 





Entrepreneurship in transition economies (Estrin 
et al., 2008)  
Unstable policies   
Administrative barriers, such as slow registering 
property procedures, complicated business start-up 
procedures and uncertain outcomes  
 
High costs, especially for SMEs, generated by 
inefficient and unfair taxation systems, such as 
“frequent changes to tax policy” and “ambiguity of 
taxes”  
 
Financial voids, such as underdeveloped financial 
markets and inexperienced banks, which are not 
capable of financing emerging private SMEs  
 
Lack of an updated and appropriate legal system  
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and enforcement for a market economy  
Weak formal and informal contract enforcement, such as the uncertain  capability of the courts 
to enforce contracts, and suppliers unable to deliver  
 
Lack of security of private property rights Trust within networks  
China & Russia 
Entrepreneurship in Russia and China: The 
impact of formal institutional voids (Puffer et al., 
2010)  




Lack of effective legal framework and enforcement 
for commercial contracts 
The obligation of contracts relying on 
personal relationships  
China 
Partnering with Foreign Firms: How Do Chinese 
Managers View the Governance and Importance 
of Contracts (Luo, 2002)  
 Lack of contract spirit and obligation  
The common use of consultation and renegotiation, while less use of law suits and arbitrage  
 





Institutional transitions and strategic choices 
(Peng, 2003)  
A bureaucratic regime friendly to certain projects and 
industries, such as the  military and space programs 
 
The lack of rule-based, impersonal   exchange   
The lack of effective third-party enforcement  
 
Islamic pre-emption laws (shuf'a) (to stop the 
concept of property rights) 
The lack of concept of property rights  
Bangladesh 
Entrepreneurship in and around institutional 
voids: A case study from Bangladesh (Mair & 
Marti, 2009)  
The lack of the access to credit ( kinship norms of behaviour (to stop the 
concept of property rights)   
 Norms of purdah and the patriarchal 
system (to stop the development of 
marketing enforcement mechanisms)   
 The Patron/client norms  
 Moral obligation to help the needy  
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 Microfinance groups' rules and norms 
 




Business group affiliation and firm performance 
in a transition economy: A focus on ownership 
voids (Ma, Yao, & Xi, 2006)  
 
Governmental interventions  such as business 
licenses, real estate policy, access to public utilities  
Unfavourable Government attitude to 
FDI (I) 
Vietnam 
Foreign Investment Strategies and Sub-national 
Institutions in Emerging Markets: Evidence from 
Vietnam (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005)  
Local government’s interpretation of laws and 
regulations in their interests  
Government’s protection of incumbent 
firms’ interests  
Lack of tax incentives Corruption  
 The popularity of networks  
 
Lack of effective legal system (legal enforcement of 
contracts, enforcement of property rights) 





International Business Research on Transition 
Economies (Meyer, 2001b)  
Lack of capital market The popularity of opportunistic 
behaviour, rent shifting, bribery, and 
corruption 
Lack of systems providing information, accounting 
and auditing 
Existing vested interests 
The inexperienced bureaucracy The tradition of few incentives for 
quality and customer service 
 Weak linkages between firms within 
the supply chain 
 The common use of informal networks 




3.4 An integrative analytical framework based on transaction costs 
economics analysis and institutional perspective 
3.4.1 The part of transaction costs economics analysis on trading 
companies in integrative analytical framework 
3.4.1.1 New transaction costs economics analysis on trading 
companies 
Williamson (1979, 1985, 1988, 1996) indicates that markets, firms and hybrid modes, 
as different government structures for organizing transactions, incur different degrees 
of costs, “the superior efferent one can form”. Williamson’s studies prefer the firm or 
hierarchy, to the markets with relatively higher transaction costs. It maybe helps to 
explain the existence of firm, integration decision’s logic and some inappropriate 
parts in former American antitrust laws. Nevertheless, the TCE doesn’t raise the 
conclusion that the “firm” must institute the market. As Coase said “the firm is not 
the only possible answer to the problem” and the “administrative costs of organising 
a transaction through a firm are inevitably less than the costs of the market 
transactions which are superseded”. Also the administrative costs may be high, 
“particularly so when many diverse activities are brought within the control of a 
single organisation” (Coase, 1960). Thus the market, as an alternative choice for 
economizing on transaction costs apart from “hierarchy”, should also acquire more 
attention. Moreover, the different markets with varying government structures also 
incur different costs.       
 
With the development of the TCE, the theory of the firm has been refreshed. The 
firm is not a black box any more. The firm is a substitute for the market mechanism 
(Coase, 1937). The firm is an more efficient arrangement for internal contracts, 
replacing external market contracts(Cheung, 1983). The firm is the “team production” 
of members with effective monitoring(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Spulber et al 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 2008; Casson, 1982; Spulber, 1996, 1999, 2003) argues that 
the firm is also considered as the market-maker.  
 
In Spulber’s “intermediation theory”, firms are believed to be the intermediary 
between the sellers and buyers, suppliers and buyers, and employees and buyers or  
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between consumers and providers of inputs, like finance, delivery etc (Anderson & 
Gatignon, 2008)). “They are formed when the gains from intermediated exchange 
exceed the gains from direct exchange” (Spulber, 1999, pix), Spulber further 
indicates “through pricing and market-making activities, the most efficient market 
microstructure produces the greatest gains from trade net of transaction costs” 
(Spulber, 1999, p256). In other words, firms can profit in two ways in increasing 
gains from trade and reducing transaction costs(Spulber, 1999, p259). And here the 
former one can also ensure that the firm achieves the same gains as others but with 
the lowest costs by these “pricing and market-making activities”. More specifically, 
he argues that these market-makers are able to reduce the transaction costs, by taking 
advantage of the “economies of scale and scope”, “coordination economies” and the 
identity of third party. These arguments are echoed by other scholars. Ménard et al 
(2000) stated that a firm’s activities,…, create new markets,…, principally by 
reducing transaction costs(incurred when using the price mechanism). In addition, 
Foss and Foss (2005) also mention “While transaction costs are a major source of 
value dissipation, reducing such dissipation may create value.” In the end, the firm, 
as the intermediary, can achieve gains from reducing transaction costs.  
 
The market is “a group of buyers and sellers of a particular good or service.” 
(Mankiw, 2008, p66). In the markets of international trade, in particular, there are 
normally three players: sellers (manufacturers), buyers and trading companies 
(brokers and resellers) (Casson, 1998; Peng, 1998), which consist of two basic 
markets (shown as Figure 3-2). One contains manufacturers and buyers, called the 
“direct market”. Another one, the “indirect market”, includes the intermediary 
companies, namely trading companies, apart from manufacturers and buyers. From 
the perspective of manufacturers, or buyers, either the direct or indirect market incurs 
transaction costs; they will choose whichever has the lowest transaction costs. From 
a trading company’ point view, they have to reduce the transaction costs of the 
indirect market operated by them, in order to survive and acquire the value 






Figure 3-2 The direct and indirect markets with different 
transaction costs in export  
                                        Source: adapted from Spulber (2003) 
 
3.4.2 The analytical framework by integrating institutional perspective 
(section 3.3) into transaction costs economics analysis on trading 
companies (section 3.4.1) 
 
According to the previous arguments of the institutional effects on transaction costs, 
stated in 3.2 and 3.3, it is reasonable to believe that local institutions in transition 
economies will exert effects on direct export transactions between domestic 
manufacturers and foreign buyers, and those operated by ETCs on indirect markets. 
As a result, the ETCs can reduce the institution-related costs on China’s export 
markets, while domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers fail to do so. 
Correspondingly, the previous TCE analysis on ETCs and direct and indirect export 
markets will be revised by such two arguments from the institutional perspective 

















Indirect market with transaction costs 1 
Direct market with transaction costs 2 




Figure 3-3 The direct and indirect markets with different institution-
related transaction costs in export  
                                            Adapted from Spulber (2003) 
 
The sort of “double-edged sword” (increase and reduce) influence of institutions on 
transaction costs becomes more obvious in transition economies, where the absence 
of market-supporting institutions or some inherent market-preventing institutions 
largely raise transaction costs, and people have to pursue other institutions, like 
informal institutions and personal transactions, to pursue lower transaction costs 
(Meyer & Peng, 2005; North, 1990, p67). There are three main institutional 
constraints within the previous institutional framework applied to these just-
transiting economies that jointly increase the transaction costs for both inexperienced 
local economic agents’ and foreign players (Meyer, 2001a).  
 
First of all, these former formal institutional constraints increase both foreign and 
incumbent firms’ costs for doing business in transition economies. Buck et al (2001) 
found that though the trend is getting better, some existing regulations on JVs in 
these economies still limit foreign firms’ entry and mode into the market, and choice 
of local business partner, which obviously increase the MNEs’ costs for negotiation 
and ex post governance (Meyer, 2001a). In the meantime, these institutional 
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Moreover, an efficient marketing economy needs  supporting institutions (Roland, 
2004), but the institutional transition has not finish, and leads to current formal 
institutional constraints, which also incur additional costs for business transactions in 
transition economies  with efficient markets (Khanna & Palepu, 1999; Mair & Marti, 
2009; Meyer, 2001b). For instance, Khanna et al (2000) compare developed 
countries and emerging markets, and indicate that the absence of specialized 
intermediary institutions, such as specialized financial markets, is one major 
institutional voids in emerging markets, which certainly increase transaction costs for 
both foreign and local firms (Ricart, Enright, Ghemawat, Hart, & Khanna, 2004), 
like the response of which local large firms have to diversify into other functions 
with additional costs and resources (Khanna et al., 2005).   
 
Likewise, Witt et al (2007) define the misalignment as home countries’ institutional 
environment fails to support incumbent firms’ needs; this will incur additional costs, 
like opportunity costs, and further result in competitive disadvantages compared with 
other counterparts from countries without this institutional misalignment. 
Furthermore, the lack of transparency  will increase foreign firms’ searching costs for 
a qualified local partner, while the lack of intellectual property protection and 
contract spirit  increase enforcement costs of contracts (Gelbuda et al., 2008).    
 
Thirdly, informal institutional constraints also bring additional transaction costs for 
foreign and incumbent firms. For instance, the popular use of informal networks is 
one of the well-known informal institutional constraints in transition economies, like 
China’s guanxi and Russia blat (Hitt et al., 2004). But the use of these informal 
networks is also costly for both sides, especially for those new entrant firms and 
people, “because transaction parties need to build strong social networks through a 
time- and resource-consuming process” (Peng, 2003). In addition, in one study of 
Chinese-Western supply chain partnerships, Jia & Lamming (2013)indicate the 
foreign managers admit they manage to adapt to Chinese partners’ guanxi-style 
culture during the collaborative work. And this adaptation certainly costs much for 
both parties. Peng (2003) also states that these established networks and personal 
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relationships also lift barriers for new entrants, as the firms in the networks will be 
locked into the networks and fail to search and transact with newcomers. Thus they 
also increase these new entrants’ costs of entering networks.   
 
Therefore, this study argues that these three institutional constraints in transition 
economies also raise the transaction costs on China’s export market. Actually some 
recent surveys about foreign purchasers have already indicated some key problems 
highly related to these three institutional constraints for importing from transition 
economies. For instance, According to the China Purchasing Development Report of 
2010 (LFRC, 2010), the “unreliable supplier” and “on-time delivery” are listed as1st 
and 3rd (the 2nd is increasing operational costs) challenges by foreign purchasers for 
their sourcing in China. Moreover, another research study about international 
purchasing offices (IPOs) in China indicates the one main function of these IPOs is 
for controlling quality (Nassimbeni & Sartor, 2006). These “quality” problems 
certainly increase costs of enforcement of contracting, and monitoring costs for 
importers. Certainly some institutional barriers and voids, like weak formal legal 
systems, and lack of informal contract enforcement, the increase possibility of these 
problems (Luo, 2002).   
 
As a result, the previous transactional framework is integrated into this institutional 
framework (shown in the Figure 3-4). In this new integrative framework, the 
previous TCE analysis on ETCs and direct and indirect export markets are affected 
by three institutional constraints from the institutional framework, and then generate 
different institution-related costs. On the other side, the Chinese ETCs effectively 
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3.4.3 The framework for this study  
Based on previous discussion on institutional theory (section 3.3 and 3.4) and transaction 
costs economics (section 2.3.1 and 3.4.1), empirical findings from pilot study (chapter 6) as 
well as  historical review on trading companies (chapter 2 and 4), an integrative and feasible 
theoretical framework (shown as figure 3-5) is generated in this section in order to 
practicably guide future data collection and analysis.  In turn, the chapter 8 cross- case 
analysis finally echo this theoretical framework by illustrating and analysis the findings cross 
multiple cases.   
 
As illustrated in figure 3-5, the integrative framework contains three parts: three groups of 
institutional constraints from pilot study and six cases, five elements of transaction costs, and 
ETCs’ methods on economizing transaction costs from six cases. In general, institutional 
constraints influence five elements and increase transaction costs for export transaction in 
China, which can be then reduced by various methods employed by ETCs in turn.  
 
First of all, the previous literatures help to identify three groups of ordinary institutional 
constraints in institutional transition, which may inhibit export transaction in China 
(discussed in section 3.3 and pilot study chapter 6), including former formal institutional 
constraints, current formal institutional constraints and informal institutional constraints. The 
findings from pilot study (chapter 6) have proved these three groups and further clarify them 
as inefficient bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals, weak legal system and 
informal contract obligation in each group, which require further confirmation from cases. 
 
Then the integrative approach of institutional theories and transaction costs economics 
(discussed in section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2) takes place: three groups of institutional constraints will 
increase the level of costs of export transaction, by influencing any elements of transaction 
costs: bounded rationality, opportunism, frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity 
(discussed in section 2.3.1).  
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The last stage of this framework refers to ETCs’ responses to such institutional constraints in 
institutional transition, say institutional constraints create opportunities for ETCs and ETCs 
will strategically develop business to make up these institutional constraints (discussed in the 
conclusions of section 2.2 and chapter 4). The logic is that ETCs have their methods and 
advantages on economizing these institution-related transaction costs by influencing any 
elements of transaction costs: bounded rationality, opportunism, frequency, uncertainty and 
asset specificity (discussed in section 2.3.1). 
 
Regarding the methodology, this framework identifies the direction of data collection. On the 
one hand, data collection will follow the direction of three groups of institutional constraints 
to explore institutional constraints in each case, including confirmation of known ones found 
in pilot study and previous cases, which can influence  any elements of transaction costs. By 
doing this, it answers the first research question in this study: what are the institutions, which 
generate transaction costs for domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers, in China’s export 
market? On the other hand, this framework guides to collect data from the perspective of 
ETCs’ methods and advantages on economizing these institution-related transaction costs. In 
other words, ETCs’ responses to institutional constraint will be investigated one by one in 
each case. Thus the answer for second research question is collected in this way.  
 
Last, this framework is analytical framework for data analyses as well. It firstly confirms the 
sequence of data analysis: it will follow the sequence of institutional constraints. Moreover, it 
also confirms the logic of analysis: the analyses and explanation will surround five elements 
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Figure 3-5 Integrative analytical framework for data collection and analysis 
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3.5 Chapter summary  
 
In order to construct one analytical framework for this study, this chapter initially 
discusses relevant arguments in the literatures on institutions in general academic. 
Then after more specific discussion of the literatures related to institutional 
perspective in transaction costs, one general institutional framework specifically for 
transition economies, developed and used by previous literature, is adopted. In the 
meanwhile, one new TCE analysis on ETCs is developed to fix one gap in extant 
TCE analysis of missing the perspective of foreign buyers. In the end, one integrative 
analytical framework for this study is developed based on the initial institutional 






















Chapter 4  The history of Chinese trading companies since 
1949 
 
Compared with the relative handful studies on exporting intermediaries from the US 
and EU, and general trading companies from Japan and Korea, trading companies or 
exporting trading companies from China are still shrouded in mystery. There are two 
reasons: the first one concerns under-developed research about China. Although the 
recent emphasis in academic circles is being shifted to emerging markets, transition 
economies and China, especially as they continue their brilliant economic 
performance when other developed economies are in a persistent downturn, studies 
on China are still unstructured and lack of sound theories(Peng, 2005). The second 
reason is the lack of data on the sector of trading companies in question, due to their 
characteristic as service firms that render them difficult to separate from 
manufacturers in the whole exporter dataset (Peng & Ilinitch, 1998). For instance, 
there is no separate statistic on trading companies or ETCs in any of China’s official 
annual statistical reports (made by custom, the national bureau of statistics or other 
department).  
 
In this section, in line with the different periods of transition in China’s trading 
system, the history of Chinese trading companies is divided into three periods: 1949-
1978; 1979-1993; 1994-now. In addition, two main institutions in China’s exporting 
market and ETCs, namely the import/export authority and reselling system, are also 
discussed.  
4.1 First period (1949-1977): the period of 12 state-owned trading 
companies 
This is the initial period of international trade in the new China. From the 
institutional perspective, China’s trading system was completely based on central 
planning in this period. Under such a system, around 12 state-owned trading 
companies monopolized the import/export trade in China (Young, Hood, & Lu, 
1998). As the only bridges linking China and outside world, they organized domestic 
supply for export according to international orders, and international purchase for 
domestic demand. In turn, domestic manufacturers were only able to receive 
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international orders through these trading companies, produced products according 
their requirements, and had no chance to direct exports; essentially they functioned 
as factory “agents” for these trading companies.  
 
Meantime during the establishment of the new China in 1949, there had been 4600 
private trading companies, which then employed a total of 350,000 staff and made up 
50% of domestic exports (Fu, 2008, p4). Under the socialist transformation from 
1949 that entailed “utilizing, restricting and transforming the capitalist sector of the 
economy” (e.g. gradually reducing and stopping the approval of foreign exchange to 
private trading companies, and shifting im/export activity to newly established state-
owned trading companies (Fu, 2008, p13)), these private trading companies were 
gradually nationalized and disappeared in 1950-1956. At the same time, the new 
central government of China established 12 state-owned trading companies
1
 
according to different product categories (shown in the table 4-1), which were under 
the control of the newly established Ministry of Trade
2
(MOFCOM now) in 1949 
(MOFCOM, 2012). Each of these trading companies took charge of one specific 
category of products with an exclusively authorised license for this category of 
products. Therefore, each of their official names contained a corresponding products 
category. Such allocation of tradable products even had an influence on present state-
owned trading companies, according to the “company name at present” in table 4-1.  
Table 4-1  12 state-owned trading companies established in 1950s. 
Company name 
when established  
Company name at present 
Year of 
established 




Company.   
China Minerals Company 
and China Metals Import 
Company merged into China 
Metals & Minerals Import & 
1950 minerals 
China Metals 




                                                 
      1  14 specialized large state-owned trading companies in (Fu,2008) and (Liu,2007) , 12 in (Young, 
Hood, & Lu, 1998)  
2
 Ministry of Trade (1949.11-1952.8), Ministry of Foreign Trade (1952.8-1982.3, splitting to 
Ministry of Commerce), Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (1982.3-1993.3, 
combining Ministry of Foreign Economic liaison, State Import and Export Regulation Commission, 
State Foreign Investment Regulation Commission), Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-
operation (1993.3-2003.3), Ministry of Commerce (2003.3-now) (MOFCOM. 2012. The restructuring 
of MOFCOM, Vol. 2012.) 
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Export Corporation in 
1961.1, and renamed China 




Company   
SINOCHEM Corporation 1950.3.10 Rubber, fertilizers, etc 
China Cereals 
Export Company, 
China Oils Export 
Company and 
China Foods 
Export Company   
China National Cereals, Oils 





such as cereals, oils and 
food. 
China Silk Export 
Company  
Chinatex Corporation 1951.10 Silk 
China Sundries 
Export Company   
None 1952.9 





Company   
China National Light 
Industrial Products Import 
and Export Corporation 
(ChinaLight)  , a fully-owned 
subsidiary of China Genertec 
Technology (Group) Holding   
1952.9 Light industrial products 
China Technical 
Import and 
Export Company   
China National Technical 
IMP. & EXP. CORP (CATIC) 
1952.9 
156 types of specific 
technical and related 
complete equipments in 





Export Company  
China National Instruments 
Import & Export (Group) 
Corporation (INSTRIMPEX), 
a fully-owned subsidiary of 
China Genertec Technology 
(Group) Holding 
1955 





Export Company   
China National Machinery 
Import & Export Corporation 
(CMC) 
1950 
Mechanical and Electrical 
Products 
China Tea Export 
Company   
China National Native 
Products & Animal By-
Products  Import & Export 
Corporation at 1970.1 
(CHINA TUHSU), a fully-










1951.3 Animal By-Products 
 
Till 1978, these state-owned trading companies had in total 12 headquarters and 130 
subsidiaries spread over the major cities in China (Fu, 2008, p18). Only the 
headquarters and several special subsidiaries, which were typically in certain trading 
ports, had the monopoly of import/export authorities, which were only and strictly 
approved through Ministry of Trade, whereas the majority of the other subsidiaries 
could only take responsibility for purchasing domestic products for export (Fu, 2008). 
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In other words, fewer than 20 trading companies directly participated in international 
trade during that period in China.  
At this time, these 12 state-owned trading companies mainly followed the 
instructions from central government. They were “executives of the national plan” 
and acted as a government department for administrative purposes rather than as a 
profit-seeking economic organization (Liu, 2007, p32). Under this highly planned 
economy, the operation and business of these trading companies relied on the central 
plan for purchasing, allocating, exporting, importing, the balance of foreign 
exchange, etc. Firstly, the import and export plan is mainly constructed by the State 
Planning Commission (SPC)
3
, and then issued to trading companies as the annual 
plan.  
 
In addition, trading companies’ finance was planned and managed by the Ministry of 
Finance. The individual trading company only calculated and balanced profit and 
loss, and reported to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which further calculated and 
balanced profit and loss in the sum total of foreign trade, and reported to Ministry of 
Finance. Ministry of Finance obtained any profit or undertook any loss. The trading 
companies, manufacturers and companies using imported products did not take profit 
or loss. And also the liquid capital required by trading companies was also allocated 
by Ministry of Finance.  
 
Third, the import/export authority was only issued to state-owned trading companies 
and several of their subsidiaries in some important ports, like Tianjin & Guangzhou. 
These trading companies operated all import and export transactions, such as 
negotiation and enforcement with/to foreign importers and exporters. Other majority 
of subsidiaries of these trading companies across the country took responsibility for 
purchasing domestic products in the way of buy-out with domestic prices, and then it 
was left to previous trading companies to export. In terms of imports, according to 
                                                 
3  1952.11.15-State Planning Commission (SPC); 1998.3-renamed as State Development 
Planning Commission (SDPC); 2003.3- change to National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), by merging with the State Council Office for Restructuring the 
Economic System (SCORES) and part of the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC)  
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instructions from the SPC or Ministry of foreign trade, these trading companies 
finished transactional task, like ordering, payment, freight, inspection etc. The real 
user or importer could only participate in technical negotiation, and left all others to 
the trading companies. In other words, the real domestic manufacturers and importers 
failed to participate in exporting or importing, and to have contact with the 
international market.  
 
Fourth, because of foreign exchange control and central planning, the foreign 
exchange obtained by trading companies through exporting would be collected and 
used by central government through specific authorized banks, according to the then 
Bank of China . In practice, they only focused on the amount of foreign exchange 
obtained from export, failing to consider the export’s profitability (Fu, 2008, p13-14).  
 
Fifth, due to the distance between domestic manufacturers and the international 
markets and the planned economy, these trading companies also expanded into other 
trade-related functions, such as warehousing, freight, packaging and even 
manufacturing (Fu, 2008, p19).  
 
In particular, during this period, the responsibility of all trading companies was to 
complete the export task under the central plan and to pursue the foreign exchange 
needed by government to purchase necessary materials and industrial inputs. The 
achievement of exporting task assured future support from government, and whether 
or not the trading authority would be granted(Liu, 2007, p104).  
4.2 Second period (1978-1993): the monopoly of massive state-owned 
trading companies 
 
During the second period, China’s trading system began to transit from a central-
planning to market-based system. In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee marked the beginning of China’s reform and opening-up policy. 
In terms of foreign systems, reform mainly focused on the decentralization of 
import/export authorities, as the over-concentrated trading authority decreased the 
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incentive for exports for local government and domestic manufacturers (Fu, 2008, 
p35). It can be concluded that such decentralization could take place in three ways.  
 
First of all, the import/export authorities were gradually delegated from several state-
owned trading companies’ headquarters to their subsidiaries from 1978 to 1988. 
More specifically, each subsidiary was granted the exclusively import/export 
authorities for specific products, which differed from each other and from the parent 
companies’ products categories.  (Liu, 2007, 102-103).  
 
Second, the import/export authorities were gradually delegated from central 
government to local governments. Some provinces and cities, including Liaoning 
Province, Fujian Province, Beijing City, Tianjin City, Shanghai City, etc, were 
granted permission to establish province-level trading companies, mainly to import 
and export specific products which are normally manufactured and used in these 
regions. Two Experiment regions, Guangdong Province and Fujian Province, were 
granted larger import/export authorities; for instance, the newly established province-
level trading companies could process almost all products in this province, and 
province government could arrange import and export by themselves out of the 
central plan. (Fu, 2008, p89-90).  
 
Third, the import/export authorities were gradually delegated from the trading 
companies sector to other industries. Initially, many large state-owned manufacturers 
were gradually granted exporting authorities for owned products, and some 
importing authorities for inputs
4
(Fu, 2008, p89-90). It is worth noticing that these 
sorts of import/export authorities could only export their manufacturing products, 
and/or imports needed as input for manufacturing. They were different from trading 
                                                 
4 In particular, there are two kinds of export authority in China. One is called trading authority, 
and specifically issued to organizations, like trading companies, to trade products or services 
offered by others, like manufacturers. Another one is  called a manufacturer’s export 




companies’ import/export authorities, which could export most of products from 
domestic manufacturers.  
 
In addition, 19 Ministries and commissions of the central government were also 
allowed to establish their owned trading companies to import/export certain products, 
which were formerly exclusively imported/exported through the trading companies 
under the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Fu, 2008, p89-90) such as the China National 
Machinery & Equipment Import & Export Corporation (now the China Machinery 
Engineering Corporation (CMEC)) that was established in 1978. Six of these were 
under the Ministry of Machinery Industry (now Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology)(CMEC, 2011), rather than the Ministry of Foreign Trade.  
 
In particular, some industrial departments or groups of manufacturers were also 
allowed to establish their trading companies, in order to improve the manufacturers’ 
significant distance from international markets. This new group of trading companies 
were named the “Industrial trading companies” (ITCs), and were usually based on 
existing trading companies or manufacturers, in order to obtain closer relations 
between trading and manufacturing departments. These ITCs commonly took charge 
of the export of all or partial manufacturers’output in each industrial department and 
group. They were organized and managed by national and local governments or 
certain government departments. For instance, the China Silk Corporation was one 
example of a national ITC. In the 1970s, the production and sale of silk-related 
products belonged to different departments according to value chains, like the 
Ministry of Textile Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of 
Commerce, and the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Co-operatives 
(another Ministry-level department in China). The poor collaboration between 
different chains resulted in the dproblematic export of silk-related products. Thus 
through removing these silk-related functions from previous departments, and 
combining them together again, a new China Silk Corporation was established in 
1982, in order to unify process inputs, production, and the domestic and foreign sale 




Moreover, the Qingdao Textile United Import & Export Company is another local 
ITC in Qingdao City. It was established by 9 state-owned textile-related 
manufacturers, including textile mills, textile printing & dyeing mills, weaving mills, 
knitwear mills and flannel mills (it was extended to the whole textile industry in 
Qiangdao City and emerged with the Qingfao Textile Industry Company in 1985.10), 
in 1982. It owned 80 employees and exports amounted to 20,210,000$ in 1982(Liu, 
2007, p21; QDSQ, 2011). The 3
rd
 group of ITCs were commonly established by some 
manufacturers under same government industry department. For instance, the 
Ministry of Machinery and Industry Ministry established the China Abrasives 
Industry Joint Export Company (China Abrasives Import & Export Corporation 
(CAEC) now (CAEC, 2011)), the China Bearing Industry Joint Export Company 
(China National Bearing Joint Import & Export Corporation (CBEC) now (CBEC, 
2011)) etc respectively in the 1980s(Liu, 2007, p21).  
 
As a result of such decentralization of import/export authorities, there gradually 
appeared a great deal of new state-owned trading companies, with various names, 
sizes and tradable products, in China from 1978 to 1988. According to the statistics, 
the number of exporters from 1979 to 1987 increased by around 2,200. Most of them 
were trading companies (Fu, 2008, p88).  
 
However, these emerging state-owned trading companies, as affiliated institutions of 
government, failed to act as independent economic agents on the export market, and 
therefore failed to efficiently facilitate domestic exports (Fu, 2008, p104). More 
specifically, these state-owned trading companies had no economic incentive to 
actively participate in the export business, due to some of the practices of previous 
institutions under the planning system. For instance, the trading companies had to 
hand in the profits from exports, in term of foreign exchange, and re-apply for the 
foreign exchange from the relevant departments for import, due to the strict control of 
foreign exchange. On the other hand, these state-owned trading companies often 
operated export business at a loss, in order to achieve the required export amount (as 
tasked to do). As a result, central finances had to shore up these losses, and became 




Therefore, a series of policies and reforms took place inside these state-owned trading 
companies from 1988 to 1993, in order to change them gradually from affiliated 
institutions of government to independent economic agent in the marketplace (Fu, 
2008, p104).  
 
From 1988, a 3-year “foreign trade contract responsibility system” was initially 
applied to trading companies to replace the previous planning system. Under such a 
policy, each national trading company (and local government), as contractors, set a 
certain number of export targets, earned foreign exchange targets, and economic 
performance targets within in 3 years. It was further modified in 1991, by changing 
direct government subsidies to banks loan (Fu, 2008, p96-p104; Huang, 2000, p30; 
Liu, 2007, p154). The trading companies were also allowed to keep a portion of 
export profits to encourage their business. In the meanwhile, most of the subsidiaries 
of the 12 large state-owned trading companies were separated from their parent 
companies, and became independent companies or were re-integrated into trading 
companies groups, under the control of local government (normally the local 
commission of foreign trade) (Liu, 2007, p147). These parent companies of the 12 
trading companies got rid of these financial burdens and inefficient subsidiaries, and 
became one new independent company (Huang, 2000). For instance, all the 
subsidiaries of the China Minmetals were handed over to local government in 1988, 
and then China Minmetals established 13 new trading companies based on the 
previous internal departments of the parent company, including China Minmetals 
Trading Corporation, China Minmetals Non-ferrous Metal International Trading 
Corporation, etc.(Minmetals, 2011).   
 
In addition, these reforms went further in some special state-owned trading 
companies. For instance, according to the government’s regulations, trading 
companies related to light industrial products, handicraft and garments had to 
“assume sole responsibility for its own profits and losses”, but were allowed to keep 
the majority of foreign exchange profits through exports (Fu, 2008, p96), which 




Driven by these incentive policies to encourage exports and growth in exports in 
China, the number of exporters with import/export authority was further extended. 
Up to 1993, the number increased to around 6,000. Amongst these, the state-owned 
trading companies numbered around 4,000 (Fu, 2008, p104). 
 
In summary, the transition towards market-based trading systems, and reforms of 
trading companies were not completed and fully successful during the second period. 
The import/export authorities were delegated from the 12 national state-owned 
trading companies to more companies. But they were still dominated and 
monopolized by the industry of trade, particularly the state-owned trading companies. 
Their numbers were greater than before and their size variable. They were controlled 
by central and local government, or certain government departments. Meanwhile, 
other domestic exporters, including the majority of manufacturers, especially the 
private manufacturers who were the real engine for the emerging “world factory”, 
failed to obtain the import/export authority.   
 
4.3 Third period (1994-now): the emergence of private trading 
companies  
The third period is characterised by the further transition of China’s trading system, 
embracing the full openness of import/export authority. The situation of Chinese 
trading companies shows the deeper internal reform of state-owned trading 
companies towards that of economic agents, and the gradual rise of powerful private 
trading companies.  
 
First of all, a group of subsequent regulations and policies relating to import/export 
authority confirms that import and export businesses are no longer the monopoly of 
state-owned trading companies. A great number of private exporters, including 





In 1994.07.01, China’s government issued the first Foreign Trade Law of PRC, 
which historically clarified certain important regulations and legitimacy issues on 
import and export, including the introduction of one compulsory approval system for 
grant import/export authority to qualified exporters through the MOFCOM (Ministry 
of Commerce) and one alternative agency trading method for other companies and 
organizations without exporting authority(NPC, 1994).  
 
In 1999.01.01, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (now 
MOFCOM) issued one new regulation to allow private manufacturers to apply for 
manufacturers’ exporting authority (MFTEC, 1998); this means that private 
manufacturers began to acquire the right to export directly (Fu, 2008, p118). In the 
meantime, one new and easier registration system of application for import/export 
authority has been experimentally attempted replacing the previous examination and 
approval system in five special economic zones from 1997, and then extended to 
1000 larger state-owned manufacturers in 1998(Fu, 2008, p118).  
 
After China’s accession into the WTO in 2001, the government began to lower the 
barriers for market access, including import/export authority on the export market. In 
2004, a new edition of the Foreign Trade Law of PRC was renewed (NPC, 2004): the 
approval system for import/export authority was officially replaced by the 
registration system, and the requirements to qualify for eligibility for import/export 
authority were also lowered. As a result, small and medium-sized private firms and 
individuals, including manufacturers and trading companies, began to participate in 
the import/export business(Fu, 2008).   
 
Under the impact of such changes, the reform of state-owned trading companies has 
been deepened. The share-holding reform is the most important characteristic of 
state-owned trading companies. For instance, the China National Cereals, Oils and 
Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) and several large trading companies, were 
processed on an experimental basis through share-holding reforms, and became 
wholly state-owned enterprises or limited liability companies, including corporate 
governance, personnel systems, income distribution systems, organizational structure 
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and financial management systems. Then, similar reforms were gradually extended 
to other state-owned trading companies from 1994. They were changed to a limited 
liability company or joint-stock company, which usually contains state-owned 
majority shares and employee minority shares. After such reforms, the traditional 
state-owned trading companies further changed themselves from the administrative 
institutions that operated under the central planning system to independent economic 
agents in a marketing economy. In turn, a great number of unsuccessful state-owned 
trading companies gradually disappeared from the stage, due to a series of re-
structuring, mergers, and acquisitions, losses in market competition and loss of 
support from the government.  
 
Due to the full openness for accessing import/export authority, the forms of Chinese 
trading companies, in term of size and ownership, has shown diversification. Briefly 
they can be divided into three groups: central state-owned trading companies, local 
state-owned trading companies, and private trading companies.  
 
Central state-owned trading companies refer to the large state-owned trading 
companies among the 115 central SOEs in China, which are under the control of the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council (SASAC). They include the Sinochem Corporation (Sinochem), China 
National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO), China Minmetals 
Corporation (Minmetals), China General Technology Group (Genertec), Chinatex 
Corporation, China National Arts & Crafts (Group) Corp (CNACGC), and the China 
Silk Corporation. Most of them stemmed from previous parent companies of state-
owned trading companies. They are large conglomerates with diversified businesses 
across the world. For instance, the COFCO clearly demonstrated its transitional 
strategy from traditional trading companies to diversified companies from 1992. It 
currently has 13 various businesses inside and outside China, including 
manufacturing, food production, electronic commerce, real estate, finance and so 
forth (COFCO, 2013). Such a situation also took place in other central state-owned 
trading companies during the third period. Some of them still participate in 
international trade, but mainly in commodities, such as grain and steel, and hold 
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monopoly power on these commodities in China’s export market. For instance, the 
COFCO monopolizes the import/export of many grains (COFCO, 2013). Due to 
extensive diversification in various businesses, the nature of these conglomerates 
becomes fuzzy and far from transitional trading companies.  
The second group are massive local state-owned trading companies. As stated before, 
the state-owned trading companies had experience of several rounds of reform from 
1978, and increasing and severe competition from other emerging domestic exporters. 
Therefore these local state-owned trading companies are the survivors of these 
reforms, and the relatively successful ones compared with the defunct ones. They are 
still a presence in international trade but they differ in history and conditions from 
each other. Some of them used to be the subsidiaries of central state-owned trading 
companies, whilst others are the result of multiple restructuring and re-organization 
of state-owned trading companies, manufacturers and certain government 
departments.  
 
To take one example of local state-owned trading companies in Tianjin, one of the 
four largest municipalities in China. There were more than 40 state-owned trading 
companies during the 1980s. They contained the local subsidiaries or branches of 
central state-owned trading companies and government departments, and some of the 
then newly established state-owned trading companies belonged to local government. 
From the end of the 1980s, these trading companies were gradually separated from 
previous parent companies and government departments, and re-affiliated to the 
Tianjin Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Commission (the local agent of the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of P.R.China), to ease financial 
pressure on central finance. Afterwards, due to weaker competitive capacity than the 
exporters that emerged when government opened up the import/export authorities, 
most of them were discontinued and integrated into other companies. The remaining 
20 were re-structured, merged, and processed in the share-holding reform, and finally 
were constructed into two new state-owned trading companies groups in 2003 that 
were affiliated to the Tianjin Commission of Commerce (the Tianjin Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade Commission was reformed into the Tianjin 
Commission of Commerce, which was changed to be affiliated to the Tianjin 
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Municipal Government), and State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the Tianjin Municipal Government. The headquarters of the group 
only takes charge of administrative issues, but does not participate in corporate 
management.  
These local state-owned trading companies are inter-independent. They usually have 
30 to 150 employees, relatively fixed products and domestic manufacturers that 
developed historically. Due to the loss of monopoly of import/export authorisation, 
they had to compete with other exporters, including domestic manufacturers and 
trading companies on the same import/export market.  
 
The last group is a large number of private trading companies, which emerged from 
1994 onwards, and gradually became the most important facilitator for current 
international trade in China. They are the most unknown group of trading companies. 
Due to lack of official data, the description here mainly relies on the interviews in 
this study. These private trading companies’ number is numerous. It is easy to find a 
couple of them in each business building in China. Some of them are formal 
companies, whilst others are special individual exporting traders (IETs), now called 
self-employed individual traders or SOHOs. Similar to the import/export 
intermediaries in western countries, they are usually small sized (1 to 20 employees). 
Their services are as diversified as each unit in the whole trading process. The 
tradable products through them can range cross almost all products, which are 
manufactured in China. The owners and staff of these private trading companies 
usually used to work in traditional state-owned trading companies. Some of them had 
the experience “Guakao
5
” in state-owned trading companies. They were well trained 
                                                 
5
 The method is called guakao, means literally ‘nominal, rather than actual, affiliates’(Li, Yao, 
Sueâ Chan, & Xi, 2011). It happens in many circumstances in China, such as Chinese 
household register system, construction industry, NGOs etc. “The guakao mechanism has 
been widely used by private entrepreneurs to handle issues such as legitimacy, market entry 
barriers, and other discrimination as well as political, legal, regulatory, and administrative 
uncertainties. Under the guakao mechanism, private investors “attach” or “affiliate” 
themselves or their subsidiaries either to collectively owned or state-owned units. Such an 
enterprise was sometimes said to be wearing a “red hat,” which enabled it to circumvent 
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in the knowledge of international trade, especially on China’s import/export markets 
during the period of state-owned trading companies, and open private companies 
after the government opened up the import/export authorities to pursue higher 
economics returns. They mainly serve domestic SME manufacturers, which normally 
lack resources for and knowledge of international trade. Due to a more efficient 
service, they are also attractive to foreign buyers, especially those who are unfamiliar 
with purchasing from China.  
 
In general, these three groups of trading companies comprise the whole picture of 
Chinese trading companies at present. The first group gradually changed themselves 
to large MNEs, due to their considerable diversification. The second group has stuck 
with their traditional customers and products in international trade. The third group is 
the most dynamic of the trading companies on current import/export markets, due to 
their flexibility and efficiency.  
4.4 Two distinct features of Chinese trading companies in the whole 
process of evolution   
 
In addition to the previous description, there are two significant features of Chinese 
trading companies during their evolution, which are worthwhile highlighting here as 
distinct from the trading companies in extant literatures.  
4.4.1 Import/export authorities 
 
During the three periods in which Chinese trading companies evolved, the 
import/export authorities constituted one important factor. The change of 
import/export authorities reflects faithfully the nature of institutional transition in 
China, namely gradualist reforms and the characteristics of path dependency of 
institutional change failing to quickly change previous institutions developed over 
time under a central-planning system (see chapter 3).  
                                                                                                                                          





The policies on import/export authorities in China kept changing from initially 
wholly monopolistic through several state-owned trading companies to other more 
state-owned trading companies and manufacturers, and finally to other private 
trading companies and manufacturers. Actually such change is still on-going today, 
and changed into certain indistinguishable “authorities”, that continue to generate 
invisible institutional constraints for domestic exporters. The procedure is also 
complicated for them. To apply for export authority, one firm may have to register 
with many government authorities, including the local Administration of Industries 
and Commerce, Taxation Bureau (which is important for the product with export tax 
rebates), the Administration of Foreign Exchange (the foreign exchange is controlled 
in China), Customs (including e-port, on-line customs, etc), the Bureau of Quality 
and Technical Supervision, banks and so on.  
 
The details of export authorities and how they generate institutional constraints for 
domestic exporters are found and discussed in the pilot study in next chapter together 
with the findings of this study. In turn, the import/export authority had been the 
exclusive authorities for trading companies (state-owned and other ownership) and 
some large manufacturers for a long time. As a result, these trading companies 
accumulated a great deal of knowledge, experience and information on international 
trade, related industries and institutions, which generate huge advantages compared 
with domestic manufacturers when import/export authorities are gradually 
decentralized to all domestic exporters.  
4.4.2 Reselling system in China’s exporting market 
 
Under this import/export authority, a special “reselling system” had been developed 
in the export market in China. The reselling system means that ETCs firstly purchase 
outright the ownership of products from domestic manufacturers by means of a 
buying contract, and then sell it to foreign buyers through a selling contract. From 
1949 to 1978, this system was compulsory for all domestic manufacturers and ETCs 
under government regulation. From 1979 when the foreign trade system in China 
was reformed, the central government experimentally promoted the “agency system”, 
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which allows ETCs to represent manufacturers without export authority ( that is, by 
an agency contract) and  to contract with buyers (by means of a selling contract).  
 
However, the related laws, such as Civil Law General Principles of PRC and 
Contract Law of PRC, fail to clearly identify obligation, rights and principal-agent 
relationships for ETCs and manufacturers in the agency contract. The main problems 
are that the ETCs, as the agent, take more and even full risk during the transaction, 
since the agency contract is not fairly protected under these domestic laws, and the 
selling contract only appears in the agent’s name. In addition, the commission fee for 
brokerage is only 1-3% in practice, which is far less than the profit from a normal 
exporting transaction. Therefore, both business tradition and rationality enable most 
ETCs to undertake the reselling system in practice in China. Moreover, as the foreign 
exchange and tax rebates systems run by government authorities are complicated and 
time-consuming, the manufacturers are willing to accept this reselling system to 
reduce the turnaround time of capital. Thus until 1986, the export activity under the 
agency system only made up 6.3% of the total amount; 1990 it rose to 7.29%; 1991 it 
was  running at5.1%, 1992 at 1.2%, 1993 at 3.7%, 1994 at 1.41, and in 2000 at 4.4% 
(Xu, 2000; Yao & Chen, 2001).  
 
Similar to the previous import/export authorities, the long-term reselling system 
enabled and even pushed these trading companies to obtain more knowledge about 
export and other related industries and institutions. In addition, it enabled Chinese 
trading companies to take full responsibility, rather than partial responsibility, as they 
were neither the agent for domestic manufacturers nor foreign buyers, as assumed in 
some recent studies on trading companies in western countries (Peng, 1998; Peng & 
Ilinitch, 1998; Peng & York, 2001). As a result, Chinese trading companies 
undertake more jobs in the export process, such as coordinating with each part in one 
transaction, and monitoring the quality, time and other related issues on contract, that 
are usually problematic in export markets in China. The details of the advantages of 




4.5 Implications from historical developments of Chinese trading 
companies 
Last, it is interesting to note that the history of Chinese trading companies also 
supports previous statement made in Chapter 2, which is the  improvement of 
institutional environment diminishes the significance of trading companies in trade 
business. Since the second period (1978-1993), the institutions in China’s export 
market had been largely improved, such as the delegation of import/export 
authorities. In the meanwhile, there were increasing numbers of domestic 
manufacturers to bypass trading companies and participate in exporting business on 
their own. As a result, it makes existing trading companies quit trading industry and 
others have to switch to other business. Despite of multiple reasons, the institutional 
change is an important cause of such situation.  
  
4.6 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter presents the history of Chinese trading companies since 1949 following 
three main periods. Among of them, the significant events, relevant institutions and 
government policies, and Chinese trading companies’ characteristics and change are 
respectively displayed.  Finally, import/export authorities and reselling system, as 
two main features of Chinese trading companies, are discussed.   
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Chapter 5   Research strategy and methodology 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The previous two chapters respectively identify the research gaps and research 
questions, and generate the analytical framework. This chapter aims to illustrate the 
research strategy and methodology, which “ensure that the evidence obtained enables 
us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible”(De Vaus, 2001, p9). 
Section 3.2 sets out the author’s philosophical stance. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 
respectively offer the justification for the use of a qualitative approach and abductive 
logic in this study. Section 3.5 provides the reasons behind the choice of the case 
study as the preferred method. Then the detailed case study design is discussed in the 
section 3.5. Finally, section 3.6 summarizes this chapter. 
5.2 Research Philosophy  
 
The philosophical stance or paradigm, is one vital part of the research methodology, 
that sets the scene for the whole research enterprise (Creswell, 2008; Maxwell, 2012). 
It refers to “certain assumptions about how they will learn and what they will learn 
during their inquiry” (Creswell, 2008, p6).  It draws conclusions about “the nature of  
the  world  (ontology), and how we can understand it (epistemology), ” (Maxwell, 
2012). The main paradigms are drawn from positivism, constructivism, 
interpretivism, realism, pragmatism and so on. Although these paradigms might seem 
controversial and contradictory, a confluent trend had gradually emerged within 
recent academic thinking (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011).    
 
The philosophical stance of this study is interpretivism. Interpretivism can be traced 
back to the sociologists of the 19
th
 century, such as Weber and Wilhem. From 
viewpoint of interpretivism, “what distinguishes human (social) action from the 
movement of physical objects is that the former is inherently meaningful. Thus, to 
understand a particular social action (e.g., friendship, voting, marrying, teaching), the 
inquirer must grasp the meanings that constitute that action…….To find meaning in 
an action, or to say one understands what a particular action means, requires that one 
123 
 
interprets in a particular way what the actors are doing…….In other words, 
interpretivists argue that it is possible to understand the subjective meaning of action 
(grasping the actor beliefs, desires, and so on) yet do so in an objective manner” 
(Schwandt, 2000). Therefore the researcher must understand the actors’ actions from 
their field, think about the delivered information, find out the relations between them, 
and finally indicate their siganificance. In order to so so, the reasecher has to 
“participate in the life world of others”. Understanding is “an intellectual process 
whereby a knower (the inquirer as subject) gains knowledge about an object (the 
meaning of human action).” (Schwandt, 2000).  
 
In line with interpretivism, the research process in this study should take the 
following form: the researcher(s) interviews specific informants involved in the 
export business in China, observes their company, transaction process and related 
activities. From these experiences, the researcher elucidates an understanding of the 
main problems and solutions for these practitioners in undertaking exports from 
China. Researcher then further transposes these problems and solutions into their 
common export transaction process and related activities, against the backdrop of 
China’s institutional background. When the researcher realizes most of the 
institutional constraints and the ETCs’ corresponding solutions in China’s export 
market, he/she will describe these findings with the acceptable methods by audience. 
5.3 Qualitative approach 
 
The qualitative and quantitative approaches are two main streams in academic study. 
These two approaches show large distinctions, though there exits some common 
ground (Neuman, 2007). Denzin & Lincoln (2000) define qualitative research as “a 
situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of 
interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform 
the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, 
interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self”. It 
stresses the qualities of entities and processes and meanings, the situational 
constraints that shape inquiry, and how social experience is created and given 
meaning. Alternatively,  Creswell (2008) states that “a quantitative approach is one 
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in which the investigator primarily uses postpositive claims for developing 
knowledge (i.e., cause and effect thinking, reduction to specific variables and 
hypotheses and questions, use of measurement and observation, and the test of the 
theories), employs strategies of inquiry such as experiments and surveys, and collects 
data on  predetermined instruments that yield statistical data”. Therefore, these two 
research approaches do appear to have large differences, in terms of philosophical 
stand, research design, method of data collection and analytical approach. Although 
most studies on trading companies use qualitative approach, the quantitative 
approach is also adopted in several studies.  
 
This study chooses qualitative approach for many reasons. First, it consists of one 
explorative study. Creswell (2008) states the decision to select a qualitative or 
quantitative approach mainly relies on the topic being researched. When researching 
a phenomenon where the problems are underdeveloped, significant variables are 
unknown, existing theories do not apply, or research is exploratory, the qualitative 
approach is appropriate. The topic of this study closely reflects such features. The 
knowledge on trading companies from transition economies, like China, is unknown. 
The existing theories on trading companies are confronted with a large challenge in 
explaining trading companies from traditional economies.  
  
5.4 Why case study research?   
 
Case is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth 
and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident.” (Yin, 2003b, p13) . Yin (2003b, p5) indicates 
that one research can choose different research strategies, such as experiments, 
surveys, archival analysis, and case study, according to three basic conditions: “(a) 
the type of research question posed, (b) the extent of control an investigator has over 
actual behavioural events, and (c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to 
historical events” (shown in Table 5-1). Correspondingly, the case study is suitable, 
when “a how or why question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over 
which the investigator has little or no control” 
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Table 5-1  Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies. 
Strategy  Form of research question 




Experiment How, why? Yes Yes 
Survey 
Who, what, where, how 




Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes/No 
History How, why? No No 
Case study How, why? No Yes 
                                      Source: (Yin, 2003b, p5) 
The character of this study is aligned to the case study approach in terms of these 
three conditions. The main aim of this research is to explore the unknown Chinese 
ETCs and institutional environment, which is one “empirical investigation of a 
contemporary phenomenon”. The research questions (what are the institutions, which 
generate transaction costs for domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers, in China’s 
export market? And how do Chinese exporting trading companies respond to such 
institution-related costs as an intermediary between domestic manufacturers and 
foreign buyers) are typical “how” questions. Meanwhile, the institutions, as a “real-
life context” will be explored, as their effects on Chinese ETCs are one main 
objective in this research. These institutions and Chinese ETCs will be illustrated as 
a combination, which is in line with the statement that “boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. In addition, this study intends to 
develop theory on trading companies, which is another important function for case 
study research (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
It is necessary to note the sort of case study in this study. The case study could be 
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory (Yin, 2003b). The cases studies in this study 
contain such three characteristics. The exploration of export-related institutions and 
ETCs in China results in a characteristic, exploratory case study. The description of 
complicated export-related institutions and Chinese ETCs’ export process make the 
case for a descriptive one. In the end, the effort to explain why Chinese ETCs are 
able to reduce these institution-related transaction costs contributes to one 
explanatory case study. Moreover, the case study can be qualitative, quantitative or 
mixed at the same time (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Yin, 2003b). But most researchers 
tend to support the case study’s qualitative nature (Merriam, 1998; Miles & 
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Huberman, 1999). Due to the decision of qualitative approach, the case study is 
qualitative in this study. In the end, this case study is qualitative one with exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory characteristics.  
5.5 Case study design 
 
One clear procedure is able to enhance the rigor with which the case study is 
undertaken. Eisenhardt (1989) establishes one basic structure to process case study 
(shown in Table 5-2); this comprises eight steps from the research questions through 
to data collection and analysis, and then to final theoretical development.  
 
Table 5-2  Process of Building Theory from Case Study Research. 
 




Pettigrew (1997) also illustrates one research approach  for “processual analysis” of 
the case study  by combining deductive and inductive approaches:  
“the core question of the study -- related themes and questions -- preliminary data 
collection -- early pattern  recognition -- early writing -- disconfirmation and  
verification -- elaborated  themes  and  questions -- further  data  collection -- 
additional  pattern  recognition -- across  more  case  examples  -- comparative  
analysis -- a more refined  study vocabulary and research questions.   (Pettigrew, 
1997) 
 
Yin (2003b) concludes one common strategy for the case study approach in his 
famous book. The obvious additions to the previous procedures include the 
highlighting of the pilot study and pre-study, and the “feedback” loop, which enables 
re-visiting of previous cases with new findings in a current case.   
 
 
Figure 5-1 Case Study Method.  
                     Source: (Yin, 2003b, p50) 
These three procedures have a high resemblance to each other and are mutually 
complementary. By synthesizing them, one comprehensive case study procedure is 





Table 5-3  The comparison of three procedures and procedure used in this study. 
Eisenhardt Pettigrew Yin This study 
Related themes and 
questions 
Research questions and related themes 
Research questions and 
existing theories 
Research questions and existing theories 
  Developed theory Developed theory/analytical framework 
 
Preliminary data  
collection 
 
Pilot study (The preliminary identification of institutional 
constraints in China’s export market)  
 Early pattern  recognition  Early pattern  recognition 
 Early writing  Early writing 
 Disconfirmation and  verification  Disconfirmation and  verification 
 Elaborated  themes  and  questions  Elaborated  themes  and  questions 
Selecting cases  Selecting cases Selecting cases 
  
Design data collection 
protocol 
Design data collection protocol 
  Pilot case study Pilot case study-Case A 
Crafting Instruments and 
Protocols 
Elaborated  themes  and  questions 
Revised data collection 
protocol 
Revised data collection protocol 
Entering  the  Field Further  data  collection 
Data collecting  
 
Further data collecting from more case  
Analysing   Data 
Additional pattern recognition across 
more  case  examples 
Data analysis 
 
Additional data analysis across more  case 
  Feedback loop Feedback loop on emergent findings 
 Comparative  analysis Cross-case analysis Cross-case analysis 
Shaping   Hypotheses A more refined study vocabulary and 
research questions 
Modify theory Modify theory 
Enfolding  Literature 
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5.5.1 Role of Theory  
 
The analytical framework “is derived from the orientation or stance that you bring to 
your study. It is the structure, scaffolding, the frame of your study” (Merriam, 1998, 
p45). Yin (2003a, b) suggests that the theory (analytical framework) development 
should be concluded and play an important role in the process of the research design. 
He concludes that there are several main roles for theory in case study research.  
 
Theory development should be undertaken before the stage of data collection, 
irrespective of the research aims to develop or to test theory. It offers research the 
“blueprint”, which helps to choose data types, analysis strategies and generate a fine 
research design (Yin, 2003b). It also helps to collect data and generalizing theory 
from cases (Yin, 2003b, p31). Merriam (1998) also indicates that the analytical 
framework helps to clarify the importance of the research topic, those aspects that are 
already available in the extant literatures and those that remain unknown and gaps in 
the extant literatures relevant to this topic, and the necessity of unveiling these 
unknown features.  He further states that the analytical framework comes from the 
extant literatures related to the topic, especially the commonly accepted concepts, 
models, theories and other important aspects.  
 
Therefore, in this study, the analytical frameworks mainly come from the existing 
literatures on trading companies, transaction costs economics and institutions related 
ones, particularly the ones related to transition economies and emerging markets 
(both of them are overlapping in academic). These theoretical literatures, together 
with the findings from the pilot study, jointly contribute to one analytical framework, 
indicating the perspective from which the data is collected in the stage of data 
collection, the description during data display and explanation in the later data 
analysis.   




The generation of research questions is the first challenging aspect in the case study 
research design (Yin, 2003b). By finding the gaps, such as the ignorance of certain 
important fields, from extant literatures, namely the “gap-spotting” method, is the 
most common approach for generating the research questions in academic studies 
(Wynekoop & Russo, 1993). In this study, there are three main gaps after reviewing 
the extant literatures. They are 1) while most studies are about the trading companies 
from developed countries, less attention is paid to the transition economies, like 
China, which has become one of the most important players in international trade. 2) 
The extant literatures using TCE analysis, which is considered the most significant 
theory on trading companies, fail to pay enough attention to other players involved in 
international trade, especially foreign buyers or importers. 3) These literatures using 
TCE analysis ignore concerns from an institutional perspective, which have been 
proved the most important determinant for the study of business in transition 
economies. 
 
Correspondingly, the research questions in this study are: 1) what are the institutions, 
which generate transaction costs for doemstc manufacturers and foreign buyers, in 
China’s export market? And 2) how do Chinese exporting trading companies respond 
to such institution-related costs as an intermediate between domestic manufacturers 
and foreign buyers. These two research questions initially lead to one new study on 
the trading companies from transition economies, say China, which fill in the first 
gap in the studies on trading companies. Then, putting the spot light  on “institution” 
in the research questions shows that this study tends to explore the institutional 
perspective in particular, which fills in the third gap. In addition, part of the 
transaction costs in the research questions concern the extension of transaction costs 
economics analysis on trading companies to foreign buyers’ perspective.  
5.5.3 Unit of analysis  
 
The unit of analysis, namely the question of what constitutes the case, is another 
necessary component in the research design. The case can be individual, an event, a 
decision, a programme, a process, organizational change and so forth. But one 
research design cannot contain all information related to the research topic. 
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Therefore, the unit of analysis helps to focus on the specific and feasible scope of 
data collection and analysis. (Yin, 2003b, p24-25) Miles & Huberman (1999, p25) 
indicate that a case is “a phenomenon of some sort of occurring in a bounded 
context” , and it contains “a focus, or “heart,” of the study, and in a somewhat 
indeterminate manner defines the edge of the case: in other words, what the study 
will not comprise.” (Shown in Figure 5-2) In addition, the choice of the unit of 
analysis relies on the research objectives (Merriam, 1998, p27), and provides 
signpost  to relative literatures (Yin, 2003b, p26).   
 
 
Figure 5-2 The case as the unit of analysis.  
                    Source: (Miles & Huberman, 1999, p25) 
 
Therefore, the research focus in this study is the Chinese ETCs, while the boundary 
of the case study, is their business activities related to transaction cost-economizing.  
More specifically, the unit of analysis is the Chinese ETCs business activities and 
institution-related transaction costs during the export transaction process.. As a result, 
the choice of such a unit of analysis enables this study to focus on the Chinese ETCs’ 
export transaction process. The export transaction process is the main unit of analysis 
in previous literatures on trading companies (Casson, 1998; Peng, 1998; Peng & 
York, 2001; Roehl, 1983), and transaction costs economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
In addition, it also makes this study pay more attention to the institutions on China’s 
export market and institution-related costs during these export transactions process, 
as the institutional perspective on the analysis of trading companies is the main 
concern of this study.  
 
Focus 







The embedded unit involved in the case study means the subunit in one case to 
enable a more in-depth and specific analysis(Yin, 2003b). In this study, the exporting 
transaction processed by ETCs is appropriate as a subunit for two reasons. First, the 
nature of transaction costs economics focuses on the transaction analysis 
(Williamson 1975; Williamson 1985). Second, the existing literatures on trading 
companies (Roehl 1983; Casson 1998; Peng 1998; Peng and York 2001), especially 
those based on transaction costs economics, had already proved that the focus on 
analysis of trading companies is transaction itself. Third, one major research study 
questions is how ETCs process the exporting transaction, which inevitably throws 
the spotlight on the transaction process. 
5.5.4 Case Selection 
 
There are two basic decisions to be made in selecting appropriate cases in one’s 
research: the number of cases, and how to sample the cases (Voss, Tsikriktsis, & 
Frohlich, 2002). In addition, the criteria for selecting cases, as the 3
rd
 decision in this 
section, are also helpful for guiding rigorous case selection.  
5.5.4.1 Number of Cases 
 
Yin (2003b) settles on four situations for the case study approach: single case, single 
case with an embedded unit, multiple-cases, and multiple-cases with embedded unit  
(this study does not refer to the fifth which is the longitudinal case). Due to its 
stronger external validity and generalizability (Yin, 2003b), most scholars 
recommend the multiple case design (Merriam, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1999; Yin, 
2003b). After reviewing many studies on the case study method, Perry (1998) 
calculates that the number of cases recommended in these studies ranges from two to 
fifteen. More importantly, the number of cases rely on the point at which  
“theoretical saturation” is reached according to Eisenhardt (1989). It means that 
“theoretical saturation is simply the point at which incremental learning is minimal 
because the researchers are observing phenomena seen before”. Such a similar 
argument is also mentioned by many other scholars (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Glaser 
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& Strauss, 2009; Merriam, 1998). In addition, many scholars also warn that PhD 
students should consider their limited time and funding, and other strict practical 
troubles during the real data collection period, in choosing appropriate an number of 
cases (Merriam, 1998; Perry, 1998).   
 
 
Figure 5-3  Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies. 
Source: (Yin, 2003b, p40) 
 
In this study and before entering the field, four cases were decided as the minimum 
number. During the process of data collection and analysis, the number became six, 
when the study reached the theoretical saturation. More specifically, from the fifth 
and sixth cases, no new findings emerged on institution-related transaction costs and 
new methods, by which these ETCs were able to reduce institution-related 
transaction costs. In addition, the time and funding did not allow another case in 
China.   
5.5.4.2 Sampling  
 
For the case study design, the sampling method is not random, but purposive 
(Merriam, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1999; Seawright & Gerring, 2008; Yin, 2003b). 
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Merriam (1998) believes that “purposive sampling is based on the assumption that 
the investigator wants to discover, understand, and gain insight and therefore must 
select a sample from which the most can be learned” As Yin states, “every case 
should serve a specific purpose within the overall scope of inquiry” Therefore,  the 
sampling and selection of cases should follow specific objectives.  
 
Seawright & Gerring (2008) highlight two basic objectives of case selection: “(1) a 
representative sample and (2) useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical 
interest.” To achieve such aims, they further conclude that seven common sampling 
strategies are required in case studies: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, 
most similar, and most different. Similarly Merriam (1998) concludes seven common 
sampling strategies in cases studies: typical, unique, maximum variation, 
convenience, snowball, chain and network 
 
The case selection in this study mainly follows the maximum variation strategy of 
purposeful sampling by concluding the common pattern from various cases (Merriam, 
1998). Trading companies are usually divided into agent and trader or pure and 
hybrid trading companies (Balabanis & Baker, 1993a; Casson, 1998). Also 
ownership (private and state-owned) may affect the firms’ characteristics in China. 
Thus six cases were chosen, representing agent, trader, pure trading companies, and 
hybrid trading companies (that included manufacturing), private trading companies 
and state-owned trading companies.  
 
In addition, the sampling in this study also follows the replication logic, more 
specifically literal replication(Yin, 2003b). Yin(2003b, p46-47) indicates that the 
replication logic is the same as doing multiple experiments, where experiments are 
repeated with the same conditions, or with several expected-changed irrelevant 
conditions, to test the consistency of findings. The former is named literal replication, 
while the latter one is called theoretical replication. Among of this procedure, the 




5.5.4.3 Case Company Selection Criteria 
Merriam (1998, p65) recommends that it is best to build up a series of criteria, which 
can guide the case selection. All cases in the study should follow those criteria. The 
chosen criteria should be consistent with the sampling strategy. Peng (1998) 
concludes three main parameters: location, ownership, and function, as the criteria 
for case selection in the research on American export intermediaries. In line with his 
parameters, this one also uses these three parameters, plus with another two, shown 
as follow.  
 
1. Location: The main entities of the cases, such as office and human capital, are 
located within Mainland China. As a result, the Chinese firms’ sales operations, 
subsidiaries overseas, and independent foreign import trading companies are 
excluded. These companies also help Chinese manufacturers to export or foreign 
buyers to import from China. However, they don’t have any entities in China, and 
usually act in the same manner as other foreign buyers. In addition, Peng (1998) 
indicates the specific state context might impact on his study of American EIs’, and 
therefore, cases from different states were selected. Bearing in mind this caution, this 
study also tries to search for cases from different provinces or areas in China, to 
avoid any regional bias.  
  
2. Ownership: The cases must be China-owned companies so that the difference 
between the influence on foreign and local firms by Chinese government policies is 
removed. For instance, Chinese government usually adopts incentive policies on 
foreign firms. This could reduce the policy-related effects on the export transaction 
that is the objective of this study.  
 
3. Function: The main business of these companies must be exports. The trading 
companies have the reputation of being diversified in function (Casson, 1998; Jones, 
1998b, 2002b; Sarathy, 1985), as discussed in the literature review chapter. 
Therefore the trading companies, which mainly participate in export business from 
China, become the most valuable cases. In practice, one method is adopted to select 
the right cases. The turnover from the export business of the chosen ETCs must be 
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over 50%. Therefore, those trading companies with export as their main business 
were selected.  
 
4. Size:  trading companies can be large and small in general. The large trading 
companies, like JGTCs, can have thousands of employees, while the small ones, like 
the American EIs, only have around 10 employees. In order to fulfil the maximum 
variation strategy, it is necessary to obtain both small and large trading companies in 
this study.  
 
5. As stated in chapter four, the trading companies in China are classified into three 
groups: large centrally state-owned trading companies with diversified businesses, 
state-owned trading companies with pure trading businesses and private trading 
companies. The cases involved in this study mainly come from the last two groups. 
By doing this, this study can focus on the trading companies whose core business is 
export. The details of this issue will be discussed in section 9.6 (Limitation and 
future direction) in this study.  
 
In the end, the target cases in this study are named as Chinese Export Trading 
Companies (Chinese ETCs), to show that they are located in the mainland of China, 
owned by Chinese, and mainly participate in the export business.  
 
Table 5-4 summarizes the main characteristics of the six ETCs in this study. In 
general, the selection of these ETCs fulfils the criteria in term of location, ownership, 
and function, which are stated in this section. Cases are selected from five different 
cities in the mainland of China to avoid regional bias. Then all of them are China-
owned companies to remove the effects from the difference between Chinese 
government policies on foreign and local firms. Third, all cases concentrate on 
export business, while two of them have or jointly have own manufacturers. Forth, 
five cases are small ETCs with 9 to 17 staffs, while the other one is large ETC with 
120 staffs. Last, all cases are selected from two groups: state-owned trading 
companies with pure trading businesses and private trading companies, according to 
classification of Chinese trading companies described in chapter four.  
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Table 5-4 A summary of the six cases 









Location Guangzhou Tianjin Shanghai 
















Spain, France and 
















Amount $5,000,000  $60,000,000 $30,000,000 
Per 
capital 
$625,000   $500,000 $3,000,000 
Margin 15%  2.5% 1% 
 Case D Case E Case F 
Name 
Fulu exporting trading 
companies 
Lueyuan Imp&Exp Co., 
Ltd 
Aomeite Exp Co., 
Ltd 
Location Beijing Qingdao Qingdao 






Establishment 1997 2000 2007 
Product Bedding products Tableware  Wooden furniture 
Foreign 
markets 
worldwide Worldwide US (60%), Spain 












$7,000,000 $7,000,000  $7,000,000 (2010) NA 
$333,000 $333,000 $411,746  (2010) NA 
10% 10%  12% (2010) NA 




Case study protocol is one main method for enhancing the reliability of a case study. 
It is able to guide data collection during each case, and is extremely helpful for 
multiple-case study. In addition, it helps to focus on the subjects of the research, 
structure the case report and later writing, and lock the research to audience. One 
case study protocol should contain an overview of the research, fieldwork procedures, 
research questions, and so forth (Yin, 2003b, p67-69). One case study protocol is 
generated for this study in accordance with the recommendations (shown in appendix 
1) 
5.5.6 Data Collecting 
 
Yin (2003b, p85-86) arrives at six common methods for data collection in a case 
study design. They are: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct 
observations, participant observation, and physical artefacts. They have different 
strengths and weakness (shown in the Table 5-4). This study adopts interviews, 
documentation, and observation, together with one pilot study, for gathering the data. 
In the timeline, there are two stages: pilot study and case studies. The former mainly 
offers the specification of institutional constraints on China’s export market, while 
the latter one leads to the main multiple-case study. In the specific process of data 
collecting, they are similar. One informal email, telephone or visit was undertaken at 
very beginning, in order to enquire if they were interested in being involved in this 
study. After they agreed, the background documentation relating to the company, 
product, and industry, would be collected at the outset. Material was collected from 
academic journals, the company website, government websites, newspapers, 
magazines, etc. Then specific interview notes, which differed according to the 
previous background data, would be generated. During the formal interviews, the 
main questions were first asked to the key informants, while some additional 
questions and triangulation questions to other informants.  It is worth mentioning that 
these methods are usually alternately used, as the “data collection in case is a 
recursive and interactive process” (Merriam, 1998, p134)  




                                       Source: (Yin, 2003b) 
 
5.6.6.1 Interviews  
Interviewing is the most important source, sometimes the only source(Merriam, 1998, 
p71), of data for a case study (Yin, 2003b). It commonly contains three main types: 
structured, semi-structured and unstructured, according to different level of control 
on questions and structure (Ghauri, Gronhaug, & Kristianslund, 1995; Merriam, 
1998; Yin, 2003b). The Figure 5-4  below shows the different characteristics of three 









Structured/Standardized Semi-structured Unstructured/Informal 
 
Wording of questions predetermined 
Mix of more- and less-structured 
questions 
Open-ended questions 
Order of questions predetermined  Flexible, exploratory 
Oral form of a survey  More like a conversation 
 
Figure 5-4  Interview structure continuum. 
                    Source: (Merriam, 1998, p73) 
The structured interviews, or standardized interviews, is a standard format of  the 
interview, which is used with an emphasis on fixed response categories and 
systematic sampling, and loading procedures combined with quantitative measures 
and statistical methods. The unstructured interview (or in-depth interviewing) is the 
freer data-collection method, during which the respondent is offered almost full 
liberty to discuss reactions, opinions and behaviour on a particular issue (Ghauri et 
al., 1995, p64). The semi-structured interview is the other different kind of interview 
that tries to integrate the former two methods. Burns and Robert (2000) state “this 
has been used either as part of a structured interview or an unstructured interview, as 
investigators from both persuasions feel that this may help their study”. On the one 
hand, it acquires a degree of structure, such as the main issues, sample size, specific 
interviewees and leading questions. At the same time, its relatively “open” format 
aims to avoid the bias that can arise from the sequencing of subject matter by the 
interviewer, from any inadvertent omission of questions, from unrepresentative 
sampling and from an uncontrolled, over- or under- representation of subgroups 
among the respondents (Ghauri et al., 1995, p64).  
 
In this study, the in-depth and semi-structured interviews are adopted in order to 
increase the freedom of interviewers to obtain more information; after all this study 
is a kind of exploratory research. However, this format is vulnerable to the 
interviewers’ emotions and subjectivity; the researcher can often lose control of the 
interview. To overcome these problems, the interviews are guided by a series of 
question lists and brief structure guide, and open-ended questions at the same time 
(see the details in the interview guide). The setting of such a framework attempts to 
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enquire after specific questions from all respondents, and in the meanwhile it also 
allows some flexibility to pursue emergent information in each case (Merriam, 1998).  
Questions and probe  
Good questions are vital for obtaining good data during interviewing. Merriam (1998, 
p75-80) concludes with four types of good questions and three types of bad questions 
(Shown as Table 5-5). This offers constructive suggestions for the generation of 
questions in the interviews in this study (Shown as Table 5-6). For instance, the 
“Devil’s Advocate” leads to the questions on checking one statement from previous 
respondents, including within cases and cross-cases. The “ideal position question” 
can explore the difficulty generated by institutional constraints.  
Table 5-6  Four Types of questions with examples from a JTPA Training 
Program Case study. 
Type of Question Example 
Hypothetical Question: asks what the respondent 
might do or what it might be like in a particular 
situation; usually begins with “what if” or 
“suppose” 
“Suppose it is my first day in this training 
program. What would it be like?”  
Devil’s Advocate Question: challenges the 
respondent to consider an opposing view  
“Some people would say that employees 
who lose their job did something to bring 
it about. What would you say to them?” 
Ideal Position Question: asks the respondent to 
describe an ideal situation 
“What do you think the ideal training 
program would be like?”  
Interpretive Question: advances tentative 
interpretation of what the respondent has been 
saying and asks for a reaction 
“Would you say that returning to school 
as an adult is different from what you 
expected?” 
(Merriam, 1998, p75-80) 
Table 5-7  Questions to avoid. 
Type of Question Example 
Multiple Questions How do you feel about the instructors and 
the classes?  
Leading Questions What emotional problems have you had 
since losing your job?  
Yes-or-No Questions Do you like the program? Has returning to 
school been difficult?  
 (Merriam, 1998, p75-80) 
 
The probing question refers to the interviewers’ questions in response interviewees’ 
previous answers. It is constructed to ask more details, clarification and examples 
(Merriam, 1998). It helps to extend the different and emergent information from 




The interview guide is the list of prepared questions for the interviews (Merriam, 
1998). It is generated and amended from pilot study to the final case, as the multiple 
case study should repeatedly check the emergent issues from previous cases (Yin, 
2003b).  In general, the questions in this study start with the questions on historical 
and background information on the cases and interviewees, and are followed by the 
questions on transaction process, the whole process for the case and the specific 
transactional procedure for interviewees, and conclude with the open-end questions 
on the interviewees’ opinions (the details are shown in appendix 2 interview guide).  
 
In practice, the questions of interviews (shown in appendix 2: interview guide) in this 
study are generated according to the theoretical framework in this study, referring to 
previous literatures on institutional theory, transaction costs and trading companies in 
particular. These questions can be separated into two main groups. The first group is 
about the context of the case. The second group are surrounding theoretical concepts 
of theoretical framework.   
 
The context-related questions aim to introduce the case companies, like history and 
staff roles, which will help researcher and readers to realize the background of cases, 
Therefore the questions in practice are usually like “Can you briefly introduce the 
firm, like date of establishment”.  
 
The second group of questions, related to the theoretical concepts, become the most 
important part in interviews, as data from the answers test and develop theoretical 
framework. Frist of all, export transaction is proved to be focus in previous 
literatures on trading companies (Casson, 1998; Peng, 1998; Peng & York, 2001; 
Roehl, 1983), and transaction costs economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985), and 
therefore become the unit of analysis in this study, as stated in section 5.5.3. As a 
result, many questions are about the whole process of export transaction, from 
manufacturer to foreign buyers. These questions are shown as “can you briefly 
introduce how to transact with foreign buyers, step by step?” In particular, one brief 
export transaction flow chart (shown as Figure 7-2) developed from case A is shown 




Second, three groups of institutional constraints, which can obstruct export 
transaction, are one main concern of theoretical framework in this study. Thus 
questions related institutional constraints (term of problems are used in questions to 
make understandable for interviewees) are another important series of questions. The 
interviewees will be asked the problems in their import/export process, especially 
those related to institutions, like government policy, industrial traditions and norms 
and culture. Those previous literatures on institutional constraints helps to highlight 
contain problems about doing business in transition economies, like government 
intervention, contract enforcement, and intellectual property protection. In particular, 
pilot study in chapter 6 has clarified three specific institutional constraints. Thus, the 
author directly enquires interviewees’ opinions on such institutional constraints from 
their business practice in subsequent cases study. In some cases, the author describes 
these institutional constraints at first to explain the concept of institutional constraints 
and then enquires their opinion. 
 
Third, the explanation of ETCs’ advantage on economizing transaction costs, another 
important part of theoretical framework, leads to one different sort of questions in 
interviews. In response to previous questions on institutional constraints, the 
interviewees are enquired about their solutions to these problems. These questions 
usually are followed up by interviewees’ description of institutional constraints 
involved in their export business, and take the form of “So, how does your company 
solve such problems?” These questions are also based on transaction costs economics. 
For instance, transaction amount/frequency, one common explanation in transaction 
costs economics (Williamson, 1985), generates the questions on numbers of ETCs’ 
manufacturers and foreign buyers. Some of these questions are based on previous 
explanations on trading companies. For example, previous literatures argue that 
experience and knowledge on export business (Peng, 1998) and products’ 
characteristics (Roehl, 1982) help ETCs to reduce related transaction costs. Thus the 
questions on experience and knowledge (staffs’ work history) and export products 




At last, the information on ETCs’ manufacturers and foreign buyers are also 
interviewed. As stated in chapter 2, the comparative approach of economizing 
transaction costs to different transactions and governance structures is the main 
research method in transaction costs analysis (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Moreover, 
comparison and contrast are also common analytical methods in case study (Miles & 
Huberman, 1999). Therefore this study will explore the situation of alternative 
trading partners in order to explain the ETCs’ advantages on economizing transaction 
costs by comparing with their domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers. As a result, 
this group of questions are surrounding the information of these domestic 
manufacturers and foreign buyers. For instance, the size, production capability, 
characteristics of ETCs’ domestic manufacturers are interviewed in case study.  
 
Informants 
Purposeful sampling is also appropriate for the selection of informants (Seidman, 
2012). Huber & Power (1985) indicates the importance of the key informant, as a 
consequence of their massive knowledge of events in the company. They further 
recommend that “If  more  than  one  informant  per  unit  of  analysis is to be 
interviewed,  choose  informants whose unique  biases or lack of  knowledge are 
likely to offset those of  other  informants”   
 
Therefore, this study respectively interviews two groups of informants within each 
case: the key informants and ordinary informants. The key informants are mainly the 
owners and CEOs in the case, who are clearly the persons more likely to have 
acquired knowledge on trading companies and export transactions (Peng, 1998). 
They offer main and general data on the company, export transaction processes and 
significant parts in each case. The ordinary informants include department managers, 
ordinary staff, who offer information on specific transaction unit procedures, and on 
their related parts in the case. In addition, amongst the ordinary informants are some 
informants external but related to the ETCs, such as staff from manufacturing. The 
information from ordinary informants offers the triangulating check on previous 
interviews, thereby increasing internal consistency (Peng, 1998), and supplementary 




In the end, a total of 42 formal interviews from six cases and 10 independent 
interviewees in pilot study were completed. And many follow-up interviews, 
telephone calls and on-line conversations were adopted for clarification of some 
questions. The formal interviews lasted 60 to 120minutes on average. To enhance 
reliability, all interviews were recorded and transcribed (Merriam, 1998). Then all 
content related to the research was translated by the author, and checked by another 




Yin (2003b) indicates that the documentation covers various items, such as letters, 
agendas, administrative documents, formal studies and newspaper articles. In 
particular, the documentation on the background to the cases should be collected 
before formal and main data collection. This enables the researcher to identify the 
key points, events and persons in the case, and to establish the corresponding 
fieldwork guide for formal and main data collection. For instance, Pettigrew (1997) 
suggests that “the interviews should ideally be preceded by the collection and 
analysis of historical documents, which are used to establish the core of the 
chronology of the process and identify key individuals and transition points in the 
process.” In addition, Yin (2003b) states that the documentation is also useful for 
corroborating and augmenting evidence. In other words, this triangulation through 
the documentation offers the opportunity to both check the findings, and supplement 
any information lost in the main data collection process, such as the interviews in this 
study.  
 
Therefore, the documentation relevant to this study is collected in two separate stages. 
First, the background documentation related to the company, product, and industry of 
the interviewees and case company is collected before the formal interviews. The 
documents are mainly referred to in the generation of specific interview notes. After 
the interviews, certain documentation is also specifically sought to further triangulate 
and check certain statements from the interviews. The main sources of the 
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documentation include academic journals, industrial reports, company websites, 
government websites, newspapers, magazines, etc. 
5.6.6.3 Observation 
 
Observation is another important method for data collection in the case  study  which 
is commonly recommended by methodology studies (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2003b). 
Merriam Merriam (1998), p94 believes that observation can construct one “natural 
field setting” and obtain first-hand data on the phenomenon.  
 
Observation took place in the first case in this study, in order to develop a picture of 
the Chinese ETC in practical business. The author spent two months in this ETC. 
During this time, the author observed the ETC’s working site, each staff’s daily work, 
the transactional process, communications and business transactions with external 
organizations. In addition, formal interviews and informal chats were processed 
during the observation period.   
5.6.6.4 Pilot study 
 
Many studies suggest that preliminary study should be used in a case study 
(Pettigrew, 1997; Yin, 2003b). Yin states that the pilot study is the preliminary study 
before proceeding with the formal case study. It helps to “to refine your data 
collection plans with respect to both the content of the data and the procedures to be 
followed.” The investigation and data in the pilot study could be “broader and less 
focused” than that in real case study. The timing should be as earlier as possible. The 
sources should contain as much as possible from previous research to empirical 
findings of your own. In addition, the data collection process should reflect 
“convenience, access and geographic proximity” (Yin, 2003b, p79-p81). 
 
The pilot study is separated into two parts in this study. Initially, one pilot study was 
undertaken before all the case studies so that the main institutional constraints 
encountered in exporting in China, could be explored and specified. Since the scope 
of the institutions is too broad, and the specific institutional constraints in export 
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practice in China are unknown, one explorative investigation on specification of such 
institutional constrains helps to check the previous analytical framework, and to 
make more efficient data collection in the forthcoming case study. In addition, the 
practical information on China’s export business and process, and Chinese ETCs also 
contribute to such aims. The main method of data collection is the interview, while 
the informants are from manufacturers, foreign buyers and Chinese ETCs. In the 
second stage, the pilot study was the same as the case study, as is widely adopted in 
the case study method (Yin, 2003b). As a formal single case, its procedure is same as 
in subsequent cases in this study. Similarly, it aims to check the analytical framework, 
and increase the efficiency for subsequent cases. For instance, one comprehensive 
export transaction flow chart, which is developed in Case A as observation offers 
more information, is also used in the interviews of subsequent cases. Such method 
largely increase efficiency of interview and is welcomed by the informants. The main 
methods of data collection in case A include the interviews and observation. The 
informants also represent key and ordinary informants, as stated in 3.6.6.1.   
5.5.7 Data Analysis  
 
Many studies recommended the data analysis should take place in the early stage of 
research and continued throughout the whole research (Merriam, 1998; Miles & 
Huberman, 1999; Yin, 2003b). In other words, the data collection, data analysis, and 
theoretical development are synchronous (Miles & Huberman, 1999).  As stated in 
Yin’s “feedback” loop, this enables re-visiting of previous cases with new findings in 
a current case, earlier data analysis also enables researchers to revise previous 
analytical frameworks, and to prepare further analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1999). 
Therefore, the data analysis in this study took place at the same time of pilot study 
and alongside the data collection and analysis. In addition, the main part of the data 
analysis is separated into within case analysis and cross-case analysis, a strategy also 
suggested by the extant literatures (Miles & Huberman, 1999; Yin, 2003b).  
5.6.7.1 within Case Analysis  
Miles & Huberman (1999) advise one interactive model for data analysis, which 
includes data collection, data reduction, data display and drawing/verifying (shown 
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as Figure 5-5 and 5-6). Amongst these, data reduction, data display and 
drawing/verifying jointly construct the process of data analysis. In the process of data 
reduction, the data on the field notes or transcriptions are selected, simplified, 
abstracted and transformed. This process takes place even before data collection. It is 
part of the analysis. It helps to sharpen, sort, focus, discard and organize data, so that 
the final conclusions can be drawn and verified (Miles & Huberman, 1999, p10-11) 
(shown as Figure 5-5). In this study, the data reduction ensures that the original 
interviews transcriptions are selectively simplified according the integrative 
analytical frameworks. In particular, the complex transactional process of each ETC 
is concentrated and simplified into simpler several transactional procedures. And the 
complicated institutions in China are simplified and organized according to the 
institutional framework.  
 
 
Figure 5-5  Components of Data Analysis: Interactice Model. 
Source: (Miles & Huberman, 1999, p10-p12) 
 
Data display is “an organized, compressed assembly of information that permits 
conclusion drawing and action”, and enables the researcher to find the patterns 
efficiently (Miles & Huberman, 1999, p11, p91). This part is similar to the “case 
description” (Yin, 2003b), which is argued by Yin as one main strategy for data 
analysis in a case study. Miles & Huberman’s work (1999) contribute many  
effective and workable means for data display, including various matrices, charts and 
networks. Among of them, this study adopts the synergetic data display between 
time-ordered display (Miles & Huberman, 1999, p110) and conceptually-ordered 
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display (Miles & Huberman, 1999, p127).  First, following the time-order, time-
series analysis in Yin’s study (Yin, 2003b),  the data are displayed according to 
sequential orders during the whole export transactional process. Then these data are 
reduced, simplified, organized and re-allocated into different export transactional 
procedures and different institutional constraints, which are distincive concepts 
during whole export transactional process.  
 
Conclusion drawing and verification is another component of the data analysis 
process. It requires the researcher to observe, search for, and analyse the “regularities, 
patterns, explanations, possible configurations, causal flows and propositions” 
among the data. In the meanwhile, the conclusion drawing and verification are 
simultaneous and interactive processes (Miles & Huberman, 1999, p11). Similarly in 
this study, the findings and conclusions from each case are verified and tested in 
other cases, in order to improve the validity.  
 
 
Figure 5-6  Components of Data Analysis: Flow Model. 
Source: (Miles & Huberman, 1999, p10-p12) 
5.6.7.2 Cross Case Analysis  
 
Cross-case analysis/ synthesis is one more powerful analytical means in the case 
study, with its greater robustness compared with a single case (Yin, 2003b, p133). It 
enhances generalizability, and deepens understanding and explanation, by illustrating 
repeated-appearances of the same/similar event, process, and more important patterns 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) crossing different cases (Miles & Huberman, 1999). In addition, 
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cross-case analysis should not ignore the uniqueness of each case, when it pursues 
these general items across different cases (Sliverstein, 1988).  
 
This study adopts the mixed strategy, sometimes referred to as stacking comparable 
cases, in cross-case analysis, by combining case-oriented strategies and variable-
oriented strategies. Miles & Huberman (1999, p176) describe the specifications of 
such a strategy as “you write up each of a series of cases, using a more or less 
standard set of variables (with leeway for uniqueness as it emerges). Then you use 
matrices and other displays to analyse each case in depth. After each case is well 
understood (the cross-cutting variables may evolve and change during this process), 
you “stack” the case-level displays in a “meta-matrix,” which is then further 
condensed, permitting systematic comparison.”   
5.5.8 Criteria for Judging the Quality of Research Design  
 
Table 5-8  Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests. 
Test Explanation Case Study Tactic Phase of research 





operational measures for 
the concepts being studied 
Use multiple sources of 
evidence 
 
Establish chain of evidence 
 
Have key informants 










Establish a causal 
relationship, whereby 
certain conditions are 
shown to lead to other 
conditions, as distinguished 
from spurious relationships 
Do pattern-matching 
Do explanation-building 
Address rival explanations 









Establish the domain to 
which a study’s findings can 
be generalized 
Use theory in single-case 
studies 




Reliability Demonstrate that the 
operations of a study-such 
as the data collection 
procedures-can be 
repeated, with the same 
results 
Use case study protocol 








As shown in Table 5-7, criteria for judging the quality of research design in thi study 
concludes four main aspects: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, 
and reliability. Construct validity refers to “establish(ing) correct operational 
measures for the concepts being studied” (Yin, 2003b, p34 :Kidder & Judd, 1986, 
p26-29). Following Yin’s recommendations (Yin, 2003b), the main solutions in this 
study contain multiple data collection methods (semi-structured interviews, 
observation and documentation), multiple interviewees in same case, establishing a 
chain of evidence, and requiring key informants (only accepted in certain cases) to 
review the draft case study report.  
 
Internal validity refers to “establish(ing) a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious 
relationships” (Yin, 2003b, p34 :Kidder & Judd, 1986, p26-29). This study adopts 
“pattern matching”, which is able to improve the internal validity by matching 
“empirically based patterns with a predicted one” (Yin, 2003b, p116). Therefore, the 
data collection and data analysis in this study do check the relationship between 
institutional constraints (institution-related transaction costs) with Chinese ETC’s 
export conditions. For instance, with the improvement of such institutional 
constraints, the interviews from ETCs express the loss of their comparative 
advantages on exports, while the foreign buyers and domestic manufacturers are 
more likely to appreciate these improvements. 
 
In addition, long-term observation and peer examination are also able to improve 
internal validity (Merriam, 1998). During the two-month observation in one ETC, the 
relationship between the ETC’s business characteristics and institutional constraints 
show more clearly. Moreover, the explanation of such relationships to many 
practitioners and discussion between the author and other researchers, including the 
supervisors, also helps to clarify such relationship. As a result, they jointly increase 
internal validity.  
 
External validity refers to “establish(ing) the domain to which a study’s findings can 
be generalized” (Yin, 2003b, p34 :Kidder & Judd, 1986, p26-29). Correspondingly, 
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replication logic is used from one case to another. More specifically, these cases 
share one general outcome in the analytical frameworks.  
 
Reliability refers to “demonstrat(ing) that the operations of a study-such as the data 
collection procedures-can be repeated, with the same results”. There are two 
solutions in this study. First, one case study protocol is used. Second, the case 
database is also generated, including the interview guide, field notes, transcripts, 
recording, documentation and so on.  
  
5.7 Chapter Summary 
 
This Chapter illustrates the research strategy and methodology, which offers the 
logical link between the evidence and research questions in this study. It includes the 
philosophical stance in this study, the justification for the use of qualitative case 



















Chapter 6 The preliminary identification of institutional 
constraints in China’s export market: pilot study A  
6.1 Introduction  
The pilot study or preliminary study is recommended before the formal case studies 
are undertaken (Pettigrew, 1997; Yin, 2003b), as it helps to “to refine your data 
collection plans with respect to both the content of the data and the procedures to be 
followed.” (Yin, 2003b) Therefore, this study adopts the pilot study approach, which 
covers the first step in this chapter and second step in the first within-case (case A) 
analysis. The pilot study A in this chapter aims to pre-test and modify the previous 
integrative framework and to specify the institutional constrains on China’s export 
market. The interviews with ten experienced practitioners constitute the main source 
of data. Ten interviewees respectively come from three different groups of 
stakeholders involved in direct and indirect exporting from China: domestic 
manufacturers, foreign buyers and China’s ETCs. All of them have long-standing 
experience of China’s export market.  
 
The section 6.1 is the introduction to this chapter. Then section 6.2 contains the 
general description of pilot study A, the introduction of the interviewees, and the 
main findings of pilot study A. In section 6.3, the previous analytical framework is 
modified and specified in line with the findings in 6.2. Finally section 6.4 
summarizes this chapter 
6.2 Pilot study   
 
The pilot study forms the preliminary study before the formal case studies. It helps to 
“to refine your data collection plans with respect to both the content of the data and 
the procedures to be followed.” The investigation and data in the pilot study should 
be “broader and less focused” than that in actual case studies. The timing should be 
as early as possible. The sources should include as much as possible from previous 
research to the empirical findings of your own. In addition, the data collection 
process should reflect “convenience, access and geographic proximity” (Yin, 2003b, 
p79-p81). Therefore, these recommendations help to guide the pilot study strategy in 
this study. For instance, the timing is chosen as early as possible, while sample of the 
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interviewees is achieved through introductions by friends, and the research sites are 
mainly located in regions most convenient and accessible to the author. 
6.2.1 Description of pilot study in this chapter 
The pilot study A in this chapter aims to explore and specify the main institutional 
constraints that impinge on exporting in China. According to the previous analytical 
framework developed in Chapter 3, the major participants involved in export 
transactions comprise domestic manufacturers, ETCs and foreign buyers. Thus this 
pilot study is conducted mainly from the perspective of domestic manufacturers and 
foreign buyers, together with the triangulation check from the ETCs’ perspective, in 
order to explore the challenging problems that are generated by institutional 
constraints within China’s export market in the course of export and import practice 
in China. After that, the analytical framework will be refined to incorporate several 
specific institutional constraints that will be checked and used as a general guide for 
data collection in subsequent cases for exploring potential methods, by which 
Chinese ETCs can reduce these institution-related transaction costs. The main data in 
the pilot study are collected through interviews with practitioners drawn from these 
three groups of participants. As a triangulation check supplementing these main data, 
secondary data are also collected from public channels, such as industrial reports, 
government reports, academic literature, newspapers, and other reliable sources.    
6.2.2 Introduction of the interviewees  
 
During the pilot study A, 10 practitioners, who had been worked in the export 
business in China, were interviewed. The interviews took place in the autumn of 
2009 in the UK and China, which preceded the main data collection in the winter of 
2009 and the spring of 2010 in China. These interviewees included three 
practitioners (coded as BUY-P-A, B, C) from foreign importing companies, five 
practitioners (coded as MAN-P-A, B, C, D) from domestic manufacturers, and two 
practitioners (coded as ETC-P-A, B, C) from Chinese ETCs.   
 
BUY-P-A is one co-owner of an importing company from Taiwan. He had been 
working in China for more than ten years before he opened an importing company 
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with another partner in Taiwan in 2000. His companies mainly import building 
materials, such as fireproof materials from China, and then resell to construction 
companies in Taiwan. Due to his close contact with the culture and long-term 
working and living experience in China, he well understands China’s business 
system, including the necessary trading authority for each exporter, and is familiar 
with Chinese business habits, such as unreliable contracts. His companies initially 
transacted directly with several Chinese manufacturers. But after a number of serious 
“quality problems”, he turned to Chinese ETCs for indirect imports.    
 
BUY-P-B is one co-owner of oan importing company from Saudi Arabia. His father 
had participated in the importing business between China and Saudi Arabia since the 
1990s. With such a family background, he opened one importing company with 
another partner in Saudi Arabia in 2002. His company mainly designs and sells toys 
in Arab countries that are produced by Chinese manufacturers. Since 2003 he had 
been accustomed to travelling around China once a year, in order to search for and 
negotiate with suitable manufacturers and ETCs. At first, he used one HK trading 
company that had branches in China and Saudi Arabia, to facilitate the whole 
importing and purchasing process. Then he now changes to one Chinese ETC, which 
he knew during one business travel in China.  
 
BUY-P-C is the owner of one importing company from the UK. His company was 
established in 1998. His company mainly imports bedding products, such as pillows 
from China. Based on his 15-year business experience in China, his company has 
two main collaborative Chinese ETCs with many other backup ones, with which he 
occasionally transacts. He used to have some direct transactions with Chinese 
manufacturers but due to some problems, such as quality and delivery times, he 
turned to collaborating with ETCs, which could better facilitate with whole export 
process.  
 
MAN-P-A is the owner of one Chinese manufacturer, which is located in Tianjin. He 
had many different kinds of business experience, mainly in domestic trade, such as 
apparel, lumber, furniture etc. His company, which then produced furniture for the 
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domestic market, began to participate in exporting in 2005, when one ETC enquired 
after some cabinets from them. His main exporting market is the United States. His 
exporting channel is exclusively through two ETCs.    
 
MAN-P-B is the owner of one Chinese manufacturing company, which located is in 
Tianjin. He used to work as a senior manager in one ETC, which was operated by his 
brother and exported pre-fabricated houses. As a consequence of increasing orders 
and understanding of manufacturing, he turned to opening his own factory in 1998, 
which mainly supplied products for the previous ETC. The exporting destinations 
include Australia and New Zealand. Their exporting channel is dominated by one 
ETC.  
 
MAN-P-C is one of the main salesmen in one Chinese manufacturing company, 
which located in Qingdao. She has worked in this company for four-years as a 
salesman. Her main job is to search for new foreign buyers and maintain current 
foreign buyers. This factory produces various kinds of wooden packaging cases.  50% 
of the output from the manufacturer is exported through an ETC, whilst the other half 
is through their own export channel.  
 
MAN-P-D is a manager in the exporting department of a Chinese manufacturing 
company located in Shanghai. After graduating in business studies from the UK in 
2006, he worked as salesmen in one ETC. Then he moved to his current factory in 
2008. His department takes charge of the whole export process, from searching for 
buyers to the final enforcement of contracts. This factory produces stationery, such 
as note-boards. Before 2007, this factory only offered products to one ETC. Then, it 
gradually developed its own export channel. At present, his department takes charge 
of exporting 30% of the output, whilst the remaining 70% is still undertaken by the 
ETC.        
 
ETC-P-A is the co-owner of a Chinese private ETC located in Tianjin. He had been 
working in the export business since the 1980s, when he graduated from college and 
was recruited by one state-owned trading company. He has worked in many different 
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ETCs over the last 20s years. This ETC was established in the 1990s. At present, it 
mainly exports apparel to several foreign buyers in Japan. Its collaborative 
manufacturers are SMEs, located in the rural areas around Tianjin. These 
collaborative manufacturers are relatively fixed and have more than four years’ 
collaborative history with him. 
 
ETC-P-B is one manager of a private Chinese ETC, which is located in Shanghai. 
She has had more than ten years’ working experience in the export industry in China. 
She used to work in three different ETCs before the current one, which mainly 
exports plastic bags, such as shopping bags, to the EU and US. Although she 
continues to search for new buyers, her department mainly takes charge of two 
important existing foreign buyers from Germany and the UK, which jointly make up 
more than 50% of the export volume of this ETC. Her department takes 
responsibility for the whole export process.  
 
ETC-P-C is one manger of a state-owned ETC located in Tianjin. He graduated with 
a major in international trade in 1998, then worked as salesmen in the current ETC, 
and finally became a senior manager in this ETC. This is a large ETC that has been 
established since 1965. It has 6 exporting departments, which are divided according 
to different exporting products, and three supporting and administrative departments, 
which had a total of 70 employees and an export turnover of $40,000,000 in 2010. 
The main tradable products exported by this ETC include drawn work, artificial 
flowers, etc. His department mainly exports plastic flowers to more than 10 countries.  
 
Table 6-1  Summary of interviewees in pilot study A. 
Coded 
name  



















































































Private ETC in 
Shanghai, China 
plastic bags Manager 














In order to identify any institutional constraints during exporting in China, the main 
content of the interviews with these practitioners focused on the problems 
confronting them in their daily work in importing/exporting. In particular, the 
institution-related problems were highlighted during these interviews. For interviews 
with BUY-P-A, B, C, the questions were about what kinds of problems they met or 
perceived during their own import process in China; if and why they used indirect 
Chinese ETCs’ export channels; and how these ETCs facilitated their import process. 
For interviews with MAN-P-A, B, C, D, the questions focused on what kinds of 
problems they met or perceived during their own export process; if and why they use 
indirect Chinese ETCs’ export channels; and how these ETCs facilitated their export 
process. In terms of the interviews with ETC-P-A, B, C, the enquiries concentrated 
on what kinds of problems they met during their export process. In particular, some 
previous answers from BUY-P-A, B, C and MAN-P-A, B, C, D were also mentioned 
and checked out in the interviews with ETC-P-A, B, C. By doing such triangulation, 
the construct validity of these data was enhanced. Table 6-2 summarizes these 
problems related to local institutional constraints reflected in the interviews. 
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MAN-P BUY-P ETC-P 
A B C D A B C A B C 
Complex and time-consuming administrative procedures 
for applications for export authority, business licences and 
registrations  
Bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals 
MAN-P-A, B, 
C, D  
ETC-P-A, B, C 
Y Y Y Y    Y Y Y 
Complex and time-consuming administrative procedures 
for approvals for each export transaction   
Y Y Y Y    Y Y Y 
Complex and time-consuming administrative procedures 
for tax rebates 
Y Y Y Y    Y Y Y 
 
Export contracts are not protected Inefficient legal system BUY-P-A, B, C     Y Y Y    
 
Uncertainty of product quality  
Ineffective legal system and 
contract obligation 
BUY-P-A, B, C 
ETC-P-A, B, C 
    Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Delay in delivery time 
Ineffective legal system and 
contract obligation 
BUY-P-A, B, C 
ETC-P-A, B, C 




6.2.3 Findings from pilot study  
6.2.3.1 Bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals  
 
The inefficient bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals in transitional 
economies have been criticized by many related studies (Estrin et al., 2008; Meyer, 
2001a; Zou, Zhang, & Wang, 2007). Meyer (2001a) indicates the local “bureaucratic 
procedures” in Eastern Europe, such as the approval for real estate acquisition, could 
generate significant costs in term of time, as these procedures are complex and slow. 
Estrin (2008) also reveals a similar finding in the study on the institutional 
environment in transitional economies. They found that some “administrative 
barriers” obstruct businesses in these transitional economies. For instance, there are 
the lengthy timescales and massive procedures for starting up businesses. These 
bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals typically inherited from the 
previous planned economy system that persist to the present time, and therefore are 
located as the “former formal institutional constraints”.  
 
First, all participants from domestic manufacturers (MAN-P-A, B, C, D) and ETCs 
(ETC-P-A, B, C) expressed the view that exporters have to obtain a series of export 
authorities, business licences, and registrations for the start-up of export businesses. 
But the applications procedures for such official documents are complex, time-
consuming and subject to change in China. This procedure is not related to the export 
transactions between exporters and buyers, but is an unavoidable feature of the 
export business in China. 
 
The secondary data (shown in the table 6-3) also support such findings. It emerges 
that the Chinese exporters have to apply for and annually renew various permissions, 
licences registration and authorities before their export business can proceed. The 
main ones are listed on the following table. The whole period of all application and 
registration needs at least two months (SINA, 2008). Also, most of these licences and 
registrations need to be renewed every year. Thus these applications and registrations 
generate additional costs, in terms of time and money, for domestic exporters. As 
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these procedures take place before any formal transaction between domestic 
exporters and foreign buyers, they add one additional pre-export procedure in formal 
export transaction process. 
 
Table 6-3  Summary of official licences/registrations for operating export 
business in China. 
Licences and registration Government departments Annual (Y/N) 
Export authority/registration 




Administration for Industry and 
Commerce 
Y 
Registration for receiving and 
exchanging foreign exchange  
Foreign exchange branches 
Y 








Registration for obtaining product 
inspection certification 
Entry-exit inspection and 
quarantine bureau 
Y 
Registration for tax rebates  Taxation bureau Y 
 
Apart from such export start-up approvals, the findings from the interviews (MAN-
P-A, B, C, D, ETC-P-A, B, C) show that China’s exporters have also to submit 
and/or receive a series of related documents/receipts to/from these relative 
government departments for each export transaction. These procedures actually take 
place after formal transactions between domestic exporters and foreign buyers 
(referred to as the post-export procedure in export transactions). To take foreign 
exchange approvals as an example, the use and receipt of foreign exchange does not 
only require initial registration with local foreign exchange branches and customs, 
but also needs exporters to process a series of documents, paper documents, receipts 
and on-line records, through these departments for each export transaction, as a result 
of the government’s strict control on foreign exchange. Without one of the necessary 
documents, the exporters will fail to export.  
 
Another example is the tax rebate procedures, which are time-consuming in China. 
The rebate of taxes is significant for exporters, as it often make up around 10% of the 
product price in China. The tax rebate procedures in China have been strict and 
complex in order to avoid fraud cases, and they constantly change as the export 
system in China changes. Likewise such procedures require documents and records 
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from local Taxation bureau and customs. Then the exporters have to wait for three-
months processing time until they receive the tax rebate. On occasion, the waiting 
time can even rise to more than half a year. Moreover, there is an expiry limit of 
three-months, which it means the exporters risk failing to receive the tax rebate if 
they make some mistakes and miss the deadline during the procedure. Finally, the 
levels of tax rebate can differ by product and over different periods. The Chinese 
Customs usually issue one large booklet containing all tradable products, every year. 
Sometimes, these rates are also changed during different periods in the year in 
accordance with changes of export policy. Exporters have to fill in the tax code 
accurately in term of their products. This increases the possibilities for making 
mistakes.   
 
In practice, therefore, the exporting company usually has to set specific and 
experienced staff to deal with these complicated documents and procedures on 
foreign exchange approvals and tax rebating.  
 
What is worse, these procedures are often changed by these government departments. 
As some changes are initially issued by central governments, or some are initially 
trialled in some regions and then extended to other regions, the real editions are 
different for different local governments. Thus even the officers and staff in these 
government departments are unfamiliar with and still learning about some of the new 
changes. In addition, some of changes are in conflict with previous and other 
procedures. As a result, domestic exporters constantly had to keep learning, adapting 
and even accepting losses from these changes.  
 
MAN-P-B describes one confusing situation as below:  
“The foreign exchange branches recently changed the procedure for applying for the 
approval to receive and use foreign exchange. But it confused us for a while. We 
asked the officers in the branch. The officers couldn’t explain it because it is a new 
policy, and told me to prepare two sets of documents respectively in line with both 




Due to these complicated and changing post-export procedures, it has been reported 
that a lot of Chinese exports, which have already obtained the necessary relevant 
official licenses and registrations to undertake export business (which are needed in 
the pre-export procedure), do not necessarily export on their own account (SINA, 
2008). In other words, these exporters give up direct export channels due to these 
costly post-export procedures, even after they have obtained the compulsory licences 
that form part of the pre-export procedures.   
 
As a result, both of these additional transactional procedures, generated by 
institutional constraints, lead to considerable costs for domestic exporters and use up 
resources for example, on the employment of additional staff to work on these 
procedures and on time spent waiting for some official document or other. Moreover, 
government policies on these procedures are continuously changing. These domestic 
exporters had to learn and understand these changing and new procedures. Otherwise, 
it will delay and even stop the progress of some export transactions. In the end, 
government policies from such procedures generate additional uncertainty, and 
related costs for export transactions.  
 
Therefore, the findings from this pilot study A initially show that bureaucratic 
procedures and administrative approvals do exist in China’s exporting markets, and 
generate additional transaction costs for domestic exporters (including manufacturers 
and ETCs, the same as in the rest of this study), as they add additional transactional 
procedures and/or generate uncertainty in export transactions.  
6.2.3.2 Inefficient/Weak legal system   
 
The cost of enforcement contracts is one important sub-cost in transaction costs 
theory (Furubotn & Richter, 2005, p25), and is closely related to international trade 
in practice (Peng, 1998). The extant literatures on international purchasing and 
importing indicate that the quality and timely delivery of products become the most 
concerning problems for purchaser’s decisions as to selection of suppliers (Kannan & 
Tan, 2002; Katsikeas & Dalgic, 1995; Leonidou, 1999). In China this condition is 
even more significant. According to the China Purchasing Development Report of 
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 challenges (the 2
nd
 is increasing operational costs) by foreign purchasers 
for sourcing suppliers in China. Moreover, other research about international 
purchasing offices (IPOs) in China also reports one main function of these IPOs is to 
control for quality (Nassimbeni & Sartor, 2006). This example indirectly shows that 
enforcement of the export contract, such as “quality” of product, is one of the the 
main problems for importing from China. The inefficient formal legal system and 
informal contract obligation are the main determinants of such problems.  
 
The inefficient legal system, including formal law and legal enforcement (Meyer, 
2001b), is the most commonly reported obstacle for doing business in transitional 
economies (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Khanna et al., 2005; Meyer, 2001a). These 
inefficient legal systems in transitional economies include private property rights 
(Estrin et al., 2008; Peng & Heath, 1996), commercial law and contract enforcement 
(Choi et al., 1999; Estrin et al., 2008; Khanna et al., 2005; Luo, 2002; Meyer, 2001b), 
intellectual protection(Meyer, 2001a), official requirements for listed companies 
(Peng, 2004) and so on. Since the legal systems have been developing from the 
beginning of the transition in these countries in order to fulfil the increasing need for 
emerging market transactions, they are classified into current formal institutional 
constraints in the analytical framework. These inefficient legal systems considerably 
increase transaction costs, especially the enforcement/monitoring costs (Coase, 2008). 
Peng (1998) also indicates that  contract enforcement and resulting monitoring costs 
on contracts are the most likely procedure during export transactions to be affected 
by the local legal system. More specifically, Luo (2002) reveals that commercial 
contracts, as part of the inefficient legal system in China, are not efficiently enforced 
in China. Ultimately, such problems and costs in import/export practice are reflected 
in the massive problems of product quality, delivery time and other contact-breaking 
behaviours from Chinese exporters, which are reported in last paragraph.  
 
During the interviews with the ETCs and foreign buyers, it emerged that export 
transactions are extremely affected by China’s inefficient legal system. BUY-P-C 




“We used to have one (collaborative) factory in China…….. Then we sent one order 
to them last year. The sample (sent by this factory) was fine. One month after we 
paid them the deposit, they told us they could not finish on time. I asked them when 
they could finish. They replied it would be two months late. This means four months 
for production. It’s too late for us, as our customers would refuse to receive on that 
time. So I asked to cancel order and for the return the deposit. They refused to do so. 
In the end, I gave up the order and deposit, as I would lose more if I received all 
products.” 
 
When I ask why not he appeal for the court or arbitrage  
“It is impossible to win in the court and recoup the loss in China.” 
 
Similar situations are echoed in the comments of other buyers (BUY-P-A, B,) and 
ETCs (ETC-P-A, B, C). They jointly agree with the statement that the costs of using 
legal system to protect their purchasing contracts are too high in China, in term of 
time and outcome. For instance, both BUY-P-A and BUY-P-B agreed that they 
would rather accept losses on the Chinese manufacturers’ failure on contracts, than 
pursue local legal arbitrage, in order to avoid potentially even greater costs on such 
legal issues without any confidence in the outcome. For instance, BUY-P-A believed 
that the local judicial departments would not treat them fairly, would lean towards 
local manufacturers as he is Taiwanese, and the costs of using these methods could 
be more than the loss of one export transaction. It is interesting to note that the 
Chinese ETCs in the interviews also had same complaints. ETC-P-A expressed that 
legal enforcement is costly in time and the outcome of any enforcement attempt 
would be problematic. He believed that it would take too long time to appeal to the 
courts or proceed with arbitrage, and the outcome would not be successfully enforced 
as the manufacturers can easily escape punishment in China. The ETC-P-C also 
argued that the legal procedures are costly and the enforcement is problematic, as the 




It is interesting to note that neither the local ETC or foreign buyers had actual 
experience of using China’s legal system when their contracts ran into problems. 
Their opinions on the inefficient and relatively costly legal system in China come 
from the recommendations and failures of friends, from the multimedia, and some 
personal experience in other businesses. Therefore, it means the costs related to 
China’s inefficient legal system are projected ones rather than reality based, at least, 
for the interviewees in pilot study A. The transaction costs economics indicates that 
many sorts of transactions costs actually do not take place, as they are very high, 
or/and transactions cannot proceed (Benham & Benham, 2000). As a result, these 
imagined costs generated by the inefficient legal system are large enough to stop 
direct importing from foreign buyers. From the interviews with three foreign buyers 
(BUY-P-A, B, C), it emerged that all of them chose to use Chinese ETCs more or 
less. One of the main determinants is their previous unsatisfactory import experience 
and high costs of enforcement on manufacturers in China. Therefore the inefficient 
legal system in China increases costs of enforcing compliance by domestic 
manufacturers in the export transactions.  
 
6.2.3.3 Inefficient Informal Contract obligation  
 
In addition to the legal system, the inefficient informal contractual obligation/spirit 
is another reason for contract enforcement in China. These informal contract 
obligations were initiated at the outset of the transition, but failed to become 
sufficiently well established to support efficient market transactions. Thus they 
belong to the informal institutional constraints in the analytical framework.  
 
As stated before, the formal legal system fails to efficiently support market 
transactions in transition economies. For instance, by investigating IJVs’ contracts in 
China, Luo (2002) reveals that the commercial contracts, as part of the inefficient 
legal system in China, fails to efficiently enforce contracts in China. As a result, 
opportunistic behaviours are magnified in these countries (Choi et al., 1999; Luo, 
2007). Therefore, the contract enforcement procedure is more vulnerable to trading 
partners’ opportunistic behaviours and environmental uncertainty, which have been 
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compounded by the inefficient legal system in China. Foreign partners have to 
enhance adaptability to unfamiliar contract obligations, and master some unique 
contract enforcement methods. Therefore, these unique contract obligations in China 
generate additional costs for foreign partners, who are not familiar with these 
business practices in China.    
 
The interviews with foreign buyers and the ETCs positively support these ideas. All 
three foreign buyers (BUY-P-A, B, C) had complained of the inadequate contact 
obligations and untruthful manufacturers in China. Their challenging problems 
include freely broken contractual obligations in terms of delivery times, quality, style 
and pricing, cheating on productive capabilities and problems during the transaction 
etc.  
 
One buyer (BUY-P-A) described one poor purchasing experience in China  
“We used to have one [Chinese] factory, which changed the materials’ parameter 
without our permission. Then these products did not match the equipment 
specification of our factory in Taiwan, which was supposed to reprocess these 
products in the plan. I telephoned the manager of that factory asking why they didn’t 
follow the original parameters on the contract. He replied that they meant to do that  
in our best interests, as they increased the percentage of that material to ensure 
better quality. I didn’t know whether I should thank him or not!” 
 
BUY-P-B complained about their Chinese manufacturers’ dishonest activities 
“They always have various excuses for their delay in delivering…….They never told 
me the truth. Sometimes we could have saved the loss, if they have told me the truth. 
For instance, if they had told me they had problems with the delivery time, I would 
have changed that part of the order to other factories. But they always told me they 
could not finish at last minute”  
 
On the other hand, the interviews with manufacturers also find some clues as to why 
such failures take place in contracts with domestic manufacturers: they ignore the 
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importance of contracts, which is similar to the findings in Luo’s argument on 
Chinese managers in international joint ventures (Luo, 2002).  
 
MAN-P-A admitted that his factory sometimes takes on too many orders, even 
though they knew they could not finish.  
 
When I asked him if his factory encounters the situation where their output could not 
fulfil the full range of orders, he replied that  
“Yes, it sometimes took place. Sometimes we had few orders, but sometimes orders 
are too numerous…. In order to manage our labour costs, we only employ the 
normal numbers of workers. But we sometimes have a large order. So we might 
temporarily employ some more workers, or we might divert some orders to other 
factories [even the farmers’ family]……. In some cases, our factory could not 
produce the products (lack of the skills for such products) ordered by the customers, 
and so we would re-send this order to other factories, which can produce. And we 
only earn the price difference”     
 
When I asked if there are ever any problems, such as delivery time and quality and 
how do they do tackle them, he relied that  
“Normally there is no problem. Sometimes it might delay the delivery time, as you 
could not find enough temporary workers or other factories have delayed the 
production schedule. ……your customers [foreign buyers] would not be angry if it’s 
not too late”   
 
MAN-P-C expressed that her factory had problems in delivery time sometimes as her 
boss accepted too many orders.  
 
“They [the failures to meet the delivery time] made too much trouble for me. It is the 
boss’s decision. …..The export business was not good last year. To recoup some 
losses, the boss took on too many orders during the two months before Christmas. 
Then our productive capability could not meet the schedule. In the end, there was 




When I ask what happed then, he told me  
“The boss asked me to talk with that customer [foreign buyer] to ask for some extra 
time. He even told me to find some excuses to persuade the customer. I did as he told 
me. The customer agreed to give us another week. But we still could not finish on 
time. Then the customer was really angry. In the end, we made the deal that we first 
sent some products by air [much quicker but more experience than by sea] at that 
time, and the remaining products were delayed for another two weeks. The customer 
was quite angry, and never come back after that time”   
 
From these interviews, it is clear that the domestic manufacturers do have some 
problems with contractual obligations. First, these two manufacturers accepted 
production orders when they already knew they could not finish them on time. 
Second, they refuse to tell the foreign buyers the real situation in production. It is 
therefore found that the inefficient contract obligations in China increase the costs of 
monitoring domestic manufacturers in export transactions.  
6.3 Specification of analytical framework  
 
By interviewing ten practitioners, who had considerable operative experience in 
export transactions in China, four institutional constraints on China’s export market 
were identified, which can be allocated into three institutional constraints in the 
previous analytical framework. The bureaucratic procedures and administrative 
approvals (former formal institutional constraints), which generate two additional 
transactional procedures, and thereby increase domestic exporters’ transaction costs. 
The inefficient legal system (current formal institutional constraints) and informal 
contract obligations (informal institutional constraints) increase foreign buyers’ 
costs of enforcing domestic manufacturers’ compliance.  
 
 




This Chapter, as the first part of pilot study (pilot study A), pre-test and modify the 
previous integrative framework, and to specify the institutional constrains on China’s 
export market, by interviewing ten experienced practitioners from the domestic 
manufacturers, foreign buyers and ETCs. In the end, three formal and informal 
institutional constraints, which influenced export transactions in China, are identified. 
They are respectively bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals (former 
formal institutional constraints), inefficient legal system (current formal institutional 




Chapter 7 Within case analysis  
7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter illustrates the analysis of four selective cases out of the total of six. In 
particularly, case A is one pilot case study, namely the second part of pilot study 
(pilot study B), which were undertaken before the remaining ones. This aims to test 
the previous analytical framework and institutional constraints identified from the 
pilot study A in one real ETC company, and to refine data collection plans for the 
subsequent cases (Yin, 2003b, p79-p81). In addition, case A used both the author’s 
observation and semi-structured interview as data collection methods, whilst the 
remaining cases adopted a semi-structured interview.  
 
In this chapter section 7.1 briefly introduces this chapter. Then the four main cases 
within the case analysis are displayed from section 7.2 to 7.5 respectively. More 
specifically, each within case analysis is structured as follows: 1) the background 
information about case ETC, its products, and collaborating manufacturers and 
buyers; 2) the export transaction processes undertaken by this ETC in practice, are 
included; 3) the exploration and discussion of specified institutional constraints 
according to the previous analytical framework in order to test the known 
institutional constraints from chapter 6 and to explore new ones for each case; 4) the 
exploration and discussion of specified methods, by which each case ETC is able to 
reduce these institution-related transaction costs. In the end, section 7.6 summarizes 
this chapter.   
7.2 Case A analysis 
7.2.1 The background information on ETC A 
 
“H-Sentury Imp&Exp Co”, founded in 2005, is one private ETC in Guangzhou, one 
of the most important export hubs in China. Its exporting turnover reached 
$5,000,000 in 2009. Its three main foreign buyers respectively come from Spain 
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(25%), France (15%) and The United Arab Emirates (UAE) (20%), which has 
different products in style, quality and amount.  
 
This ETC has 6 major domestic manufacturers, which have 200-300 workers and are 
located in several rural regions (like Panyu) surrounding Guangzhou. They usually 
do not export directly, and have several ETCs as their agents. But these factories are 
different from each other in terms of preferred products style, delivery time, 
management style, productivity etc. Thus the ETC gives them orders according to 
their different characteristics and different requirements from the buyers.  
 
In addition, this ETC also has several suppliers for main materials and trimmings. 
Due to the variety of style and quality each time orders are placed, the main materials 
and trimmings likewise change. This ETC has a flexible strategy for choosing 
suppliers for materials according to price and availability on the market. As a result, 
suppliers are only engaged as required whereas others are more likely to be held on 
retainers due to a long-standing collaborative history. 
Table 7-1  Summary of background of ETC A.  
















  Amount $5,000,000 (2010) 
Per capital $625,000  (2010) 
Margin 15% (2010) 
 
The owners are a young couple in their 30s. The husband lived and studied business 
administration in New Zealand for 4 years. After graduation, he came back to China 
and worked in the Canton Fair, the most important and largest Imp&Exp trading 
show in China. During 2-years’ work there, he mastered the export skills and 
established an embryonic relationship with some manufacturers and buyers. After 
that, he opened “H-Sentury”, which mainly exported arts and crafts during that time. 
The initial export business of arts and crafts was unsuccessful. In the owners’ 
opinion, the reasons were due to their inadequate knowledge and understanding of 
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products, manufacturers and production and a low volume of export orders. After the 
1
st
 year, they gradually changed the products to clothing, the present product, with an 
increase of orders and familiarity with clothing and production. Then the business 
gradually stabilised with regular foreign buyers and collaborative manufacturers.  
 
This ETCs has a total of 10 employees. Their main duties and organizational 
structure are shown in figure 7-1and table 7-2.  
 
 
Figure 7-1  Organizational structure of ETC A. 
Table 7-2  Summary of staffs in ETC A. 




One of the owners holds the most important position in this ETC. He 
generally managed the whole export process, including searching for 
new buyers, new manufacturers, negotiating with current buyers and 
manufacturers, monitoring the production, quality controlling, enforcing 
delivery of manufacturers’ products, and the design of new products. 
Among of them, searching for foreign buyers is one major job. The other 
owner is mainly in charge of administrative management and assistant 
work for the first owner. She is  also responsible for part of the task of 
foreign exchange approval and tax rebate procedures (which are then 




TMs generally take responsibility of all exporting documentation, such as 
drawing up exporting contracts and other documents for export. In 
particular, they also take part of the work submitting/receiving official 
approvals from government departments, including the local 
Administration of Industries and Commerce and Bureau of Quality and 
Technical Supervision. Another main job of these TMs is to enforce 
manufacturers’ production, including the production schedule, quality 
investigation, delivery time etc. All TMs have relevant experience and 
educational background in exporting. The manager of the TMs teams 
has five years working experience in exports. 
Purchasers (2) 
Purchasers mainly take the job of searching and purchasing raw 
materials from suppliers or on the market. Due to their understanding of 
production, they also take on the job of enforcing sample making from 








The persons with the red colour are interviewees in this case 
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helping enforcing production. Two of the purchasers have long-term 
working experience in clothing production. Interestingly, they do not 
speak English, which is commonly considered as the universal language 
in the field of international trade.  
Accountant(1) 
She has 10 years’ experience in corporate finance, especially in 
exporting companies. Amongst her main tasks are the completion of the 
tax rebate procedures, approvals of foreign exchange and receipt of 
payment from foreign buyers.  
Internet staff (1) One IT staff member is specialized in website design, photo design 
 
In this case, a 2-month observation was undertaken in this ETC. In addition, 11 
interviews with the seven interviewees were completed. These interviewees included 
two owners, one TM manager, two purchasers and one accountant, who are the main 
participants in the export transactions in this ETC and are highlighted in red in the 
organizational structure. Further, one owner of a manufacturing company was 
interviewed for the purposes of triangulation and clarifying some points. The core 
interviewees are the two owners, who offer the general information about 
background of the companies and transaction process, while the unit interviewees are 
the manager of TMs, two purchasers, one account and the owner of manufacturer 
who introduce their working experience in specific unit in whole process.   
 
7.2.2 Export transaction process  
 
In this section, one general export transaction process, operated by ETC A, is 
illustrated step by step (Shown in Table 7-3 and 7-4) in order to highlight the parts 
where the institutional constraints and related transaction costs occur. At first the two 
owners offer the general flow of export transactions in this ETC. Then the details of 
each step are obtained and/or checked from related interviewees. Certainly the 
author’s observation also modifies and polishes these processes. In the meantime, the 
additional procedures related to local institutional constraints are also watched out.   
Table 7-3  Summary of transactional procedures of ETC A. 
1 Sample making and searching for buyers 
2 Negotiations  
3 Transacting with materials suppliers 
4 Enforcing the production of manufacturers   
5 Processing relevant documents 
6 Receiving payment from foreign buyers 
7 Tax rebating 
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Table 7-4  Details of transactional procedures of ETC A. 
1 Sample making and searching for buyers 
This procedure could be twofold. First, and most of the time, the ETC made clothing styles according 
to the foreign buyers’ requirements, which was presented in documentation with a series of 
parameters and standards, like colour, size, materials requirements, etc. These samples, plus some 
other samples, such as colour samples, material samples etc., would be sent back to the buyers 
immediately for feedback. On receiving the buyers’ feedback, corresponding modifications would be 
made in the next samples. This process would happen once or be repeated several times according to 
the different cases. Second, the ETC sometimes makes promotional styles for the trade shows, B2B 
website or other marketing activities. The sample making process usually takes place in the 
collaborative manufacturers, or sometimes in specialized sample making companies.  
2 Negotiations  
The ETC negotiates with buyers, potential manufacturers and suppliers, in terms of price, quantity, 
lead-in time, payment terms etc. This process is cyclical and dynamic, mainly including buyers’ 
inquiries to the ETC and the ETC’s inquiry to potential manufacturers and suppliers. In this 
procedure, the ETC has to choose one or several of the most suitable manufacturers and suppliers for 
certain order depending on this order’s quantity, quality, style, delivery time, etc. Price is not the most 
important consideration for the ETC, as some manufacturers and suppliers could also give a 
competitive price, but without any guarantee. Thus the manufacturers and suppliers, with whom the 
ETC has had collaborative experience, are the most trustworthy. Actually the owners of this ETC had 
understood which manufacturers and suppliers would be able to finish this task when they knew the 
order’s requirements based on their previous experience with products and manufacturers. Then the 
remaining considerations are the manufacturers’ production schedule, availability of material, and so 
on.  
3 Transacting with materials suppliers  
Two purchasers took charge of the supply of materials, including the main materials and trimmings. 
Actually the searching for materials began as early as the sample making process. Although there are 
several large-scale public markets in Guangzhou, which can offer many kinds of materials for 
clothing, the main materials are usually not immediately available goods, but customized from 
material manufacturers. Their long-term experience in the clothing industry and private connections 
with some large material manufacturers facilitates purchasers search for suitable materials. As 
material suppliers are more likely to have no additional schedule for your orders, an advanced plan 
from the ETC is necessary. Thus this ETC usually booked one production schedule with material 
suppliers during the sample making or negotiation procedure. In addition, the large-scale public 
markets in Guangzhou also offer alternative choices for some rare materials. Finally the purchasers 
have to closely monitor the production of the material and in line with quality and time requirements.  
4 Enforcing the production of manufacturers   
One owner and one staff member from the TM and purchasers tightly enforced manufacturers’ 
production. They formally inspected the production on three occasions, namely at the beginning, 10-
days before lead-in time, and loading date. But sometimes they have to visit the manufacturers many 
times informally to check the production schedule and quality. The experience and knowledge of 
production and products is necessary to better monitor timing and quality. In some extreme cases, they 
have had to live in the manufacturers’ factory to ensure the production schedule. In some cases, they 
divide one order between several manufacturers due to different products, or large quantities. The 
situation becomes more complicated, as they have to ensure the production, packaging and shipping 
synchronously and collaboratively, the delivery time and quality. 
5 Processing relative documents  
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In the meantime, the TMs process all exporting documents, deliver and receive to and from various 
organizations. These documents usually include a “letter of credit” from the bank, a foreign exchange 
receipt certificate (or called verification sheet) from the local foreign exchange branches, packing lists 
from the manufacturers,  a customs declaration from the customs broker, a bill of loading (B/L) from 
the shipping agent, certification from the local entry-exit inspection and quarantine bureau etc. These 
documents need to be accurate, consistent and mutually linked (the approval of some documents 
needs the others). Some of them have to be loaded onto corresponding datasets on websites of 
government departments, like the customs websites and foreign exchange branch system. Most 
importantly, many of the organizations involved are government departments. Thus TMs have to be 
familiar with their procedures, policies, regulations, traditions, officials’ habits, etc, which are highly 
changeable, different from each other and time-consuming, in order to finish all documents accurately 
and timely.  
6 Receiving payment from foreign buyers 
The accountant will take charge of receiving payment from foreign buyers after shipping the products 
and sending the documents. It needs to go through the bank, local foreign exchange branches, and 
customs, and takes one-month (mainly waiting for the receipt from customs) in order to finally receive 
these payments, as the payment and receipt of foreign exchanges are strictly monitored by 
government.  
7 Tax rebating 
On completion of the whole transaction and possession of the whole official document, the accountant 
will apply for the tax rebate from the local taxation office. The tax rebating rate is 7% for products in 
this ETC. This application normally takes 3 months. This procedure is important for the ETC’s capital 




















7.2.3 The institutional constraints and related transaction costs 
This section aims to explore the institutional constraints, which can generate 
transaction costs in China’s export market. The four known institutional constraints, 
developed in chapter 6 (pilot study A), will be checked in the first instance. 
Meanwhile, the emergent institutional constraints and costs in China’s export market 
will be explored according to the findings. The analytical order follows the TCE 
analysis in the analytical framework, more specifically following transactional 
procedures from the domestic manufacturers to the foreign buyers. Table 7-5 
summarizes the institutional constraints and related transaction costs in ETC A.  
7.2.3.1 The side of domestic manufacturers  
7.2.3.1.1 The pre-export and post-export procedures  
 
The findings discussed in chapter 6 (pilot study A) suggest that bureaucratic 
procedures and administrative approvals are main the former formal institutional 
constraints that generate additional transactional procedures and costs for standard 
export transactions in China. The main evidences for such institution-related costs 
from the pilot study A are that Chinese exporters have to obtain a series of 
applications, registrations and approvals with many government departments for the 
start-up of an export business, and have also to submit/receive a series of related 
official documents to/from these government departments for each current export 
transaction. In this case, the pre-export and post-export procedures provide similar 
evidence to that of the pilot study.  
 
First, the main owner of this ETC admits that these administrative approvals do cost 
them a lot of time during the interviews. He indicates that his company used to 
employ one agent company to assist with finishing the initial applications for these 
administrative approvals, and subsequent annual renewals. But in recent years he has 
begun to do it himself. He also agreed with the argument that these procedures 
changed regularly, and that he and the staff had to keep learning and enquiring from 




Second, I found from observation that one major aspect of each TM’s work is to 
submit/receive official documents to/from these government departments, which 
process the administrative approvals that cost additional time and human resources 
for this ETC in the post-export procedure. 
 
Third, the tax rebating procedure (procedure 7 tax rebating) referred to 7.2.2 
transaction process also shows that the administrative procedure is also time-
consuming. The interview with the accountant responsible for tax rebating in this 
ETC, shows that the slow tax rebating system in China actually reduces the capital 
turnover, the possibility of more transactions and resulting profits, and increases 
transaction costs for exporters in the end. 
 
She told me that  
“The tax rebating rate for clothes is 7%, which means that 7% of the export value is 
occupied for 2-3 months. If this sum of money is paid back into our company 
immediately, we will use it for the next orders [such as materials’ payment, deposits 
to factory]. So our profits will increase” 
 
In other words, to some extent, the ETC relies on how often it can recycle these 
financial capitals, given fixed profits from each transaction. Therefore, these 
administrative procedures before and during export transactions generate additional 
costs, in term of time, human resources, and financial capital, for domestic exporters.   
7.2.3.1.2 The procedure of transacting with materials suppliers  
 
This procedure is new, compared with the normal transactional procedures, where 
ETC only resell final products, and the findings from pilot study A, as most of 
trading companies in the literature and in pilot A do not refer to their additional 
transactions with materials’ suppliers. Therefore one new institutional constraint is 
found as the reason for such additional transactional procedures.  
 
Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) is one transactional arrangement between 
brand name company (OEM buyer) and the contract supplier, where the OEM buyer 
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offers detailed technical blueprints and most of the components to allow the contract 
supplier to produce according to specifications (Ernst, 2000; Kang, Mahoney, & Tan, 
2009). Such arrangements become the most important trading method in China. The 
famous example is the Foxconn, which is the major OEM manufacturer for iphone, 
ipad, Kindle PlayStation, etc. In addition, there is another OEM-like arrangement, 
named “processing trade”, which mainly relies on export contract in China. Different 
from traditional export process, where manufacturers design, produce, market and 
export products, and processing trade enables manufacturers to receive export orders, 
then to produce and export according to the requirements of orders. These orders 
come from various foreign and domestic companies, including ETCs as well.  
 
As manufacturers only take responsibility for manufacturing products, these OEM 
trade methods lower the requirements of manufacturers in term of costs, capabilities 
and risk (Hobday, 2000), and become popular in China. It was estimated that export 
through these sorts of trade methods made up half of the export volume in China up 
to recent years (Fu, 2008; Yu, 2012). The manufacturers in the pilot study also 
witnessed the popularity of OEM trade methods in China. The MAN-P-A’s 
manufacturer currently still uses the processing trade method with one buyer, and the 
owner of MAN-P-A used to work in one OEM manufacturer before he opened his 
factory. The MAN-P-A’s manufacturer is also an OEM. In addition, most of the 
current and former collaborative manufacturers of ETC A also work under OEM 
trade methods. According to the owners’ description, their manufacturers mainly 
produce the orders from ETCs or perhaps some foreign buyers, while the latter ones 
offer designed modes and materials. These manufacturers only focus on the 
processing without the other business functions.   
 
However, OEM trade methods also generate many problems for those manufacturers’ 
own direct export. Hobday (2000) indicates that the OEM trade method has some 
disadvantages, making manufacturers subordinate to partners, become dependent on 
buyers and other core components. In this case, some similar problems are found 
related to OEM trade method in China. Under the long-term OEM trade method, the 
Chinese manufacturers might lose some important functions, necessary for direct 
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exporting, and thereby generating additional costs for domestic manufacturers’ direct 
export. Therefore, the long-term OEM trading method, as current formal institutional 
constraint in China’s export market, generates additional transactional procedures 
and relative costs for domestic manufacturers.   
 
In this case, it emerges that there is one procedure of transacting with suppliers 
(procedure 3 enforcing the supply of materials) during the export transaction. In this 
procedure, ETC needs to organize, including searching for, negotiating and enforcing, 
the main supply of materials and trimmings for the manufacturers, rather than simply 
to buy end products from domestic manufacturers.  
 
The main owner explains that “the point is price. If we ask factories to find materials, 
they usually give us a more expensive price for same products. In addition, they often 
cannot find the suppliers for some materials.” 
  
When I tried to confirm this with the owner of one of their manufacturer, he 
confirmed that “all customers do it this way. Most of our customers [ETCs] bring 
materials of their own. We can help them to find [materials] from nearby areas of 
our factory. But we cannot go too far to find [materials]. We have no time or 
additional staff to do that job, especially as some materials are hard to find; we are 
busy on the production for many ETCs. If we help all of them, there will be a lot of 
different materials. So if we do that work, we have to employ additional staff. And 
also we have to enforce the material supply, and buy out these materials from 
suppliers on our own; I will definitely charge more for that. So, all our customers 
purchase materials on their own. We only take care of manufacturing. We felt less 
exposed to risk, when we only charge manufacturing fee”  
 
In short, it is found that the domestic manufactuers have little information on 
marterial supply, in term of price and style, as they get used to outsource such 
functions to buyers, including ETCs and foreign buyers, and are lack of relevant 
information. As a result, they fail to find the stuiable materials in term of price when 
buyers have such requirements. In other words, the long-term OEM trading method 
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decreases trading possibility of manufactuers’ direct export. In conclusion there is 
one additional transaction procedure for transacting with materials suppliers, which 
is the result of domestic manufacturers’ lack of market information, specifically lack 
of information on material supply, in the context of the long-term OEM trading 
method. Therefore, the long-term OEM trading method interfere domestic 
manufactuers’ direct export, and become one formal institutional constraint in 
China’s export market. 
7.2.3.2 The side of foreign buyers 
7.2.3.2.1 The procedure of enforcing manufacturers 
 
As proposed before, enforcement costs will increase due to the inefficient legal 
system (current formal institutional constraints) and unique contract obligation 
(informal institutional constraints). The interviews in this case strongly support this 
proposition. Both owners in this case continuously mention the “quality problems” 
and “delivery time problem” during their interviews.  
 
“Our collaborative manufacturers are all SMEs without systematic quality control, 
so we have to go to the factories to monitor production regularly. Indeed, the quality 
problems happen many times during production. In some case, it is quite serious. 
Taking a recent example, I found the factories used a wrong mark label (the one with 
the size and logo on back of collar) one day before shipping. So we had to ask all the 
workers to take them out manually, and redo them. It took us the whole night to 
finish. Fortunately I found that problem on time to avoid the loss…….Because these 
factories also offer products for other exporters, we have to monitor their production 
schedule, especially at some peak time, we are afraid that they might delay our 
order……In some extreme cases, we have to live in the factories for several days to 
ensure our production order on time”  
 
The observations also support this point. The period before the shipping out of 
products is the busiest and most important time. One owner and purchasers had to 
take turns visiting the factories to investigate the production schedule and product 




Table 7-5  The summary of institutional constraints and related transaction costs in ETC A.
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7.2.4 The ETC’s methods for reducing institution-related transaction 
costs 
This section aims to explore the methods, by which this ETC can effectively and 
efficiently reduce these institution-related transaction costs in indirect export market. 
The analytical order also follows the TCE analysis in the analytical framework, from 
the domestic manufacturers to the foreign buyers. Table 7-7 summarizes ETC A’s 
methods and advantage in export transaction.  
7.2.4.1 The side of domestic manufacturers  
7.2.4.1.1 The pre-export and post-export procedures 
 
Many studies have proved that having staffs knowledgeable and experienced in the 
export process can reduce the costs of export transactions (Peng, 1998; Peng & York, 
2001). Similarly, this case demonstrated that the costs related to administrative 
approvals during pre-export and post-export procedures, which are found in 7.2.3.1.1, 
could be reduced by ETC’s knowledge (experience) on these administrative 
approvals procedures during the export transactions in China. The specific 
knowledge required is about how and where to apply for and register these official 
approvals and licences; about how, when and where to prepare, submit and receive 
these necessary official documents to/from various government departments. The 
description below of the characteristics of staff in this ETC show that the relevant 
staff in this ETC are professional, and possess plenty of experience in such 
administrative approvals.  
 
The relevant staff in the TM team, two owners and an accountant in this ETC, jointly 
finish the administrative approvals during pre-export and post-export procedures of 
each transaction. The description from the main owner of administrative approvals 
for the start-up of an export business in China in 7.2.3.1.1 indicates the owner 
gradually learnt and mastered the relevant knowledge on how to obtain these official 
administrative approvals during his practice. This evidence explains how this ETC 




Moreover, it is evident that other relevant staff had knowledge on these 
administrative approvals that also helps to reduce the costs during post-export 
procedures. The TMs team finish some parts of the administrative procedures of each 
transaction, such as applying for certificates from the local Bureau of Quality and 
Technical Supervision, and Registration with Customs. The staffs not only graduated 
with an export-related major from college, but also have several-years’ experience in 
exporting. TMs average number of years of working in exports is 2.25 year, while 
the manager in TMs has 5 years’ experience. The accountant in this ETC undertakes 
the main job of tax rebating and approval of foreign exchanges. She has 10-years’ 
experience in export-related accounting, and has worked in many other ETCs. 
Relevant staff’s working experience is shown in Table 7-6. During the interview, the 
owner expressed the view that they prefer to employ the people with the export-
related education backgrounds or/and experience. In China, colleges and universities 
teach students the administrative procedures as one unit during whole export process. 
Also these graduates would be supervised by the manager of TMs team for at least 
one month at the beginning. More importantly from the author’s observation, both 
pre-export and post-export procedures are dealt with as a matter of regular routine in 
this ETC. The ETC has one formal timeline plus instructions in one handbook for 
different administrative procedures in export transactions. Moreover, the second 
owner often reminds to relevant staff of the timing of key administrative procedures 
during their daily work.  
 
Table 7-6  Relevant staff’s working experience in participating in 
administrative approvals during pre-export and post-export procedures. 








accountant owner owner Average 
yrs. 5 2 1.5 1.5 10 5 5 4.3 
 
The logic behind why the ETC can reduce its costs by obtaining these sorts of 
knowledge is based on the advantages of economics of scale, which is commonly 
considered as the ETC’s advantage in cost-economizing in international trade(Carlos, 
1992; Carlos & Nicholas, 1996; Peng, 1998; Roehl, 1983; Spulber, 1999). It enables 
this ETC to process these administrative procedures with lower costs for each 
transaction than manufacturers. This ETC has a greater volume of transactions, as 
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reflected in more collaborative manufacturers and buyers, and tradable products, than 
an individual manufacturing exporter. Thus the costs, in terms of time, resources to 
employ specific staff, and other fixed costs are shared and reduced. The interviews 
with domestic manufacturers also show one of reasons why they prefer to use ETC’s 
for indirect exporting than owned direct exporting is that the increased labour costs 
on these specific personnel are not economic for their lower export volume. In 
addition, experience and work routine is established through the repeated work. It 
saves the costs, in terms of time, and reduces the possibilities of making mistakes. 
Also, the greater the volume, the greater the opportunities for understanding any new 
procedures and policy on the export market. 
7.2.4.1.2 The procedure of transacting with suppliers  
 
OEM trading methods undermine manufacturers’ ability to function with regard to 
supply of materials in this case, and further increase transaction costs of domestic 
manufacturers’ direct exports. ETC A relies on its knowledge of materials’ supply, 
which is based on their professional purchasers, to release these costs.  
 
As stated in the literature review, one of the Japanese GTCs roles in international 
trade is the organizer/coordinator of the production system, as they organize and 
coordinate with many different stages of whole production system, such as the 
purchase of raw materials, sale of products, logistics, finance, marketing and so on 
(Kojima & Ozawa, 1984; Yoshino & Lifson, 1986). Kojima & Ozawa (1984) 
indicate that the contextual explanation for such JGTC characteristics could be 
attributed to then inefficient business system in Japan, which could not support 
domestic inexperienced manufacturers in achieving the national targets at that time, 
namely quick economic development during the Meiji period and post-WWII period. 
Yoshino & Lifson’s study (Yoshino & Lifson, 1986, p45) add that the reason for 
such conditions is the long-term isolation of Japan from the world resulting in 
domestic manufacturers failing to understand advanced industrial production systems. 
Under the previous logic of institutional constraints in this study, the institutional 
constraints in Japan make domestic manufacturers inefficient and lacking in 
knowledge of the whole production functions, and therefore failing to produce 
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products for export on their own. This situation is as same as the one in the findings 
noted in 7.2.3.2.1, in that the long-term OEM trading method in China’s export 
market disables some domestic manufacturers through their lack of knowledge of 
material supply.  
 
In turn, Japanese GTCs acquired specific knowledge on each distinct but related 
units of the whole production system, as long as they participated long-term in 
various trades, some of which were related to these units, and provided opportunities 
for incremental learning alongside the development of trading businesses. In the end, 
by organizing the whole production system, JGTCs achieved “economies of scope”, 
and reduced the total costs and sub costs for each of the units  (Yoshino & Lifson, 
1986) 
 
Although without such comprehensive organization and coordination of production 
systems, the ETC A in this study also shows similar capabilities in helping domestic 
manufacturers’ incompetence with regard to the supply of materials, through  access 
to specialized staff and knowledge.   
 
Two purchasers in this ETC specifically take charge of this material supply 
procedure. Interestingly, they do not speak English, which is commonly considered 
as the universal languages in the field of international trade. The explanation from 
the owner is that “they don’t need to know English. Their main job is to take care of 
the supply and manufacturing. That is the reason we employ them.” But both of them 
have long-term experience in the supply of material in the clothing industry.  One 
purchaser has 10 years’ experience in the clothing industry, while the other one has 3 
years. Both of them used to work in manufacturing. Therefore, they master a great 
deal of knowledge on materials, in term of price, place of origin, quality, style and so 
forth. In addition, their knowledge on the supply of materials has also been kept 
updated during their current daily work. From the author’s observation, both 
suppliers often visit different suppliers and public markets to search for materials and 
update their price information. They also keep the regular contact with various 
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remote suppliers, especially the suppliers of certain main materials, who are based in 
some clusters across the country.  
 
Therefore, these sorts of knowledge on the supply of materials held by these two 
purchasers largely help this ETC to search for the required supply (according to the 
buyers’ order) with low costs. According to the logic of the advantages of economies 
of scale, the larger transaction amounts and the greater number of products and 
materials, enable ETC A to obtain knowledge and information by employing 
professional purchasers, with greater economy than manufacturers with fewer orders 
and product lines.  
7.2.4.2 The side of foreign buyers 
7.2.4.2.1 The procedure for enforcing manufacturers 
 
Asymmetric information is one major reason for difficulty in identifying the quality 
of products and other resulting problems that stop transactions, such as adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Obtaining more 
information on products, production and producers helps to reduce such information 
asymmetry. 
 
In general, this ETC’s knowledge of production helps to reduce information 
asymmetry and the related costs of enforcing manufacturers. Knowledge of 
production mainly includes the knowledge of current production conditions, of the 
production process and products, and of manufacturers’ characteristics. It is clear 
that this ETC pays a lot attention to the enforcement of their manufacturers according 
to transactional procedure 4 (Enforcing the production of manufacturers) during the 
export transaction process. The author’s observation also supports this idea. This sort 
of work is jointly undertaken by the main owner, manager of the TMs team, together 
with support from two purchasers and other TMs. These persons regularly visit their 
manufacturers during the whole production period for various aims, such as sample 
making, modification, and material supply. Although the aims of these visits could 
be irrelevant to the monitoring activity, a great deal of information on current 
production conditions, such as workers’ number, production schedule and technical 
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problems, had taken place in each visit. In addition, the period before the shipping 
out of products is the busiest and most important time during the transaction process 
of this ETC. The main owners and others often take turns to investigate the 
production schedule and product quality of the manufacturer to avoid any problems. 
According to the description of the main owner, he even had to live in the factory for 
many weeks in some extreme cases in order to monitor closely the manufacturing 
process.  
 
Moreover, this ETC’s familiarity with the materials’ supply also enables them to 
master more knowledge about production, which helps to reduce any opportunism by 
manufacturers in changing the product’s price and quality. As mentioned in pilot 
study A and in 7.2.3.2, the manufacturers could increase the price with the excuse of 
rising prices of inputs, including material supply. As ETC A takes responsibility for 
the supply of materials to their manufacturers, it possesses more knowledge on costs 
of production for estimating the final products’ price. The acquisition of the 
information on material supply reduces the asymmetry between manufacturers and 
buyers, and avoids manufacturer’s opportunism.  
 
Knowledge of the production process and characteristics of the products also helps 
them to deal with the quality problems. The main owner, TM’s manager and 
purchasers have a great deal of knowledge about the production process and products, 
as a result of long-standing quality investigation experience, and/or working 
experience with manufacturers. The main owner stated one recent case where he had 
to save one large order with quality problems the day before shipment, as he found 
the wrong neck label in the garment; he had to ask the factory to modify them 
overnight. The owner also confirmed that one criterion for employing the TMs 
manager is the direct work experience in enforcing production. 
 
Last but not least, knowledge of the characteristics of their manufacturers is 
important as well. This knowledge helps the ETC to choose the “right” and reliable 
manufacturers before committing to formal production, and to quickly change 
manufacturers when some emergency happens.    
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The owner described how detailed their understanding of their manufacturers is as 
described below:  
 
 “Our current manufacturers had been filtered from previous many collaborative 
transactions……. Indeed we had withdrawn from some bad manufacturers…….We 
knew their productive capability, such as their favourite products, quality level, and 
output amount……When I receive an order from buyers, I will think about which 
manufacturer is suitable for this order. For instance, one manufacturer is suitable 
for the European orders, as the products require higher quality. Another one is 
suitable for the UAE’s order, as their price is cheaper……I will try to understand the 
characteristics of the owner of factories, such as if he is a reliable person, if his 
factory has a poor track record so that I can choose if and how I can collaborate 
with him……We would check their production schedule before we choose the 
manufacturer for this order……We usually have some backup manufacturers, which 
can be used for some special orders”  
 
Therefore, it emerged that knowledge of the characteristics of manufacturers actually 
operates prior to the real enforcement, so that the problems can be avoided during 














Table 7-7  The summary of ETC A’s methods and advantage in export transaction. 
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7.3 Case B analysis 
7.3.1 The background information on ETC B  
 
Tianjin-Minmetals (TJM) (Century Minmetals also well) is a state-owned trading 
company in Tianjin. It had 120 employees in trading companies, and jointly owned 
one welding electrodes firm of 230 employees. Its exports reached $60,000,000, 
while it turned in a profit of $1,500,000 in 2010. Its buyers are numorous, worldwide, 
and different from each other, from middlemen to ship factories. TJM used to be one 
subsidiary of China Minmetals, one of largest and earliest central state-owned 
trading companies, which engage in mineral and metal products in China. After the 
reform of the trading system and state-owned companies in China during the 1980s, 
the TJM and related properties (offices, warehouse, etc.) were separated from China 
Minmetals, and became one independent trading company indirectly controlled by 
local government through one group company, the Northernint. 
 
Table 7-8   Summary of background of ETC B. 
Name Tianjin Minmetal 
Location Tianjin 
Ownership State-owned 
Size(Personals) 120 (trading companies)+235 (manufacturers) 
Established 1955 
Products 
Welding consumables, hardware, steel products, 
etc 












Per capital $500,000 
Margin 2.5% 
 
The main products of this ETC are concentrated in the field of metal products, such 
as welding consumables (welding electrodes), welding tools, sealing and insulation 
products, pipes and fittings, etc, which are respectively processed by five export 
process departments in this ETC. The series of welding electrodes become the most 
important products accounting for 60-70% of the total export volume. For this the 
transaction of welding electrodes becomes the main focus for this case analysis.   
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The ETC B have developed, marketed and managed two well-known brands and 
trademarks for their welding electrodes, say “Permanent” and “MT-12”, since as 
early as 1970s.  
Figure 7-3  The trading partners of ETC B. 
 
 
In general, the brief situation of domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers is 
illustrated in the Figure 7-3. From the 1970s to 1990s, all collaborative 
manufacturers of TJM went through the OEM trading method: TJM received orders 
from foreign buyers, then many factories produced the products according to the 
orders from TJM, and pasted TJM’s brands on them, finally TJM bought out these 
products, and resold to foreign buyers and processed the whole export transaction. 
This method was based on TJM’s exclusive export authority. But with the economic 
reforms and the introduction of the free market in China, some manufacturers began 
to export on their own and into the domestic market as well. In turn, TJM gradually 
changed into other emerging small factories. In the end, TJM jointly invested in one 
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former shareholders of this factory in Tianjin in 1991, and helped it develop into a 
qualified large supplier.  
 
The former factory of TDWE was established in the 1970s, when it was a single 
village factory with only 50 employees. From the 1980s onwards it began 
collaboration with TJM with a few orders, as it could only produce very simple 
products due to lower technical capabilities and simple equipment. In 1991, the TJM 
invested a 20% stake in this factory to enhance their production capabilities, 
including equipment, technique, etc.  Most importantly, TJM helped them increase 
quality products, by purchasing high-tech equipment and skills, introducing 
technicians from other large factories and universities, applying for the certificates 
from classification societies (international stardard agents). Till now, TDWE had 235 
employees, could produce 50,000 ton various welding electrodes annually, and 
became the main supplier, making up 80% of the welding electrodes in TJM. 
 
The classification society, such as  Lloyd's Register, ABS, etc, is “an organization, 
whose main function is to carry out surveys of vessels, its purpose being to set and 
maintain standards of construction and upkeep for vessels, their engines and safety 
equipment” (Mike, 2006, p41). Approval from these classification bodies, has 
become necessary in ship building, including the main engines, pumps and other 
machineries on the ship, and other offshore structures, like the oil platforms, etc, in 
order to ensure the shipping safety. Due to the strict standards and public credibility, 
the approvals and certificates from these classification societies have also come to 
symbolise official certificates for many other products in international trade. Welding 
electrodes are used widely and mostly in ship building, the certificates from the 
classification society for these products have become universal quality guarantees 
and/or necessary certificates in recent international trade. Thus this ETC had 
obtained these certificates for their Permanent welding electrodes in the 1990s, when 
they started the factory.  
 
The application for such certificates is not easy for many inexperienced companies. 
Initially this ETC asked for help from the Tianjin Commission of Commerce and the 
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parent companies. Through their introduction, this ETC found another factory, which 
just applied for the same certificates one year ago. After several months’ 
communications, they learned and mastered the procedures for applying for these 
certificates. In the meantime, they also found that the products and production 
process of their new factory could not fulfil the requirements of classification society. 
In the end, they had to employ several technicians from the local university and 
factory to train staff in the new skills, had to buy new equipment, and enforce some 
management and production process reforms in the factory. One year later, they 
eventually passed the quality control, and obtained the first certificates’ from 
classification society. Till now, all their welding electrodes, including Permanent and 
TM-12 series, have received certificates from seven main international classification 
societies (as the certificates are not inter-accepted by different classification societies 
and importing countries, the foreign buyers usually require different certificates) , 
which generally cover all overseas customers’ requirements. Moreover, ETC B also 
continues to help this factory welding electrodes to be successful in the annual 
review. 
 
As shown in Table 7-9 and Figure 7-4, this ETC has ten internal departments. Apart 
from the administrative departments, there are five main export process departments, 
which are classified according to the groups of products. One export transaction is 
processed by several trading merchandisers (TMs) from these process departments, 
and accountants from accounting department. In addition, the top manager office 
takes charge of the administrative process of all licenses and official documentation 
involved in exporting, such as the annual renewal of export rights, business licenses, 
etc.    
Table 7-9  Brief introduction of departments of ETC B. 
1 Top managers office CEO and vice CEO office, general management 
2 Export Management Office   To offering supportive service to all departments  
3 1
st




Specified export process of metal netting, refractory 
materials, etc. This department is the second 




Specified export process of welding electrodes. This 
department is the largest department, which makes up 




Specified export process of minerals. This department 
is the one that is shrinking most with the gradual loss 
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 department Import business 
9 Accounting department Cooperate finance, tax rebate, etc. 
10 Human resource department Recruitment, etc 
        
Figure 7-4  Organizational structure of ETC B. 
 
 
During this case, seven interviews from five interviewees were undertaken. These 
include two interviews with the CEO of ETC; one interview with a retired manager 
in ETC who used to participate in investment into the factory; two interviews with 
the manager in 3
rd
 department; one with the CFO in accountant department; one 
interview with a retired manager from the joint-venture welding electrodes 
manufacturing company.  At first the CEO offer genral information on this ETC, 
while the manager of 3rd department offer the general flow of export transactions in 
Top managers Office (CEO, vice CEO and assistants 
1
st
 department (pipes, fittings, 
valves, etc)  
(Manager, Salesmen and TMs) 
2nd department (Metal netting, 
refractory materials, etc) 
(Manager, Salesmen and TMs) 
3rd department (welding 
electrodes) 
(Manager, Salesmen and TMs) 
4
st
 department (Minerals)  
(Manager, Salesmen and TMs) 
5
st
 department (hardware, 
polishing wheels, etc)  
(Manager, Salesmen and TMs) 
6
st
 department (import 
business)  
(Manager, Salesmen and 
TMs) 





The persons in red colour are interviewees 
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this ETC. Then the details of each step are obtained and/or checked from other 
related interviewees.In addition, one retired manager in ETC, who used to participate 
in investment into the factory, and another retired manager from the joint-venture 
welding electrodes manufacturing company also offer additional information on the 
process of vertical integration and the joint-venture manufacutruers. 
7.3.2 Export transaction process  
In this section, one general export transaction process, operated by ETC B, is 
illustrated step by step (Shown in Table 7-10 and 7-11) in order to highlight the parts 
where the institutional constraints and related transaction costs occur.  
Table 7-10 Summary of transactional procedures in 3rd department of ETC B. 
1 Sample making and searching for buyers 
2 Negotiations 
3 Enforcing the production of manufacturers 
4 Processing the relevant documents 
5 Receiving the payment from foreign buyers 
6 Tax rebating 
7 Classifications in classification society 
8 Managing the brand 
 
Table 7-11  Details of transactional procedures in 3rd department of ETC B. 
1 Sample making 
Different from ETC A, the procedure for sample making is easier and does not need to 
enforce in this case. During most cases, on receipt of the requirements for sending samples 
(the existing modes) from the potential and existing buyers, the TMs would ask for them from 
the welding electrodes manufacturer, and resend them to the buyers, as these products are 
usually standardized and stocked in the manufacturers’ warehouse. In addition, these 
samples can also be used during many other marketing activities in this ETC, like the trade 
show and B2B website. Sometimes, the buyers would ask for certain unique modes, which 
are different from their existing modes, or have unique requirements on standardized modes. 
In these cases, the TM will ask the manufacturers to experimentally produce some samples 
according to these requirements (if the production capabilities can fulfil these requirements), 
and then monitor and test them. When the performance of welding is able to fulfil these 
requirements, they send them to buyer for further test modification as well.  
2 Negotiations  
The buyers would inquire the price from the ETC for the required products. Then the ETC 
will make the same request of their factory. When they receive the price from the factory, we 
would add their fixed profits and send to the buyers. The buyers would make decision to 
accept the price or give another bid.   
3 Enforcing the production of manufacturers 
Technically, this ETC only enforces the lead-in time of production, as the modes and series 
of welding electrodes have been consistent for a long time, and the quality of products has 
been stable throughout this longstanding collaboration. 
4 Processing the relative documents 
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The TMs from the 3rd export process department produce, submit and  receive most of the 
exporting documents to/from relevant external organizations, which is as same as the 
previous ETC A. 
5 Receiving the payment from foreign buyers 
The accounting department takes charge of receiving the payment from foreign buyers, 
which is as same as that in ETC A.  
6 Tax rebating 
The accounting department takes charge of tax rebate applications from local taxation, which 
is the same as that in ETC A. The tax rebate rate is 9%, 11%, or 13% for the welding 
electrodes in this ETC. 
7 Classifications in classification society 
Due to many foreign buyers requiring the classification societies’ approvals for welding 
electrodes, this ETC has to help the manufacturer apply for different classifications from 
seven classification societies. The 3
rd
 export process department and top manager office 
jointly work on these application procedures, including training the manufacturers, document 
preparation, communication, and payment for the classification. In addition, these 
classifications have to be renewed every year or every two years.  
8 Managing the brands 
The top managers’ office has been renewing the brands with the local Trademark Office of 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, and registering with China Customs every six 
years. In order to protect these brands, the top managers’ office has to investigate fake 
products, which are mainly produced by other Chinese factories, on the export markets with 
the help of China Customs. In some extreme cases, they have had to instigate lawsuits in 
relation to a large number of fake products as well. 
7.3.3 The institutional constraints and related transaction costs 
Similarly to 7.2.3, this section aims to explore the institutional constraints and 
relevant transaction costs in China’s export market. The four identified institutional 
constraints, three from developed in the pilot study and one from case A, are initially 
explored. In the meantime, the emerging institutional constraints and costs in China’s 
export market are explored and analysed according to current findings. The 
analytical path continues to follow from domestic manufactuers’ perspective to 
foreign bueyrs’ perspective.  
7.3.3.1 The side of domestic manufacturers  
7.3.3.1.1 The pre-export and post-export procedures 
 
In case B, the administrative approvals during the pre-export and post-export 
procedures also resemble those in pilot study A and case A. This supports the 
proposed argument in chapter 6 that “the bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals are the main former formal institutional constraints, which 
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generate additional transactional procedures and costs for standard export 
transactions in China.”  
 
More specifically, the CEO of ETC B admits that his company also meets the same 
problems and costs as in case A. ETC B needs to renew or maintain some of the 
registrations with these government departments every year, though certain official 
applications, mainly compulsory for exporters’ start-up export businesses, had been 
discontinued officially  a long time ago. 
 
In addition, the transactional procedures of 4 and 6 in 7.3.2 show that the 
administrative approvals during “post-export” when this ETC was set up, mainly 




 export process departments, and staffs from 
accounting department. It was their responsibility to submit/receive these relevant 
official documents and approvals to/from these government departments for each 
current export transaction, including the local foreign exchange branches, local 
entry-exit inspection and quarantine bureaux, and the local China Customs Office. 
The transactional procedure 6 (Tax rebating) also shows that this ETC completed tax 
rebating under their own steam.  
7.3.3.1.2 The procedure for managing brands and applying for special 
certificates   
Case A found that the long-term OEM trading method results in a series of problems 
and costs for domestic manufacturers in China. A similar situation is also found in 
case B. The long-term OEM trading method in China’s export market makes the 
domestic manufacturers incapable of managing brands and applying for special 
certificates. As a result, the findings in case B also support the argument in case A: 
that “the long-term OEM trading method in China’s export market, as the informal 
institutional constraints, generates additional transactional procedures and relative 
costs for domestic manufacturers.”  
 
As stated in case A, the OEM trading method helps Chinese manufacturers to 
quickly acquire opportunities to participate in global business, with cheap labour 
costs. However, it also results in a lack of massive marketing functions, such as 
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brand, market, and sales channels. In case B, it can be said that the main influence 
falls on two parts: the brands management and special certificates for products.  
Brands  
Brand is one effective method for offering quality information for buyers. It reduces 
their measurement costs on products, and further increases transactional possibilities 
for both sellers and buyers (Akerlof, 1970; Barzel, 1982, 2001). This became more 
important for the manufacturers from transition economies, where the inefficient 
institutions generate considerable quality problems and increase measurement costs 
for foreign bueyrs. However, to establish, manage and maintain brand is costly and 
not easy, especially in China, where some institutions constrain such business 
activities, such as the popularity of pirate activity. The long-term OEM trading 
method is one of these institutions. It obstructs domestic manufacturers in using 
owned brands. An interview with one retired senior manager of a factory also reveals 
that the manufacturers’ lack of brand and capabilities for establishing brand quickly 
undermines the development of direct transactions with foreign buyers.  
 
“Before the establishment of the factory, we only received orders from ETCs. Our 
factory’s ability [then] was limited. So we did not think about exporting on our 
own….We used different brands of customers [ETCs] during that time, we didn’t 
have a brand till recent….When the TJM recommended establishing one joint 
venture, our consideration was that their “Permanent” brand [TJM’s brand] could 
help us develop and open up foreign markets…To quote the factory director, it was 
called “to borrow the ship to go to sea” … we tried to export under our own brand 
in recent years, but the outcome was not good… currently 95%  of our output is 
offered through the TJM”  
 
Obviously, the brand became a large obstacle for this manufacturer’s direct export to 
foreign buyers, before and after the establishment of a joint venture. 30 years have 
passed since the establishment of the joint venture. This manufacturer’s products still 
paste the TJM’s brand, though their production capability has advanced and branding 
knowledge is no longer secretive. This proves that the long-term OEM trading 
method leads to this manufacturer failing to establish an own brand, and miss the 
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opportune time to do so. The reality is that this manufacturer still meets the problem 
of brand to this day. Therefore, the OEM style export mode in China disables 
manufacturer’s other functions apart from the manufacturing, including brand 
management. As a result, these manufacturers come to lack these capabilities when 
they really want to start their owning export. 
Special certificates 
Similar to the issue of brand, products’ guarantee is another effective method for 
avoiding quality problems in the products for buyers (Akerlof, 1970; Barzel, 1982, 
2001). Many extant studies (Clougherty & Grajek, 2008; Urbonavicius, 2005) also 
indicate that quality certificates, such as the ISO system, which is widely accepted on 
international markets, is extremely valuable for manufacturers with limited 
international reputations, and in developing countries, where local institutions fail to 
effectively reduce information asymmetry resulting products’ quality problems.  As 
stated in 7.3.1, the requirement for certificates from international classification 
societies becomes one universal standard and source of reliable evidence for good-
quality products on the export markets, such as the welding electrodes in this ETC. 
Therefore, these certificates become the products’ guarantee, which could reduce 
foreign buyers’ monitoring costs on products’ quality.  
 
However, the successful application of these certificates is not one easy job in China. 
The transactional procedure 7 (Classifications in classification society) have briefly 
indicated that the application procedures for such certificates requires a series of 
documentation for the work, quality system requirements, on-site investigations, 
experiments with products, and so on. It requires manufacturers, products and 
production processes to fulfil strict surveys. During 1980s, fewer factories, especially 
the emergent small private factories like the factory in this case, were able to 
successfully pass these surveys, due to poor production systems, low-quality 
products, and lack of knowledge and experience in these surveys. In addition, due to 
the trading method of the OEM, such jobs as applying for these certificates had been 
undertaken by TJM with the result that the manufacturer still does not know how to 




In addition, the interview with the manager in the 3
rd
 department illustrates the 
difficulty in such work and the manufacturer’s problems with this. As stated by the 
manager  
 
“The TJM arranged the surveys of certificates from classification societies every 
year, including early preparation and applications, inside investigations on factories, 
on-site investigations, and so on…….[more specifically]we usually prepare for 
applications from November every year, preparing relevant documents. After 
deciding the date, we will send experienced staff to the factory to investigate the 
production conditions, and advise them on any important modifications to the 
production….sometimes, we also need to communicate with external labs for some 
special experiments.”  
 
When I asked him if the staff in the factory know how to apply for such certificates, 
he replied that they only knew some parts, not whole process. He further add that 
they had to help the manufacturers a lot during the survey, including on-site checking, 
as they knew the “points” of these surveys, which had been accumulated through 
long-term experience.  
 
Therefore, these certificates of classification societies in this procedure become 
another problem for factories’ direct export, and create additional costs in their direct 
export market.  
 
In general, the acquisition of brands and certain special certificates helps exporters 
export with the assurance of the products’ quality, which is attractive for many 
foreign buyers as such activities reduce their enforcing costs (which will be further 
discussed in next section). In other words, it increases the possibilities, and reduces 
the costs of searching for foreign buyers. But the long-term OEM method increases 
the difficulty of doing so for domestic manufacturers, as it obstructs them in 
obtaining, learning and improving their capabilities in these fields.  
7.3.3.2 The side of foreign buyers 
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7.3.3.2.1 The procedure of enforcing manufacturers 
 
As proposed before, the enforcement costs will be increased due to the inefficient 
legal system (current formal institutional constraints) and contract obligations 
(informal institutional constraints) in China. The evidence in this case also confirms 
this proposition by showing the reasons for this ETC’s vertical integration. 
Vertical integration of production 
 
Although the reasons for vertical integration are variable and debatable, the studies 
from transaction costs economics believe the relatively large transaction costs is the 
major one (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1971, 1979, 1985). 
Given the level of asset specificity, the opportunistic behaviour, especially the “post-
contractual opportunistic behaviour”, such as moral hazards and hold-ups, lead to the 
vertical integration (Demsetz, 1990; Klein et al., 1978). Obviously the formal legal 
system and informal contract enforcement influence opportunistic behaviours, and 
the resulting decision for vertical integration. Fan et al (Fan, Huang, Morck, & 
Yeung, 2009) indicates that China’s institutional factors, such as the inefficient legal 
system and less well developed market mechanism, generate a great deal of 
transactional difficulties. As a result, many local firms choose vertical integration as 
a countermeasure.  
 
Since this ETC invested in one factory since 1980s, the author interviewed one 
retired senior manager who used to work in this ETC at that time. He describes the 
reasons why they made such an investment at that time. First, it solves the supply 
problem. Since the 1950s, this ETC monopolistically operated the export of welding 
electrodes in the area of Tianjin. Two large factories in this area had to collaborate 
amicably with this ETC, and arrange production completely in line with the ETC’s 
export orders. Since the export authorities gradually began to issue some 
manufacturers with certificates since the 1980s, and with the development of the 
domestic markets, these factories began to change their focus towards other export 
orders and domestic markets. Therefore the supply from these two factories suffered 
with shortages. After that, this ETC had to send some export orders to some smaller 
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factories. But some problems emerged, such as untimely delivery, un-negotiated 
increases in price and so on. Details are shown below:  
 
 “Our orders from them usually had problems at that time…….All factories began to 
work for other export and domestic orders. But they had limited productivities. Thus 
our orders were not exclusive and not guaranteed in terms of quality and time. Some 
orders were delayed as factories sent products to other buyers......Usually we would 
not think about changing factories, as others were no different to the previous ones. 
In some worst cases, we could change factories for some products, such as 
standardized hardware. But we could not change factories for the welding electrodes, 
as there were only several manufacturers nearby Tianjian (the city of the ETC’s 
location). We didn’t think the others were any better. They might be even 
worse…….[Most importantly,] these factories could change contract terms 
arbitrarily, especially the price. They always had some reasons raising the price, 
such as the increasing price of raw materials and labour costs. But we already 
offered the original price to our customers (buyers). So we sometimes had to explain 
a lot to our customers, or even lose money in business.” 
 
In terms of the current partner, the joint-venture welding electrodes manufacturer, 
this ETC does not have complete confidence in them, the manager of the 3
rd
 
department described as follows:  
 
“We have three staff in this factory. One is vice manager in the accounting 
department of this factory, in the event that they arbitrarily raise product price. He 
would take care of this issue. Moreover our products [welding electrodes] have some 
patents, such as the prescription. We are afraid that they sell same products to other 
exporters, and may do harm to our brand and patents. By sending these people, we 
can avoid they could do so [to some extent].” 
 
According to these descriptions, this ETC, as the buyers, integrate products’ 
suppliers, in an attempt to ease their opportunistic behaviours generated by the 
inefficient legal system and unique contract obligations, such as raising prices, 
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delaying supply, and so on, which worsen the enforcement problems. The aims of 
this ETC’s integration of manufacturers and placing their own staffs in this factory 
reflect that the inefficient legal system and informal contract obligation actually fails 
to lighten manufacturers’ opportunistic behaviours. As a result, the buyers, says the 
ETC in this case, had to use internalization and close monitoring of the factories’ 
behaviours to avoid potential risk. In the same logic, the foreign buyers could be 
faced with similar and even more severe difficulties in China.
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Table 7-12  The summary of institutional constraints and related transaction costs in ETC B. 
 
Procedure in export 
transaction 
Related institutions 
Parts of the 
institutional 
framework 
Evidence in case 
Specific 
transaction costs 
How costs are 
increased  










Licences and registration from 
various government 








Registration and approvals 
from various government 







procedures and policy 
By generating 
uncertainty 





The procedure of 
managing brands and 
applying for special 
certificates    




The manufacturer is lack of 
owned brands  
Costs of searching 
foreign buyers 
By reducing the 
possibility of 
transaction 
The manufacturer is lack of 
information and experience to 
obtain certain industrial 
certificates 
The procedure for 
enforcing 
manufacturers 
Inefficient legal system   
 Current formal 
institutional 
constraints 
Quality problems such as 
untimely delivery, random 
increases in price, illegal sell 
of products to other exporters 










7.3.4 The ETC’s methods for reducing institution-related transaction 
costs 
7.3.4.1 The side of domestic manufacturers  
7.3.4.1.1 The pre-export and post-export procedures 
 
Similar to the findings and analysis in case A, the costs of related administrative 
approvals during pre-export and post-export procedures in this case can be reduced 
by this ETC’s knowledge (experience) of these administrative approvals procedures 
during the export transactions in China. First, according to the introduction from the 
CEO, this ETC arranges several specific staff from the Export Management Office 
and Accounting Department to respectively finish the administrative approvals, and 
license applications, which are compulsory for start-up export businesses, and 
subsequent renewals of such approvals, including the export authority, business 
license, and various registrations with customs, foreign exchange bureaux and so on. 
Most of these staffs had been working on these tasks for many years. In addition, 
according to the manager from the 3
rd
 department, the export process, especially the 
post-export procedures, is routine work as well, which is as same as the findings in 
case A. For instance, the specific TMs in each department work on export documents 
processing; some other staff in accounting department works on the tax rebating 
process and foreign exchange approvals with foreign exchange branches, customs, 
and taxation bureaux. Therefore, these experienced staffs, and an established routine 
reminder system helps this ETC to reduce time and failure during the process of 
these administrative approvals, and further reduce the costs related to such formal 
institutional constraints.  
 
In addition, according to the CEO’s interview, this ETC is able to quickly obtain 
information about new export regulations. There are two sources for the information. 
First, the Northernint, as the leader company, would share these kinds of information 
inside the group. Second, the relevant government departments often organize 
training sessions and conferences for related changes in procedures. Due to their high 
export volume, this ETC is often invited.  
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7.3.4.2 The side of foreign buyers 
7.3.4.2.1 The procedure for enforcing manufacturers 
 
As proposed before, the inefficient legal system (current formal institutional 
constraints) and unique contract obligatiosn (informal institutional constraints) 
increase the costs of enforcing domestic manufacturers. It has been argued that the 
ETC is able to reduce these costs by easing information asymmetry in Case A. The 
same logic also works in this case. More specifically, this ETC reduces the 
information asymmetry by establishing brand, applying for well-known industrial 
certificates and vertical integration into production.  
 
Brand 
The establishment and management of brands in China are faced with many 
difficulties, such as the inefficient legal system, popularity of pirate activity, and 
domestic manufacturer’s inadequacies under the long-term OEM trading method.   
 
Akerlof (1970) indicates that the brand name helps buyers to reduce the uncertainty 
of products’ quality and adverse selection by signing customers the quality 
information and reducing information asymmetry.  Barzel (1982) also states that the 
measurement cost of products’ quality is considerable for buyers, the brand names 
reduce such measurement costs when products are transferred between owners in a 
market. Therefore, the brand can largely reduce foreign buyers’ costs for enforcing 
domestic manufacturers in export transactions.  
 
In this case, the ETC owns, manages and maintains the brand for a long time, which 
reduces the foreign buyers’ costs for direct monitoring/measuring of product quality, 
and eases the possibilities of adverse selection. This ETC has many advantages in 
such areas. First, this ETC has a longer track record and more experience in brand 
management. As stated in 7.3.1, as the real owner, this ETC has owned and managed 
the brand of “Permanent” on the export market for more than 40 years. This is 
because the ETC, as the earliest group of exporters from China, had to establish and 
manage brands for tradable products in international competition. Conversely, most 
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of the domestic manufacturers have not had own brands until recently, due to the 
long-term OEM trading method, having no tradition of brand management, and high 
requirements/costs in order to manage the brand.  It is hard for most domestic 
manufacturers.  
 
Second, this ETC has more specified staff. According to the introduction from the 
CEO, they have specified staff in the Export Management Office in this ETC to 
specifically work on the registration of these brands and trademarks with the 
Administration for Industry and Commerce and Customs. Moreover, their more 
specified coordination with some external facilitators, like China Customs, local 
courts and lawyers, also considerably supports the management of brand.  
 
“We valued these brands very highly, and pay attention to protecting these 
brands……we often received the claims from Customs for the investigation of some 
faked examples of our products. We would send our staff to assist these 
investigations……we also meet these claims from Customs from other cities……there 
have been three occasions till now that we took legal action on the matter, as the 
export amount (of faked products)was really large……We employed a lawyer and 
then went to Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou for the court issues” 
 
As mentioned in procedure 8 (Managing the brand) and in the statement above from 
the CEO, it is clear that this ETC actively participates in the activities of managing 
and protecting their brands. Therefore, this ETC had actively established and 
managed brands for tradable products for long time, which enhace the quality 
guaranty, to reduce foreign bueyrs’ enforcement costs on export transaction. 
 
Special certificates 
As stated before, the certificates from the classification societies, as the guarantee of 
product quality, is able to resolve the information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970; Barzel, 
1982, 2001) in the export market, and reduce foreign buyers’ monitoring costs, 
particularly when they purchase from developing countries, such as China. However, 
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the long-term OEM trading method in China’s export market ensures that domestic 
manufacturers fail to obtain these certificates on their own.  
 
The ETC in this case is able to help its manufacturers to complete such certificates 
from the classification societies. First of all, this ETC has helped the factory to finish 
the initial certificates from the 1980s, when such certificates were still unfamiliar to 
most Chinese manufacturers of welding electrodes. The ETC’s efforts to learn the 
application procedures and assessment process and to improve production 
technology enabled this factory to successfully pass the investigation from 
classification societies. Second, the ETC’s continuously helped this factory to 
acquire another seven certificates from different classification societies, which 
further increased trading opportunities from more foreign buyers with different 
requirements. It is worth mentioning that these classification societies do not accept 
certificates from each other. And also the different foreign buyers acquire different 
certificates from certain classification societies, due to distinctions in national, 
industrial and business traditions. In the end, the application procedures and 
requirements for certificates from these classification societies are definitely different 
from each other. Apparently, this ETC must have learned such differences in 
knowledge to ensure the factory could fulfil these different requirements. Thirdly, the 
ETC also helps the factory to renew such certificates every year.  
 
 “We did the renewal for these classification societies every year or two years. We 
[3
rd
 department] took these jobs for welding electrodes. That period could be the 
busiest one during the year. We apply for the renewal to these classification societies, 
and inform the factory to arrange/change the production of certain welding 
electrodes on the days when they come for investigation. We have 6 different 
certificates; these classification societies have different working styles and 




In a short, this ETC had actively applied for different well-accepted industrial 
certificates for tradable products for long time, which enhace the quality guaranty, 
to reduce foreign bueyrs’ enforcement costs on export transaction. 
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Vertical integration of production 
Some trading companies, such as the JGTCs, are reported to participate in 
manufacturing. Such phenomenon is also found in this case. The reason is to be 
found in economizing transaction costs as well.  
 
Williamson (1975, 1985) directly indicates that the firms’ vertical integration aims to 
economize transaction costs. As stated in 7.3.3.2.1, the opportunistic behaviour, such 
as moral hazards and hold-ups, is a major reason for such transaction costs, in 
particular for the enforcement costs, which is evident in this case.  
 
Arrow (1975) argues that “uncertainty in the supply of the up-stream good(s) and the 
consequent need for information by down-stream firm(s)” is one of the major 
motives for vertical integration. By studying the US food industry, Hennessy (1996) 
further empirically illustrates that one important benefit from integration between 
producers and processers is the reduction of the quality-related information 
asymmetry.  It is therefore understood that the information, especially that related to 
“product quality” can reduce the uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour from 
domestic manufacturers, and therefore reduce foreign buyers’ enforcement costs.  
 
In this case, the ETC adopts vertical quasi-integration (Harrigan, 1984) by 
establishing a joint venture with a manufacturer, which lowers transaction costs, and 
is more likely to alleviate transactional problems, such as moral hazards, compared 
with simple market transactions (Williamson, 1971) with a manufacturer. In practice, 
more specifically, the ETC placed three monitoring staff in the joint venture; the vice 
CEO, the accountant and the senior manager. By doing this, the ETC obtains 
complete information about the production and the manufacturer, such as the real 
price and change in materials and products, clear production schedule, and quality-
related information. The complete information effectively avoids the manufacturer’s 
opportunistic behaviours, such as the unreasonable price changes, changes in the 




In addition, the interviews also indicate that such placing of staff in the factory also 
avoids this manufacturer’s other potential opportunistic behaviours, such as selling 
the products to other domestic exporters, which could influence the price of products 
in export markets. Therefore, the logic here is similar to that in Case A and previous 
“Brand” and “special certificates”; the vertical quasi-integration of the manufacturer 
aims to obtain more information on production and the domestic manufacturer. So 
that the ETC is able to effectively enforce the manufacturer, reduce their 
opportunistic behaviours and the transaction costs within them.  Therefore, it is found 
that this ETC is able to reduce foreign buyers’ enforcement costs on export 
transaction, by vertically integrating into production and mastering information on 
production, which effectively reduce manufactuers’ opportunistic behaviours in 






Table 7-13  The summary of ETC B’s methods and advantage in export transaction. 
Procedure in export 
transaction 
Institutional constraints ETC’s methods Evidence in the case 
How to reduce 
costs 
The pre-export and 
post-export 
procedures 
Bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals 
 
Knowledge of administrative 
approval procedures 
 
Staff educational background 
and work-based training on 
administrative procedures 
Advantages of 
economics of scale 
Staff experience of such 
administrative procedures 
Regular routines for such 
administrative procedures during 
daily work in ETC 
Updated information on the 
current export process and 
policy,  and changes 
The procedure for 
enforcing 
manufacturers 
Inefficient legal system & 
unique contract obligations & 
OEM trading method 
To establish and manage 
brand for tradable products  
Long-term participation in the 
brand management and 
protection in China 
To reduce the 
information 
asymmetry 
To apply for well-known 
industrial certificates for 
tradable products 
Long-term participation in the 
applications to classification 
societies 




Acquirement of information on 
production and export-relation 
transaction 
To place monitoring staff Factory 





7.4 Case C analysis 
7.4.1 The background information on ETC C 
 
Huakang Imp&Exp is a private ETC, established in 2004 with an export turnover 
was $30,000,000 in 2010 in Shanghai. It mainly exports ferroalloy, such as silicon-
manganese, ferrosilicon, and ferromanganese, one sort of additive in fabricating 
products, such as steel, to achieve special characteristics, which makes up about 70% 
export amount annually. With the development of business and buyers’ orders in 
recent years, Huakang began to export other steel materials, like steel pipes. These 
products make up the remaining 30% of exports. Its main foreign buyers come from 
Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan. All of them are also middlemen, who 
also transact with other ETCs and manufacturers in China, and resell in their 
countries. Huakang has long term export business contracts with these buyers. The 
earliest one (Thailand) can be traced back to 1999, when the owner of this ETC 
worked as a TM in another state-owned trading company.  
 
In general, the ETC does not have stable suppliers, due to the characteristics of its 
products and related markets in China, which will be discussed in later parts of this 
case. Broadly speaking, the main suppliers of ETC C include four domestic 
wholesalers (traders) and two steel mining companies (manufacturers) in China, 
while numerous external suppliers occasionally offer products. These suppliers’ main 
business takes place in China, though the wholesalers also undertake export on their 
own account. Among them, two wholesalers are large ones with four times the 
trading volume of ETC C at least. They also offer products to other ETCs, lower 
level wholesalers and some end customers such as steel plants. And two steel mining 
companies only do domestic trade. Their customers also include other ETCs and 
wholesalers. In addition, the products from these different suppliers, mainly refer to 
ferroalloy and steel material, are similar to each other in terms of quality and kind, 
and only differ in price and available quantity. Thus the reasons for keeping many 




The owner of this ETC used to work in a state-owned ETC. Such working experience 
helps him to master general skills on export, to establish strong trust with one current 
foreign buyer (Thailand), enhance his understanding of the industry of steel trade, 
and require connections with several large traders in the field of ferroalloy and steel. 
All of them become the most important steps during the first of several export 
transactions. After 2000, he became an independent broker affiliated to a private 
ETC. During that time, he operated export transactions on his own account, but used 
the company’s title, export authority and money to resell products, and finally shared 
some part of profits under the title of brokerage fee. Eventually in 2004 he opened 
the current ETC, the ETC C.  
Table 7-14  Summary of background of ETC C. 





Products ferroalloy, iron hardware, and machinery 












Per capital $3,000,000 
Margin 1% 
 
This ETCs has a total of 9 employees. They are shown in table 7-15 and figure 7-5 
 
Table 7-15  Summary of staffs in ETC C. 




One owner is the founder on this ETC. As mentioned before, he is in the 
core place in this company. He took charge of the general management 
of this ETC, and important units during transaction processes, especially 
the transactions with new partners, such as the investigation of the 
characteristics of new suppliers, he randomly monitored of products, and 
visited the buyers. Another owner takes charge of the administrative 




They are divided into two groups, though there are no clear departments 
and strict divisions in this ETC. Four of them generally take charge of 
the export of products through HK-registered company (without export 
rebates and export documents processes), whilst two of them work on 
the export of products through the China-registered company (with 
export rebates and documentary preparation). As with the previous 
cases, these TMs have a relevant educational background and 
experience in exporting. 




Figure 7-5  Organizational structure of ETC C. 
 
In this case, I took three face-to-face interviews with two owners and an accountant, 
another two on-line interviews with one owner (which is the major interviewee) and 
one interview with the accountant. The main owner is chosen as the core interviewee 
as he can offer most of the information on the ETC and export transaction process. 
On the one hand, he completely understands the whole information on the ETC and 
transaction process. On the other hand, other employees in this ETC are limited in 
their work, in a rather secretive approach for avoiding loss of key know-how held by 
the ETC, such as the source of buyers. In addition, the other owner and the 
accountant mainly offer the information in their work in this ETC.  
7.4.2 Transaction process  
In this section, one general export transaction process, operated by ETC C, is 
illustrated step by step (Shown in Table 7-16 and 7-17) in order to highlight the parts 
where the institutional constraints and related transaction costs occur.  
 
Table 7-16  Summary of transactional procedures of ETC C. 
1 Inquiry and negotiation 
2 Choosing from two different companies 
3 Payments and contracting  
4 Enforcement of supply of products/re-negotiation with the price 
5 Processing export documents  
6 Making full payment to supplier 
7 Receiving the payment from foreign buyers 
8 Tax rebating 
9 Registering off-shore company and account 
10 Legal issues 
 
Table 7-17  Details of transactional procedures of ETC C. 
Owner (2) 
Trading 
merchandisers (4)  
Accountant (1) Trading 
merchandisers (2) 
The persons noted in the red are interviewees in this case 
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1 Inquiry and negotiation 
At first, foreign buyers inquire about the current price for a certain amount of products to ETC 
C (as the price could be different according different amount). Then TMs of ETC C look for 
one reference price and availability of his quantity on the current market (The TMs’s main 
work every day is to obtain price information on the market, as it changes each day). The 
information channels include the current suppliers, previous partner suppliers, other 
suppliers on the markets and public trading platforms. Then ETC C negotiates with reliable 
suppliers in terms of price according to the reference price on the current market. After that 
the price (modified by adding their profits, usually 1%-2%) is delivered to the foreign buyer. 
When there is less or no stock in their existing supplier, this ETC has to use external 
suppliers, which could be previous suppliers and some new ones. This ETC is cautious 
about choosing external suppliers, due to the higher risks entailed  and the difficulty in 
contract enforcement in the future. In some large orders, this ETC needs to use more than 
one supplier. Therefore inquiry and negotiation procedures will take place with more than 
one supplier.  In the end, the ETC will choose the most profitable and suitable combination of 
suppliers in this situation. On the other hand, the negotiations between them and foreign 
buyers are usually simple, as the ETC’s offering prices are reasonable according the then 
market.  
2 Choice of two different companies 
This ETC has two different companies registered in China (on-shore) and HK (off-shore 
company), though all real processes took place in same office in Shanghai. They will choose 
one to undertake certain transactions according different tax rebate policies issued by the 
Chinese customs. When the products have a tax rebate, these transactions will be 
processed by using the title of the China company so that tax rebates may be successfully 
claimed. The rest of the process is  similar to that in cases A and B. When the products do 
have tax rebates or even have an export tax, they are dealt with through the name of HK-
registered company, because there is no tax to claim from the China customs. This process 
is one third-country trade and by doing this the ETC can avoid massive taxation in China, 
benefiting from a lower rate in the HK  
3 payments and contracting  
After negotiations, a purchasing contract will be signed between suppliers and the ETC, 
whilst a selling contract will be sealed between the ETC and buyers. In terms of the payment 
term, the telegraphic transfer (TT) with some percentage of the deposit is popular in this 
field. In such payment terms, the manufacturers will ask at least 30% deposit from ETC C. In 
turn, ETC C will ask 20-30% deposit from the buyers. These deposits could be sent and 
received from/to the ETC’s on-shore or off-shore account according to the different modes.  
4 Enforcement of supply of products/re-negotiation with the price 
The main problems related to steel and ferroalloy in this ETC are that the domestic 
manufacturers (including traders) often break the contract in order to change the original 
price. Such a situation often takes place, especially at particular times when large 
fluctuations in price had occurred on the domestic and international markets. The lead-in 
time for steel and ferroalloy between contracting and real implementation is usually 10 to 30 
days, and even 60 days in some extreme cases. Due to price fluctuations, the price can 
show some differences between the contracting and the real implementation. Because of 
ineffective legal protections and inadequate contractual obligations, the domestic suppliers, 
especially the SMEs, often ask to re-arrange a new contract with a different deal price or 
even refuse to finish the contract when the price gap is large. In these cases, this ETC has to 
immediately re-negotiate a new contract or find an alternative supplier, in order to 
successfully finish their transactions with the foreign buyers.   
5 Processing of relevant export documents  
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When the products have an export rebate, the TMs in this ETC will complete all the export 
documents, while the accountant completes the rebating procedure. The procedure is similar 
to that in the previous ETCs. When the products have no export rebate or have an export 
tax, this ETC only processes fewer documents, such as shipping bills, and leaves the major 
work to the suppliers, who usually have export licences for these products. In this situation, 
this procedure is like one 3
rd
-country trade, where this ETC is acting as a foreign buyer from 
the HK that resells products to another 3
rd
 country.  
6 Making full payment to the supplier 
At the time of shipping by the suppliers’, the ETC will pay the remaining payment (the 
remaining 70%) to the suppliers.   
7 Receipt of the payment from the buyers 
When the ETC re-sends the shipping documents from the forwarder, the buyers will pay the 
rest of money to the ETC. For products processed under the title of a company in China, the 
payment will be sent to the on-shore bank account.  For the others through an off-shore 
company, it will be sent to the off-shore account in a local bank. But in this way, the ETC had 
to find ways o  transferring the money (usually US dollars) to the RMB account, as Chinese 
policies of currency control only allow non-business accounts to receive small amounts of 
foreign currency. As a result, this ETC had to find ways of changing foreign exchange into 
Chinese currency, including personal small amount payments abroad which are then 
transferred from illegal secret private banks.  
8 Tax rebating 
For the products with a tax rebate the accountant of this ETC will operate the procedure of 
tax rebating. This procedure is the same as that in Cases A and B. The period of tax rebating 
is also 2-3 months 
9 Registering an off-shore company and account 
Due to the use of an off-shore company and bank account, it is necessary for this ETC to 
apply for (from the HK government), to renew annually, and really operate in HK 
(occasionally receiving some forms and mail from relevant departments in HK), make and 
offer financial reports to HK government, and open one off-shore bank account (before in 
HK, now in Shanghai).  This ETC employs one agent, who is a special agent to help the 
ETCs to process these series of procedures. In order to pay less tax in HK, the agent also 
helps to construct the technical financial report.  
10 Legal issues 
As stated in transactional procedure 4, some suppliers could require new contracts or refuse 
to finish the existing contracts. In this case, the ETC often absorbs the loss, as it cannot 
change the selling contracts with foreign buyers. But when the loss is large, this ETC had to 
appeal for the legal assistance to save some losses. In this case, such a situation happened 
twice in 2009 and 2011. But the procedures are really costly, while the outcome is not 
satisfactory. In this case, each time it took several months to finish the implementation of 
adjudication in the local court in China. And also this ETC only received back part of loss in 
the end.  
7.4.3 The institutional constraints and related transaction costs 
 
The exploration of institutional constraints is the main focus in this section. The 
known institutional constraints on China’s export market, found in pilot study A and 
the subsequent two cases will be checked first of all. Similar to the previous cases, 
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additional attention is also paid to the emergent institutional constraints on export 
markets, which appear during export transactions in this case.  
7.4.3.1 Some additional background information in the case 
 
Before entering the data analysis, some relevant background information, which is 
different from the previous cases due to the characteristics of the products and related 
markets, are separately introduced. They are the market for steel materials and 
ferroalloy, and some export policies for these products in China. 
7.4.3.1 .1 the market of steel materials and ferroalloy in China  
 
The market of ferroalloy and steel materials in China has the reputation for complex 
distribution channels, uncertain prices, and large financial pressures (Davies, 2013; 
Lian & Soh, 2012; WSJ, 2013). First, there are various manufacturers and traders on 
this market, ranging from large SOEs to individual brokers. The manufacturers only 
sign annual contracts for a large amount with first-tier traders and large end users, as 
they can arrange the production schedule in advance, and receive some deposits from 
them before production to avoid loss on prices and release financial pressures. Then 
the first-tier traders resell these products to 2
nd
-tier traders, which resell to 3
rd
-tier 
traders. Certainly they also contain various small traders and end customers. In the 
end, there are all kinds of traders and manufacturers with different stocks on the 
market.  
 
Second, the real deal price of trade has been changing continuously due to rapid 
growth of demand of steel products in China and the popularity of opportunism and 
speculation in this field. The price of steel products and relative materials on the 
Chinese steel market can change in the same day. On the one hand, the domestic 
demand as continued to increase rise due to the economic boom in contemporary 
China. The growth of (international and domestic) prices of raw materials and energy 
prices (electricity and coal) also contributes to the increase in costs of these products. 
On the other hand, the popularity and tradition of opportunism and speculation in this 
industry aggravate the situation. In the past, numerous multiple-tier traders have had 
221 
 
the tradition of speculation since the beginning of the economic reform. Due to the 
lack of steel products during the economic transition and the continuous fluctuation 
of the price of steel in recent years, these traders could easily earn profits through 
holding/reducing their stock.  
 
In addition, the involvement of bank loans also enhances this situation, as the loan to 
traders on their stock can be used on the next-round buyout and additional 
speculation. Under these circumstances together with inefficient legal protection, 
certain manufacturers and traders indulge in strong opportunistic behaviours. They 
would often break the contacts with buyers to pursue higher economic benefits when 
the price increased or to avoid losses in periods of declining prices. In some extreme 
cases some suppliers in this industry choose to flee from China (Lian & Soh, 2012).  
 
As a result, the real deal price could vary with each transaction and change overnight. 
Due to these uncertainties and opportunistic behaviours, many transactions, 
especially those with small traders, take place sing the spot method. And also the 
payment terms in these transactions mainly adopt full payment before shipping.  
7.4.3.1.2 The export policy of steel materials and ferroalloy  
 
The export policy (trade policy) of steel materials and ferroalloy, mainly in terms of 
the tax rebate, export tax and export licences (quotas), have been constantly changing 
in recent years in China for some external reasons, such as environmental issues, 
energy issues, the government’s industrial policy, and WTO regulations. As a result, 
during the same period, some products might apply for tax rebates, whilst others had 
to impose additional export taxes and even limited export licences (quotas). For 
instance, the export of steel pipe has 9% tax rebates, while the export of ferroalloy 
had to acquire export licences apart from the additional 20% export tax in 2010.  
 
In addition, the government’s export policies for the same products could change 
between different periods. By way of example, before 2005, the export of ferroalloy 
was subsidized by the Chinese government through the device of an export tax rebate 
(rate 11%-15%). Then for many reasons, such as the reduction in the high 
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consumption of a natural resource and the pollution from this industry together with 
the re-structuring of distribution and marketing by reducing the number of small 
manufacturers ,the government began to cancel the tax rebate, and to apply a 5% 
export tax on ferroalloy from 2005 (MOFCOM, 2005), and then increased the export 
tax to 10% in 2006 (MOFCOM, 2006), and finally set an additional limited export 
quotas/licence and export tax at 20-25% from 2008 (MOFCOM, 2008).  
 
Under the new policy export quotas, there are only around 250 companies (traders 
and manufacturers in 2010), which were allowed to export ferroalloy in China. The 
numerous manufacturers and traders outside of this list had no right to export. 
Therefore, some of these companies began to export ferroalloy illegally. According 
to the author’s investigation, there are two channels. One is through formal export 
channels with different items registered in customs, as the official investigations are 
random. And also the agent forwarding companies are usually faked in this case. 
Another one is through frontier trade with some neighbouring countries, such as 
Vietnam, as frontier trading in small amounts is free from export tax in some 
provinces. In this ETC, their current sources of tradable products come from formal 
companies with export licences and informal (illegal) channels, as the shipping 
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Figure 7-6  Flow chart for two different trading modes in ETC C. 
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7.4.3.2 The side of domestic manufacturers  
7.4.3.2.1 The pre-export and post-export procedures 
 
In this case, the administrative approvals procedures during pre-export and post-
export procedures are also found to be similar to those in the pilot study A, cases A 
and B. It supports proposed argument in pilot study A that the bureaucratic 
procedures and administrative approvals are the main former formal institutional 
constraints that generate additional transactional procedures and costs for normal 
export transactions in China. 
 
According to the interviews, the owner of this ETC takes care of all applications and 
renewals of the administrative documents. In his opinion, these sorts of pre-export 
tasks that are compulsory for Chinese exporters, do cost them a lo of time and energy, 
as these administrative approvals are complicated, time-consuming and continuously 
changing. Second, the transactional procedure 5 (Processing relevant export 
documents) and procedure 9 (tax rebating) confirm that this ETC, as in previous 
cases, also had to obtain these sorts of post-export administrative approvals from 
relevant government departments, especially for the products processed through the 
on-shore company in China. More importantly, the owner expresses the view that 
these approvals in pre-export and post-export administration are extremely important 
and necessary for claiming tax rebates, which make up a large portion of their profits. 
Therefore, the administrative approvals do appear in the pre-export and post-export 
procedures in this case.  
7.4.3.3 The side of foreign buyers 
7.4.3.3.1 The procedure for searching for domestic manufacturers  
 
The bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals do not only contain the 
complex and time-consuming procedures, but also refer to the continuously changing 
policy in China’s export market. Policy instability is often reported as one obstacle 
for business in transition economies (Estrin et al., 2008; Hitt et al., 2004). Estrin et al 
(2008) critique that the “frequent changes to tax policy” limited the entrepreneurial 
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growth in transition economies. Meyer et al ‘s (2004) study also suggest that the 
instable rule and regulation become one main obstacle for FDI in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
 
In this case, the procedure 2 (Choosing from two different companies) in the export 
transaction process shows that the changing tax rebating policy generates additional 
costs for foreign buyers’ in search of domestic manufacturers (or the purposes of 
consistence with the rest of the cases and analytical frameworks, the suppliers, 
including traders and steel mills, will be also called “manufacturers” in the remaining 
parts of this case). As stated in 7.4.3.1, the changes in export taxes on ferroalloy has 
become a normal phenomenon in China’s export market. Uncertainty is one major 
source of the increase in transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985). These sorts of 
changes result in two negative outcomes, which jointly worsen the difficulty and 
uncertainty for foreign buyers searching for reliable manufacturers. First, the number 
of suitable domestic manufacturers is reduced. Second, the price of  is increased.  
 
When the Chinese government reduced tax rebates and increased export tax in 2005, 
some existing trading partners faced increasing prices of products on a sufficient 
scale to stop profit and transactions. Therefore these trading partners, especially the 
buyers, had to change to others trading partners able to offer suitable products at 
more competitive prices compared with other export markets.  
 
When the government issued export licences in 2008, the foreign buyers were 
obliged to change to those suppliers who had additional export licences. In both 
situations, buyers, including foreign and ETCs, face with additional uncertainty and 
costs related to searching for new trading partners and to establishing trust with and 
adapting to new trading partners. Actually the findings in this case did show such 
problems. For instance, from 2005 this ETC began to look for new suppliers as some 
existing ones were unable to continue to supply the ETC at an acceptable price under 
the new export tax. But it took them long time to identify the current ones, as they 
could not immediately take the risk of transacting on a large scale with these 
newcomers.  At the same time, it would be risky and uncertain for the buyers to use 
228 
 
new manufacturers, who could offer cheap supplies but through illegal channels. The 
description below from the owner in ETC C supports such points:  
 
“We used to have several long-term collaborative suppliers in the past. Although 
there were some problems during previous transactions more or less, they are better 
than others. But when the government began to control the export of ferroalloy, our 
business became difficult……When the policy changed [in 2005], we had to change 
to some other suppliers with the licences……. We attempted several transactions at 
first. But most of these suppliers with export licences are large traders. They had 
their fixed buyers. They don’t care about these small orders. So their price is not 
cheap enough and the supply is not on time usually. Finally some friends introduced 
me another two suppliers, who could offer some “Vietnam products”. We attempted 
many small orders at first. Their product and supply [reliability] are not too bad. 
Then we just start new transactions”  
 
When I ask for information on the “Vietnam products”, he replied 
“These ‘Vietnam products’ became popular in recent years. They might be smuggled 
products, or through the border trade. I am not sure how they can make it. But from 
the export documents, I can see some products depart from Vietnam”  
 
Therefore, it seems the new-added export tax and export licences do increase buyers’ 
searching costs for new available suppliers by reducing the number of available 
suppliers on China’s export market. The export of ferroalloy is administratively 
reduced and limited to several large players by the government. The buyers (whether 
ETC and foreign buyers) in this case have to change suppliers with illegal channels, 
which give rise to additional risks and uncertainty for foreign buyers. Otherwise they 
could not continue their business in China. Therefore, these changes of export policy 
largely increase foreign buyers’ searching costs for domestic manufacturers.  
   
Moreover, the foreign buyers would face the additional costs and potential 
uncertainty of searching for and transacting with the suppliers with illegal channels. 
The change of export policy destroys some business, while leaving the opportunities 
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for others. Though they are illegal, the “Vietnam products” have become popular on 
the export market due to their cheaper price. But the foreign buyers obviously lack 
information on how to find these suppliers. Even if they could find them, many 
resulting problems and the potential uncertainties surrounding these supplies would 
deter most of foreign buyers. For instance, are these suppliers reliable considering 
they are acting illegally? What if the supply is impounded by Chinese customs? And 
can they get the deposit back in that case?  In the end, bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals, more specifically the continuous changes of policy in 
China’s export market, and the former formal institutional constraints, generate 
additional costs for foreign buyer’s direct transactions in this case.  
7.4.3.3.2 The procedure for enforcing domestic manufacturers 
 
In the previous pilot study A and cases, it is clear that the inefficient legal system 
(current formal institutional constraints) and contract obligations (informal 
institutional constraints) jointly increase foreign buyers’ enforcement costs on 
domestic manufacturers. Such an assertion is also supported in this case.  
 
According to procedures 4 “Enforcement of supply of products/re-negotiation of the 
price” and 11 “Legal issues”, it is found that the enforcement of export transaction 
does meet with some problems due to domestic suppliers’ opportunistic behaviours, 
such as the breach of contract. The inefficient legal system and contract obligations 
on the domestic markets worsen the situation. Distinct from the pilot study, where 
the quality of products and lead-in time of production are the main problems in 
transactions, it is the uncertainty of the price that becomes the main problem in this 
case.  
 
According to the owner of this ETC 
“The participants [in this field] are not truthful and promising. No one will follow 
the contracts [in this field]. All transactions have to re-arrange the price. The only 
difference is extent. The better ones will inform of you the change of price in advance, 
increase price reasonably according market fluctuation, and agree with the re-
negotiation. Some others just ignore you and deny the contracts.” 
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When I enquired about the availability of appeal for legal protection, he said that the 
costs are too high to go for court for every problematic contract in China.  
“You cannot settle every transaction through the courst; the costs are too high to go 
for courts [in China]……. You have to go to the local court, where the suppliers are 
located. They [local court] might favour them [suppliers]…… And even if you can 
win [in the court]; the enforcement of the sentence always has problems…….Usually 
we will undertake the loss, if it is not too high……. we only went through legal 
procedures once, when we really lost too much”  
 
The owner described that extreme case, which made them lose money and all back 
on the legal process.  
  
“There is one supplier, with which we have had a couple of transactions before, who 
refused to finish one transaction. They told us they lacked the products and could not 
finish the contract. We knew they were selling the products to other buyers at a 
higher price. But we could do nothing at that time. The foreign buyers couldn’t delay 
the contract either. In order to avoid a breach of contract, and keep this long-term 
buyer, we had to buy the product from another source according to the then market 
price (higher than our contract price), and send to our buyers. We lost too much and 
brought a law suit against this supplier within international arbitration. We knew the 
local court could be one problem. We would not be treated fair by local court. So we 
went through international arbitration. We are a HK company. We import from 
China. It is a case for international trade (rather than domestic trade). It fulfils the 
requirements of international arbitration. It (arbitration) took place in HK. We 
thought it would be fairer than domestic court. By the way, the fees of international 
arbitration would be borne by the losing party…….As a result, We got the complete 
win，they [the supplier] lost the case, and were punished by carrying all the 
liabilities and costs. But the implementation [of the result of arbitration] was still a 
problem. We then visited the executive division of the local court with this result. 
One officer told me it would take very long time to execute. I knew his meaning. It 
might be one year, two year or forever. Who knows? I did not want to wait. So I 
found one local friend to help us, who introduced us to another officer in the 
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executive division. Finally with the help of this friend, that local supplier only agreed 
to compensate half of our loss……. We thought it would be the best way at that time, 
and accepted the solution”  
 
From the introduction in 7.4.3.1 and the interviews above, it seems that the 
behaviours of freely breaking the contract, as the inefficient contract obligation, are 
really popular among the manufacturers in the industry of this case. In the meatime, 
the experience of this ETC also indicates that the inefficient legal system, especially 
the execution of the law and sentence, fails to protect export transactions against 
these opportunistic behaviours of suppliers. In the end, the inefficient legal system 
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manufacturers freely raise price 
and break the contract, 
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7.4.4 The ETC’s methods for reducing institution-related transaction 
costs 
7.4.4.1 The side of domestic manufacturers  
7.4.4.1.1 The pre-export and post-export procedures 
 
Similar to previous cases, the costs related to administrative approvals during pre-
export and post-export procedures in this case, can be reduced by this ETC’s 
knowledge (experience) of these administrative approvals procedures. More 
specifically, this ETC is able to reduce these administrative costs during the pre-
export and post-export procedures, by using the staff’s knowledge of these 
administrative procedures during export transactions. First, the owner’s knowledge 
of the administrative procedures is a key contribution during the pre-export 
procedures. One owner takes most of the work of administrative approvals during the 
pre-export procedure, including the renewal of business licences and export authority 
and registrations with customs. This owner has long-term working experience in the 
exporting business, from the time of his employment with state-owned trading 
companies at first. He also confirmed that much of his knowledge came through 
long-term working experience.  
 
Second, the 2nd owner, two TMs and accountant mainly take charge of usual works 
of submit/receive the official documents to/from these administrative departments 
during post-export procedures in this case. All these three members of staff also have 
long-term experience in this work. The accountant is one of the experienced staff and 
used to work in another ETC. The 2nd owner has undertaken this work since the 
establishment of this company. The two main TMs graduated with an international 
trade major in the college. Both of them have more than 3 years’ history in the 
current work.  
 
Therefore, the ETC’s knowledge of these administrative procedures helps to reduce 




7.4.4.2 The side of foreign buyers 
7.4.4.2.1 The procedure of searching for domestic manufacturers  
 
This ETC’s knowledge of alternative suppliers helps to reduce the costs of searching 
for domestic manufacturers, which are influenced by the changes in export policy in 
this case. As stated in 7.4.3.3.1, the changes in export policy  particularly in the issue 
of export licences and export tax, largely reduce the available suppliers in export 
market in China, and generate additional searching costs for domestic suppliers. This 
ETC is also faced with the problems of searching for new suppliers with export 
licences and acceptable prices. From the interviews in 7.4.3.3.1, it is noticed that this 
ETC initially did find two suppliers with export licences, then changed to other two 
suppliers with cheaper “Vietnam products”. Double searching procedures showed 
that this ETC has enough information on potential alternative suppliers on markets. 
By mastering these sorts of information, this ETC considerably reduces the 
uncertainty generated by changing export policy on export transactions.  
 
When I enquired how they were able to find these suppliers, the owner reply that  
“They [these suppliers] are usually from friends’ introduction…….I have worked [in 
this industry] for long time. So I had many friends in this industry……They include 
traders, manufacturers, logistics, and so on. With most of them, I haev had  
collaborative experience…….We often exchange information about prices, new 
export policies and so on,……in addition, they (these channels) are more reliable.  
 
When I asked him if other public platforms, such as the internet and public market, 
are helpful in this situation, he replied that  
“they are not reliable, there are too many frauds there” 
 
Therefore, the interviews show that the owner’s experience does help to obtain 
massive information on the source of domestic suppliers. And these suppliers are 




Second, this ETC’s knowledge of how to use the off-shore company also helps 
foreign buyers’ transaction costs for searching for relatively cheap and low-risk 
domestic supply in China. As stated in 7.4.1 and 7.4.3.3.1, and in transactional 
procedure 2 (Choosing two different companies) and transactional procedure 9 
(Registering off-shore company and account) in 7.4.2, it is noted that this ETC used 
one UK-registered off-shore company to operate the export of products with export 
licences and export tax from China. This method is a kind of 3
rd
-party trading 
method (illustrated in the literature review). By using this method, this ETC partly 
reduced export prices by avoiding some corporate taxes. On the other hand, it also 
partly avoid their involvement in the illegal problems of “Vietnam” products, as this 
ETC played the role of one “foreign buyer” in HK on all export documents.  
 
Obviously rather than normal export processes on export handbooks, these 
extraordinary sorts of operation require some special knowledge, such as  knowledge 
of China and HK’s law, export policy, tax policy, and export technical process, 
which cannot easily be obtained from textbooks, as it is technically illegal, and 
requires long-term export practice to carry off. The owner of this ETC is the key 
player in this procedure. He told me how he learnt this process 
 
“Initially I knew this method from some internet forum, which is specific to Chinese 
exporters. Then I began to ask if someone really did that from my friends, as I 
thought it might be useful for those products without tax rebating (the products with 
tax rebating needs China-registered company to claim tax). Then one of my friends 
told me his company worked with this method, and introduced one HK agent to me. 
This agent helps to initial register an off-shore bank account in HK, and subsequent 
daily and annual maintenance tasks (the HK-registered company still needs physical 
office and staffs to receive and deliver some documents to HK governments), 
including the preparation of financial reports under HK law. After a year, when I 
had mastered the whole process, I changed to another agent, which offered a better 
service. And also I changed the off-shore bank account in HK to Shanghai (this 
ETC’s location), where some banks have opened off-shore businesses as well, as I 
felt it’s safer to manage the money on my own”  
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Apart from these, the transactional procedure 7 (Receiving the payment from foreign 
buyers) shows that the owner had to find ways, such as payments of personal small 
amounts from abroad and transfers from illegal secret private banks, to exchange the 
foreign currency for Chinese currency for the export of transactions through the HK 
company, as this ETC has no business receipts to show the legitimacy of such an 
amount of foreign exchange under China’s currency control policy. Therefore, this 
process also needs special knowledge on such extraordinary sorts of operation, which 
can only be learnt through non-public channels and long-term export practice.  
7.4.4.2.2 The procedure of enforcing manufacturers 
 
As stated in the previously in this case, the enforcement of manufacturers is more 
likely to be influenced by the inefficient legal system and contractual obligations. As 
a result, there appear to be increased opportunistic behaviours, such as great deal of 
breach of contract, in the markets. In turn, it is found in this section that this ETC’s 
knowledge of updated prices, characteristics of manufacturers, and how to 
effectively use appropriate legal assistance in China largely helps to solve these 
problems.  
 
As stated in previous cases, the asymmetric information is one major reason for 
difficulty in identifying product quality and other resulting problems to stop 
transactions, such as adverse selection and moral hazard (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981). In this case, the products’ price and continuously-appearing re-
negotiations with suppliers in this industry, is similar to the problems of product 
quality in transaction, as it is resulted from suppliers’ opportunistic behaviours. 
Reducing asymmetric information, mainly on product price in the current market, is 
a key method for reducing transaction costs. Such a situation shows in 4 
(Enforcement of supply of products/re-negotiation with the price) of the export 
process. Therefore, this ETC’s knowledge of updated pricing becomes the tool and 
stake of these re-negotiations to for reducing suppliers’ opportunistic behaviours, and 
the costs of re-negotiating with manufacturers.  
 
According to the owner 
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“TMs’ daily tasks are to check the price with a lot of suppliers, with the existing 
suppliers and with those with collaborative history, by telephone or internet……of 
course, they also check them on the websites. There are many public websites, which 
offer timely transaction prices. We paid the registration fees every year. We also 
used foreign websites, which offer international pricing.” 
 
In addition, as stated before, the owner also exchanges the price information with his 
friends in this field as well. Therefore, it is found that this ETC has one “dataset” for 
the updated price information. Though it is not complicated, it offers most important 
price information for the negotiations with manufacturers.   
 
Similar to the Case A, this ETC’s knowledge of the characteristics of manufacturers 
helps to reduce these enforcing costs of manufacturers. According to the interviews 
with the owners, this ETC also tries to filters out unreliable suppliers through trial 
orders (small amounts) as soon as they can in the past several years. In this way the 
ETC C can choose different manufacturers according to their transactions 
characteristics and change to the reliable manufacturers with relatively low costs if 
needed.   
 
In addition, this ETC’s knowledge of how to effectively use appropriate legal 
assistance in China, especially on how to obtain most returns from China’s current 
legal and enforcement system, also helps to reduce enforcement costs. As stated in 
procedure 10 (Legal issues), and the description and interview in 7.4.3.3.2, this ETC 
had to appeal through a lawsuit to recoup their losses during one transaction. 
Interestingly, this ETC went for the international arbitration in the court in HK rather 
than the local court, which is normally the most convenient solution for a small ETC. 
The owner’s explanation has been shown in section 7.4.3.3.2.   
 
Although this ETC finds honest external legal assistance in HK based on their 
“foreign” identity, the execution of the adjudication in the local court in China still 




 “But the execution (of the result of arbitration) was still a problem. We then visited 
the executive division of local court with this result. One officer told me it would take 
very long time to execute. I knew his meanings. It might be one year, two year or 
forever. Who knows? I did not want to wait. So I found one local friend to help us, 
who introduces another officer in executive division. Finally with the help of this 
friend, that local supplier only agreed to compensate half of our loss……. We 
thought it would be the best way at that time, and accept the solution”  
 
Obviously, the owner’s explanation in section 7.4.3.3.2 and description above relies 
on much specific knowledge on how to save losses in China, when one trading 
partner breaches the contact. The knowledge refers to the method by which you can 
get fair treatment and the most efficient execution, how to save your losses at most, 
and how to find the right person who can help you in this kind of issue in China.  
 
Therefore, this ETC’s knowledge of updated prices, the characteristics of 
manufacturers, and how to effectively use appropriate legal assistance in China 







Table 7-19  The summary of ETC C’s methods and advantage in export transaction. 
Procedures in export 
transaction 
Institutional constraints ETC’s methods Evidence in the case 
How to reduce 
costs 
The pre-export and post-
export procedures 





Staff educational background 
and work-based training in 
administrative procedures 
Advantages of 
economics of scale 
 
Staff experience of such 
administrative procedures 
Regular routines for such 
administrative procedures during 
daily work in ETC 
Updated information on the 
current export process and 
policy,  and changes 
The procedure for 
searching for domestic 
manufacturers 
Bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals 
(continuous changes of policy) 
Information on alternative 
suppliers 
Owner’s experience in this 
industry 
Reducing 
uncertainty Knowledge of how to use 
the off-shore company 
Owner’s experience in this 
industry 
The procedure for 
enforcing manufacturers 
Inefficient legal system & 
contractual obligations 
Information on updating 
prices in market 
TMs’ regular checking on the 




Contacts among the traders in 
this industry to communicate 
about price 





To filter out unreliable suppliers 
through previous transactions 
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Knowledge on how to 
effectively use legal 
assistance in China 
Information on differences 
between local courts and 
international arbitration 
Information on procedures 
international arbitration 
Knowledge of the execution of 








7.5 Case D analysis 
7.5.1 The background information on ETC D 
 
The fourth ETC, “FULU Export Trading Company”, is a private ETC in Beijing. It 
was found in 1997. Its main products are bedding textiles, such as quilts and pillows. 
Its total export amount was $7,000,000 in 2009. Its two major main foreign buyers, 
which have more than 10 year’s collaborative history with this ETC, are wholesalers 
in Netherlands and UK. They also purchase products from other Chinese ETCs and 
manufacturers. In addition, Fulu also had many foreign buyers from other countries 
and regions, which are normally found through trading shows. In general, the 
preferences of all buyers are different, in terms of quality, amount, sorts etc. 
  
The manufacturers of this ETC include two types. First, this ETC owned one 
manufacturer, which exclusively offers products to this ETC and makes up 30-50% 
of the export volume of this ETC. It usually offers the high-quality and complex 
products, such as the spring pillows. This manufacturer has 50 employees at any one 
time, but could increase to 100 employees during some peak periods (depending on 
the volume of orders), by employing temporary workers. By doing this, the 
manufacturer can reduce the operative costs during off-peak times. It was established 
in 2004 and differs from other collaborative manufacturers in the ability to produce 
high-quality, more complicated products, by virtue of owning some advanced 
equipment and production lines. In practice, this core manufacturer works in three 
ways. First, it produces some high-quality products, which require more careful 
quality control. Second, it produces some complicated products, which require some 
special production and equipment. In some cases, this manufacturer only processes 
these special production units of one product, and then leaves other simple units of 
same product to other manufacturers. Three, it produces some orders with strict lead-




The reasons for establishing their own manufacturer are twofold. First, it aims to 
better control the price of products with increasing competition on the export market. 
Second, the growth of orders in this ETC leads to the need to employ more 
collaborative manufacturers, but also results in increasing difficulty of enforcing 
them, especially considering the increasing problems in lead-in time and quality 
 
In addition, there are eight other external manufacturers (named collaborative 
manufacturers in this section) to offer the rest of the supply for this ETC. Similar to 
previous cases, these collaborative manufacturers also offer supply to other buyers. 
They vary from each other in terms of size (50 to 300 employees), output amount, 
quality, and preferred products. Some of them can only produce the low-quality 
products, whilst the quality of others’ products is not consistent due to limited 
resources and changing requirements from different orders. In general, they are 
SMEs with unstable output and limited capability. 
 
The owner of this ETC was one experienced trader. He had worked as a TM in a 
state-owned trading company since 1990. Then he worked in many different 
positions, including salesman and expatriate manager in this ETC. After 7-years 
working in that trading company, he opened this ETC in 1997. Up to 2010, his 
company had 15 employees with $7,000,000 export amount. The Table 7-21 and 
Figure 7-8 show the situation of these staffs in the ETC C. 
Table 7-20   Summary of background of ETC D. 
Name Fulu exporting trading companies 
Location Beijing 
Ownership Private 
Size(Personals) 15 (trading companies)+50 (manufacturers) 
Establishment 1997 
Product Bedding products 













Per capital $333,000 
Margin 10% 
 




Table 7-21  Summary of staffs in ETC C. 




The owner took charge of the general management of this ETC, and 
monitoring of important units during the transactions process, especially 
negotiating with main buyers and manufacturers, enforcing the 
production of manufacturers, and making final decisions for some 
difficult transactions.   
Salesmen (4) 
Salesmen generally taking responsibility for searching for new orders 
from new and existing buyers.  All salesmen have relevant experience 




TMs generally taking responsibility for exporting documentation, such as 
making exporting contracts and other documents for export. In particular, 
they also take parts of the work for submitting/receiving official approvals 
from government departments, including the local Administration of 
Industries and Commerce and Bureau of Quality and Technical 
Supervision. All TMs have relvant experience and educational 
backgrounds in exporting.  
Quality control 
(QCs) (4) 
QCs specifically take charge of core and collaborative manufacturers’ 
production, in terms of quality, lead-in time, amount, etc. Two QCs used 
to work in manufacturing, and then changed to ETCs. The other two 
have more than 2 years QCs’-related experience in ETCs. The manager 
used to work as a QC in manufacturing for 6 years   
Purchaser (1) 
Purchaser mainly takes the job of searching and purchasing materials 
from suppliers or on market. Moreover, he also works on making up 
samples according to the orders from salesmen, including translating the 




















materials and manufacturers to make the sample. He has more than 10 
years’ experience in purchasing textile manufacturing, and fully 
understands the materials markets and suppliers’ information in China. 
Logistics (1) 
He mainly works to process all shipments of products, with the 
assistance of many external forwarders.  
Accountant (2) 
They mainly process the ETC’s corporate accounting, and also 
completes the tax rebating procedures, approvals of foreign exchange 
and receiving payment from foreign buyers in this ETC. Both of them 
have many years’ experience in exporting companies’ corporate 
accounting.  
 
Figure 7-8  Organizational structure of ETC D. 
 
In this case, I took four face-to-face interviews and two on-line conversations in total, 
including four with the owner, one with the purchaser and one with the manager of 
the TMs, between 2010 and 2011. The owner offered most of the information about 
the company, manufacturers, suppliers, buyers and general export process, while the 
manager introduced the details of the export process. The owner is key person in this 
company, and fully understands the whole information and export process.  
7.5.2 Export transaction process  
 
The general export transaction process, operated by ETC D, is illustrated step by step 
in order to identify those areas where the institutional constraints and related 
transaction cause further costs (shown in Table 7-22 and 7-23). In general, the 
transaction process in this ETC is quite similar to the Case A. The owner provided 
the general flow of export transaction in this ETC. Then the details of each step are 



















The persons in red type are interviewees in this case 
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Table 7-22   Summary of transactional procedures of ETC A. 
1 Sample making and searching for buyers 
2 Negotiations  
3 Transacting with materials suppliers 
4 Enforcing the production of manufacturers   
5 Processing relative documents 
6 Receiving the payment from foreign buyers 
7 Tax rebating 
 
Table 7-23  Details of transactional procedures of ETC A. 
1 Sample making and searching for buyers 
The salesmen search for new orders from new and existing foreign buyers.  According to 
these order, which normally contain a series of technical requirements, the purchaser 
searches for appropriate materials to make a sample. The sample can be made by their own 
core manufacturer or by collaborative manufacturers, depending on the products. Then they 
are sent by logistics to foreign buyers for suggestions and potential modifications. In 
addition, the sample is also made for promotional purposes (called promotion modes) in 
trade shows, the B2B website or other marketing activities.  
2 Choice of production by own core manufacturer or other collaborative manufacturers 
After receiving orders from foreign buyers, ETC D will select one of the manufacturers (in-
house or collaborative) according to the required quality, amount and sort, and the 
manufacturers’ schedule. In general, higher quality and more complex products (or 
production procedures) will be finished by their own core manufacturer, whilst the simple and 
low quality products (or production procedures) will be produced by other collaborative 
manufacturers. In addition, the spring pillows are only produced by their own core 
manufacturer. Sometimes, they allocate one large order to many manufacturers 
2 Negotiations  
At the same time, the ETC negotiates with buyers, potential manufacturers and suppliers, in 
terms of price, quantity, lead-in time, payment terms etc. This process is cyclical and 
dynamic, mainly including buyers’ inquiries to ETC and ETC’s inquiries to potential 
manufacturers and suppliers. In this procedure, the ETC has to choose one or several of the 
most suitable manufacturers and suppliers for certain orders according this order’s quantity, 
quality, style, lead-in time, etc. But different from the Case A, ETC D will choose 
manufacturers from the core manufacturer and other collaborative manufacturers, according 
to required quality, amount and sort, and manufacturers’ schedule. In general, higher quality 
and more complex products (or production procedures) will be finished by their own core 
manufacturer, while the simple and low quality products (or production procedures) will be 
produced by other collaborative manufacturers. In addition, the spring pillows are only 
produced by their own core manufacturer. Similarly to case A, price is not the most important 
consideration for this ETC, as some manufacturers and suppliers could also give the 
competitive price, but without any guarantee. Thus the manufacturers and suppliers, with 
whom this ETC has had collaborative experience, are the most trust worthy. By confirmation 
from the owner of ETC D, they did have an understanding of which manufacturers and 
suppliers would able to finish this task when they knew the order’s requirements, according 
to their previous collaborative experience with these companies. The key factors are the 
manufacturers’ production schedule, availability of material, and so on.  
3 Transacting with materials’ suppliers  
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The purchaser takes charge of material supply, including main materials and trimmings. As 
in Case A, the searching for material begins as early as the sample marking process. ETC D 
usually chooses suppliers from the ones with whom it had been cooperating for many years. 
Sometimes it also chooses some external suppliers according to price, material availability 
etc. For some materials, it also uses some public markets for wholesalers. But all these 
activities largely rely on the experience and information of this purchaser and owner. In 
addition, they will enforce these suppliers’ supply as well. They focus on lead-in time, 
amount and quality. The methods include sample checking, timely communication, and even 
on-site monitoring.  
4 Enforcing the production of manufacturers   
The QCs work on enforcing manufacturers’ production, including their own core 
manufacturer. The QCs’ experience and knowledge largely facilitate this procedure. Similar 
to Case A, ETC D also has a regular schedule for checking the production. During some 
peak time, all staff will participate in this process, as the involvement of more collaborative 
manufacturers.  
5 Processing relevant documents  
This procedure is jointly finished by two TMs, two accountants and a logistics member of 
staff. While the TMs process most exporting documents, the accountants complete the 
foreign exchange claim, and tax rebating task, the logistics staff process the shipment 
documents.  
6 Receiving the payment from foreign buyers 
The payment methods, such as a letter of credit, are different according to the terms. 
Accountants will take charge of receiving of payment from foreign buyers after shipping the 
products and sending the documents. It needs to go through the bank, local foreign 
exchange branches, and customs. This procedure usually takes one-month (mainly waiting 
for the receipt from customs) to finally receive these payments, as the payment and receipt 
of foreign exchanges are strictly monitored by the government.  
7 Tax rebating 
After completing the whole transaction and obtaining all official documents, the accountant 
will apply for the tax rebate from the local taxation office. The tax rebating rate is 7% for the 
products in this ETC. This application normally takes 3 months. This procedure is important 
for the ETC’s capital flow and profits. 
7.5.3 The institutional constraints and related transaction costs 
As in previous cases, this section aims to explore new and test known institutional 
constraints. The known institutional constraints on China’s export market, found in 
previous cases will be checked at first, while additional attention is also paid to the 
emerging institutional constraints on export markets, which appear during the export 
transaction in this case.  
7.5.3.1 The side of domestic manufacturers  
7.5.3.1.1 The pre-export and post-export procedures  
 
Initially, it appeared that the administrative approvals were required during pre-
export and post-export procedures in this case. Therefore the proposed argument in 
247 
 
pilot study A, that “the bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals are 
mainly former formal institutional constraints, which generates additional 
transactional procedures and costs for normal export transactions in China”, is 
supported.  
 
More specifically, when I inquired to the owner of ETC D about the complex, time-
consuming and changing administrative approvals during the pre-export and post-
export, he confirmed that such problems do trouble them a lot, he had to employ one 
agent company to help finish this work many years ago. In this way, their products 
were actually exported under that agent’s name and export authority in the official 
records. When their orders began to increase in recent years, he began to do them on 
their own. At present, the administrative approvals for starting up export business are 
processed by the owner.  
 
Second, the export transactional procedure 5 (Processing relevant documents), 6 
(Receiving the payment from foreign buyers) and 7 (Tax rebating) show that the 
administrative approvals during post-export also exist in this ETC and are jointly 
finished by many different staffs. Therefore, the bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals do generate additional costs for normal export transactions 
in ETC D.  
7.5.3.1.2 The procedure for transacting with materials suppliers  
 
The procedure for transacting with materials’ suppliers is initially found in case A. It 
shows that “the long-term OEM trademethodion China’s export market, as the 
current informal institutional constraints, generates additional transactional 
procedures and related costs for domestic manufacturers” in case A. In this case, 
such situation is found as well.  
 
Similar to case A, it can be seen that long-term OEM trade method in China’s export 
market makes domestic manufacturers lose independent supply function. More 
specifically, the collaborative manufacturers for ETC D fail to offer suitable material 
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supply due to inadequate market information, specifically information on material 
supply. From transactional procedure 4 (Enforcing the material supply), it is clear 
that this ETC takes responsibility fr the material purchase to their manufacturers. 
When I asked the owner if they take care of materials supply to manufacturers, he 
reply that 
 “Yes, we always take the job of purchasing materials; since I started the 
business……we are not their [manufacturers’] only customer. They could not 
specifically set one staff to do that [to find materials] for you……. [Moreover], they 
could not find the right materials. Sometimes, for convenience, I have asked them to 
help find some small trimming materials. They either could not find them, or find the 
wrong ones. For instance, I once asked a manufacturer to help purchase a few white 
colour ZIPs for the pillows. Then they gave me grey colours, and told me it is the 
closest colour they could find. I really suspected that they were trying to use  cheaper 
ones rather than the right ones. We met similar situations several times before. So 
afterwards we never asked them purchase materials…… [More importantly] our 
materials are usually not in stock, and need specifically ordering from suppliers. So 
we need to negotiate with the suppliers about the price. The manufacturers would not 
try to find the cheaper ones for you. So their price is higher.” 
Therefore, the interviews do prove that the manufacturers of ETC D are incapable of 
finding out suitable materials, in terms of price and sort, for the ETC’s orders, as 
they get used to the simple manufacturing work under the OEM trade method. More 
specifically, these manufacturers only take care of production for different buyers, 
leaving the work of purchasing the materials to these buyers. As a result, they do not 
seek the information on markets for materials. In other words, these manufacturers 
will not be able to find the suitable materials (quality and price), when foreign buyers 
directly send orders to them. In the end, the long-term OEM trading method leads to 
domestic manufacturers’ lack of information on materials’ supply, and generates 
additional costs on direct transactions between the domestic manufacturers and 
foreign buyers.  
7.5.3.2 The side of foreign buyers 
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7.5.3.2.1 The procedure of enforcing manufacturers 
 
As proposed in pilot study A and previous case studies, the enforcement costs will 
increase due to the inefficient legal system (current formal institutional constraints) 
and contract obligations (informal institutional constraints). Such an argument is also 
supported in this case. The main problems are still the domestic manufacturers’ 
opportunistic behaviours, such as quality problems and unpunctual delivery time, 
which are magnified by the inefficient legal system and weak contractual obligations.  
 
More specifically, procedure 5 (Enforcing the production of manufacturers) 
obviously shows the enforcement costs that also appear in this ETC’s transaction. 
Moreover, the owner also described one poor case they had met before, which 
indicates the manufacturers’ opportunistic behaviours magnified by inefficient 
contract obligations.  
“We once used a particular manufacturer. As we found our products were delayed, I 
went to the manufacturer to check. When we were there without prior notice to them, 
I found that manufacturer was working on other products, rather than our products. 
We pushed them stop the production line, and change to our orders. Then we 
pretended to leave, but come back 30mins later. They had changed back to the 
previous products. We were very angry with that, and threatened to cancel our order. 
In the end we sent one staff member to stay in that manufacturer until they had 
finished our order. And we never worked with that manufacturer again.”  
When I asked him about appealing to legal methods, like arbitrage, to protect 
themselves from losses when their collaborative manufacturers do not finish signed 
contracts, he replied that the costs and time is too high to do that, and the result might 
be unfair or unsatisfactory enforcement; therefore his company never did that before. 
He also stated that he usually appealed for compromising solutions, where the 
manufacturers only undertake parts of the loss, when such problems happen, and 
finally he would change to other manufacturers in the next order. Such answers are 
quite similar to the situation in previous cases, namely the costs of enforcing 
production are increased by the inefficient legal system. 
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Vertical integration of production 
More importantly, it is found that ETC D also adopts vertical integration of 
production by establishing one wholly-owned manufacturer in this case. As stated in 
Case B, the ETC’s vertical integration, as one effective method of economizing 
transaction costs (Demsetz, 1990; Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1971, 1979, 1985), 
shows that the inefficient legal system and contract obligations generate considerable 
enforcement costs (Fan et al., 2009) conceived by ETC.  
Therefore, the interviews with the owner of ETC D pays more attention to the 
reasons for their decision to newly establish one manufacturer, considering the lower 
costs and investment of strighforward buy-out products from independent 
manufacturers. As described by the owner in ETC D, the inefficient legal system and 
manufacturers’ contract obligation is one important concern of ETC D’s vertical 
integration.  
“At that time, our orders began increasing, [the number of collaborative 
manufacturers was also increased], factories became harder to get to 
collaborate……. We could not set one (quality control) staff to each 
factory,……[moreover] some orders have high quality requirements or strict 
production schedules. We had met such situations before. The factories could not 
well collaborate…… So I began to think about opening our [own] factory.”  
In addition, another reason is the inefficient legal system and contract obligations 
that fail to effectively protect intellectual property in China. The intellectual property 
protection largely depends on the formal legal system (Oxley, 1999), and 
supplementing informal institutions, such as tradition (Wang, 2005). However, it has 
been commonly reported that the formal legal system and informal institutions in 
transitional economies, such as China, fail to effectively enforce the intellectual 
property (Meyer, 2001a; Oxley, 1999; Wang, 2005). Moreover, during one practical 
study, Midler (2010) vividly described many real cases where Chinese manufacturers 
freely copy intellectual property, such as design of products, without any punishment. 
In this case, according to the interviews with the owner, there is one special pillow, 
called spring pillow, which is only produced in this core owned manufacturer. This 
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special product is one buyer’s exclusive product with relevant patents registered in 
Europe. Although the intellectual property protection was not the direct reason for 
establishing this manufacturer, as this product was introduced by this buyer in 2007, 
the owner expressed that the view that there were oral agreements to avoid producing 
this product in other manufacturers, as both he and that buyer are worried about other 
exporters copying this product. Although there are no infringements of intellectual 
property activities in this case due to ETC D’s strict enforcement of agreements with 
foreign buyers, the costs related to the inefficient legal system and contract 
obligation, which mainly show as conceived transaction costs, do take place.  
Although there are many complex reasons for vertical integration in extant studies 
(Harrigan, 1984; Hill, 1998, p460-462; Williamson, 1971)and this case, the control 
of enforcement of production, such as product quality and delivery time, is one 
important factor behind this ETC’s vertical integration decision. According to the 
description and discussion above, such problems are directly generated by the 
inefficient legal system and contract obligations in China’s export market. In the end, 
the ETC D’s vertical integration into production further supports the argument that 
the inefficient legal system and contract obligation generate considerable 





Table 7-24  The summary of institutional constraints and related transaction costs in ETC D. 
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system   
 Current formal 
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The aims for vertical integration is to ease 
quality problems, delivery problems, freely 
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7.5.4 The ETC’s methods for reducing institution-related transaction 
costs 
7.5.4.1 The side of domestic manufacturers  
7.5.4.1.1 The pre-export and post-export procedures 
 
Confirming the statements in previous cases, the findings in this ETC also proved 
that the ETC’s knowledge (experience) of administrative approvals procedures does 
reduce the costs related to administrative approvals during pre-export and post-
export procedures during the export transactions. First, the administrative approvals 
required for the start-up of an export business are processed by the owner in this case. 
He admitted that these tasks do need massive knowledge, such as where, how and 
how often to obtain these approvals each year, which he even did not know when he 
worked previously in a state-owned trading company, and which he had gradually 
learnt in recent years after he decided to export on his own account. He also agreed 
that these procedures often change, especially in recent years. Second, the two TMs 
and two accountants mainly work on submitting/receiving these official documents 
to/from many administrative departments during the post-export procedures in this 
case. These members of staff have export-related educational backgrounds and many 
years’ experience in processing these administrative approvals. The owner also 
indicates the significance of accountant’s experience on tax rebating given the 
relatively high tax-rebating rate on their products.  
 
In addition, it is interesting note that ETC D used to employ one agent trading 
company to help them pass the pre-export and post-export procedures, and then 
began to process these on their own in recent years when their orders increasingly 
began to grow. This means the economics of scale in the volume of export 
transactions is one determinant for such a decision.   
7.5.4.1.2 The procedure for transacting with suppliers  
 
As described in 7.5.3.1.2, the OEM trading method results in the manufacturers’ 
inability to supply materials, relying on the ETC’s supply in this case. Such a 
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situation can increase transaction costs for these manufacturers’ direct export. In turn, 
ETC D’s knowledge of materials’ supply largely facilitates the completion of export 
transactions, and reduces the transaction costs. The purchaser in this ETC has more 
than 10 years’ experience of purchasing in textile manufacturing, and fully 
understands the raw materials markets and suppliers’ information in China. The 
owner also has the relevant knowledge as well as long term work experience in this 
industry.  The interviews with one purchaser and owner witness such points.  
 
“I had worked [in this field] for more than 10 years…….I am very familiar with the 
situation of materials [in China].The Beijing and Tianjin areas [where this ETC 
located] are different from, and far from the areas of Zhejiang and Jiangsu. They 
[Beijing, Tianjin] are far from the original sources of the materials [Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu]. There is no large market for materials [in the areas of Beijing and Tianjin], 
especially the main materials. So the small manufacturers normally do not know 
where to find the right materials every time when I show them [our requirements]. 
Our materials are purchased from the large manufacturers from Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu. They are the main sources of materials (for clothes) in China. In those 
places, the materials’ producers and processers [dyeing factories] are clustered…….” 
(Purchaser)  
 “I often travel to the areas where numerous materials’ suppliers are clustered, such 
as Zhejiang and Jiangs with the aim of negotiating or enforcing the materials supply, 
but I would visit some other suppliers, which were introduced by friends, to check the 
situation [price and quality etc]. So I would contact the new suppliers by telephone 
the next time……Don’t look down on the wholesale markets. I sometimes go to the 
wholesale markets nearby to find some materials, they must surprise you……..Our 
materials are usually not stocked, but specifiallyc ordered. So we need to negotiate 
with the suppliers about the price. The manufacturers would not do that for you. So 
the price is higher.” (Owner) 
Thus it is concluded that the professional purchaser and owners have amassed a 
massive amount of knowledge on the supply of materials during their long-term 
working experience in purchasing, which largely helps ETC D to find the appropriate 
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materials with relatively lower costs, compared with their collaborative 
manufacturers.  
7.5.4.2 The side of foreign buyers 
7.5.4.2.1 The procedure for enforcing manufacturers 
 
As stated in 7.5.3.2.1 in this case, the enforcement of collaborative manufacturers is 
also influenced by the inefficient legal system and contract obligations. As a result, 
they jointly increased manufacturers’ opportunistic behaviours and buyers’ 
enforcement costs. Correspondingly, the ETC D adopts two methods to solve these 
enforcement problems. First, ETC D actively obtains the knowledge on production, 
more specifically on current production conditions, on production processes and 
products, and manufacturres’ characteristics. Second, ETC D adopts vertical 
integration into production to disperse some of the volume of production and 
selectively produce some special products. By doing this, ETC D reduces domestic 
manufacturers’ potential opportunistic behaviours, and resulting transaction costs.  
 
As discussed in Case A, the asymmetric information is one major reason for the 
buyers’ difficulty in enforcing domestic manufacturers’ production, while the ETC’s 
knowledge of production can ease such problems (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz & Weiss, 
1981). The same logic is supported by the evidence in ETC D as well. ETC D 
employs three professional QCs to specifically enforce collaborative manufacturers’ 
production. Transactional procedure 4(Enforcing the production of manufacturers) 
and one interview from the owner in 7.5.3.2.1 also show that the ETC D closely 
masters and monitors the manufacturers’ production conditions. These QCs have 
many years’ experience in manufacturing, which also helps them, understand and 
modify the problems during production. In addition, the owner also admits that he 
tries to capitalize on these collaborative manufacturers’ characteristics, including 
production and entrepreneurs, so that he can give the orders to the “right” 
manufacturers. Also he gradually filtered out the unreliable ones through trial orders 
as soon as possible during their regular order. In the end, ETC D is able to reduce the 
potential problems related to enforcement before the production process.  Thus ETC 
D’s acquisition of the knowledge of current production conditions, on the production 
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process and products, and manufactures’ characteristics considerably reduces the 
information asymmetry between the domestic manufacturers and themselves, and 
reduces the enforcement costs.  
Vertical integration of production 
As discussed in 7.3.4.2.1 in Case B, the vertical integration of production is one 
effective method for the ETC to reduce enforcement costs by integrating more 
vulnerable transactions on the markets into orders inside the organizational hierarchy 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985). Different from Case B, this case adopts one wholly-
owned (Harrigan, 1984) manufacturer as vertical integration. Under such an 
arrangement, ETC D is able to flexibly to arrange different products among all the 
manufacturers, including core owned ones and collaborative  ones. 1) It can arrange 
all production of spring pillows in the core owned manufacturer, in order to 
effectively protect intellectual property rights. 2) It can arrange the production of the 
whole or parts of high-quality and/or complicated products in this core owned 
manufacturer, to achieve better quality control. 3) It can arrange production with 
relatively strict delivery times in this core owned manufacturer. Then the rest of the 
relatively simple products or parts of products can be arranged with other 
collaborative manufacturers, certainly also according to the characteristics of the 
products and their production capability.  
 
These three kinds of situations are most likely to be influenced by two institutional 
constraints during this procedure: the inefficient legal system and contract 
obligations that therefore generate higher enforcing costs on manufacturers. The 
intellectual property protection is commonly seen to be vulnerable within a weak 
legal system (Oxley, 1999) and informal traditions (Wang, 2005). The products in 
the second situation require the buyers to invest more in the quality control system. 
The products and export transactions in the third situation incurred higher costs due 
to the potential risk and uncertainties and require more collaboration from the 
manufacturers. By integrating one owned manufacturer within its company, ETC D 
can easily change its production arrangements among core and collaborative 
manufacturers and speedily with a resulting reduction in enforcing costs related to 
these two institutional constraints during these three sorts of situation.    
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Table 7-25  The summary of ETC D’s methods and advantage in export transaction. 
Procedure in export 
transaction 
Institutional constraints ETC’s methods 
Evidence in the case How to reduce 
costs 








Staff educational background and work-based 
training in administrative procedures 
Advantages of 
economics of scale 
Staff experience of such administrative procedures 
Regular routines for such administrative procedures 
during daily work in the ETC 
The procedure of 
transacting with 
suppliers 
OEM trading method  
Knowledge of materials’ 
supply 
Professional purchasers and owner with long-term 
experience of purchasing Advantages of 
economics of scale On-site visits to the suppliers and public markets 
Regular contact with distantly located suppliers 
The procedure of 
enforcing 
manufacturers 
Inefficient legal system & 
unique contract obligations 
Knowledge of current 
production conditions 
Obtaining updated information on production at any 
time  in the whole production period 
By reducing the 
information 
asymmetry 
Close monitoring in the manufacturer 
Knowledge of production 
process and products 
Main staff knowledge and experience in production 
Knowledge on 
manufactures’ 
characteristics.   
Matching suitable collaborative manufacturers with 
the order, according to their production capability 
before the delivery of the order 
Eliminating any unreliable manufacturers  
Integration of production 
Producing products with high intellectual property 
requirements in their own manufacturer site 
By reducing the 
opportunistic 
behaviours 
Producing products with high-quality or complicated 
production in their ow manufacturer site 
Producing products with high-quality or complicated 
production in their own manufacturer site 
Producing products with relatively strict delivery 




7.6 Case E analysis 
7.6.1 The background information on ETC E 
 
Lueyuan Imp&Exp Co., Ltd is the fifth case ETC. It is a private ETC in Qingdao, the 
capital city of Shandong Province. It was founded in 2000. Its main products are 
tableware, such as knives and forks. Its total export amount was $ 7,000,000 in 2010. 
It has global buyers of various characters, from middlemen to superstores. Therefore, 
their preferences of all buyers are different, in terms of quality, amount, and types. 
 
This ETC has three major long-term domestic manufacturers, which have 100-300 
workers and are located in several rural regions in Shandong Province. These 
manufacturers also have other ETCs to help them to export. They are different from 
each other in terms of preferred products style, delivery time, management style, 
productivity etc. Thus this ETC gives them orders according to their different 
characteristics and different requirements from the buyers.  
 
In addition, this ETC also has several suppliers for packaging materials, as 
manufacturers do not offer such service. The styles of packaging of products are 
different and generally from the foreign buyers’ requirements. This ETC takes the 
job of searching, purchasing and enforcing production of packaging materials, and 
then sending to collaborative domestic manufacturers. 
Table 7-26   Summary of background of ETC E. 





Product Tableware  










  Amount $7,000,000 (2010) 
Per capital $411,746  (2010) 
Margin 12% (2010) 
 
Table 7-27  Summary of staffs in ETC E. 
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This owner holds the most important position in this ETC. She generally 
manages and coordinates the whole export process in the ETC. As the 
manufacturers (three main) and foreign buyers (five main, and more 
than 50 in total) were stable in recent years, her responsibilities mainly 
focus on the maintenance of these manufacturers and foreign buyers, 




TMs are divided into two groups. Two of them generally take 
responsibility for all exporting documentation, such as drawing up 
exporting contracts and other documents for export. In particular, they 
also take part of the work of submitting/receiving official approvals from 
government departments, including the local Administration of Industries 
and Commerce and Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision. These 
two TMs have relevant experience and educational background in 
exporting. The second group, three TMs, takes the job of transacting 
with collaborative domestic manufacturers, including sending orders, 
producing purchasing contracts and so on.  
Purchasers (3) 
Purchasers mainly take the job of searching, purchasing and enforcing 
production of packaging materials, and then sending to collaborative 
domestic manufacturers. The styles of packaging are different and 
generally from the foreign buyers’ requirements. But they also undertake 
simple designs for some orders. These purchasers have many years’ 
experience one in the domestic manufacturers and markets for these 
packaging materials.  
Quality control 
(QCs) (3) 
QCs specifically take charge of the collaborative manufacturers’ 
production, in terms of quality, lead-in time, amount, etc. One manager 
of QCs has more than 8 years’ relevant experience in QC.  
Customer 
support (2) 
They take the job of communicating with foreign buyers, such as 
receiving orders, products enquiries and so on  
Logistics (1) He mainly works to process all shipments of products, with the 
assistance of many external forwarders.  
Accountant(2) 
She has 10 years’ experience in corporate finance, especially in 
exporting companies. Amongst her main tasks are the completion of the 
tax rebate procedures, approvals of foreign exchange and receipt of 
payment from foreign buyers.  
 




In this case, I took three face-to-face interviews and one on-line conversation, 
including two with the owner, one with the purchaser and one with the manager of 
QCs, between 2010 and 2012. The owner offered most of the information about the 
company, manufacturers, suppliers, buyers and general export process, while the 
manager introduced the details of monitoring production. The owner is the key 
person in this company, and fully understands the whole information and export 
process.  
7.6.2 Export transaction process  
 
The general export transaction process, operated by ETC E, is illustrated step by step 
in order to identify those areas where the institutional constraints and related 
transaction cause further costs (shown in Table 7-28 and 7-29). In general, the 
transaction process in this ETC was quite similar to the Case A with the difference 
that ETC offered manufacturers the supply of packaging materials rather than 
production materials. The owner provided the general flow of export transaction in 
this ETC. Then the details of each step were obtained and/or checked by relevant 
interviewees.   
Table 7-28   Summary of transactional procedures of ETC E. 
1 Sample making 
2 Negotiations  
3 Enforcing the production of manufacturers   
4 Transacting with packaging materials suppliers 
5 Processing relevant documents 
6 Receiving payment from foreign buyers 
7 Tax rebating 
 
Table 7-29  Details of transactional procedures of ETC E. 


















The persons in red type are interviewees in this case 
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After receiving foreign buyers’ orders, which normally contain a series of technical 
requirements, this ETC transfers them to one collaborative manufacturer to produce a 
sample. Then they are sent by logistics to foreign buyers for suggestions and potential 
modifications. In addition, the sample is also made for promotional purposes (called 
promotion modes) in trade shows, the B2B website or other marketing activities.  
2 Negotiations  
The ETC negotiates with foreign buyers, domestic manufacturers and suppliers, in terms of 
price, quantity, lead-in time, payment terms etc. This process is cyclical and dynamic, mainly 
including buyers’ inquiries to the ETC and the ETC’s inquiry to potential manufacturers and 
suppliers. In this procedure, the ETC has to choose one or several of the most suitable 
manufacturers for certain orders depending on this order’s quantity, quality, style, lead-in 
time, etc. Due to the long-standing collaboration with current manufacturers, this ETC fully 
understands their situation, and easily allocates the orders to one or several of them.   
3 Transacting with packaging materials suppliers  
Three purchasers took charge of the supply of packaging materials. Due to many years’ 
experience in this work, they have many reliable manufacturers, with which they have much 
collaborative experience. In addition, they also master the information on the markets. As the 
packages are different from each other, they often need to find other manufacturers on the 
markets. In particular, they also undertake simple designs for the package in some cases. 
Finally they have to enforce these manufacturers’ production by monitoring products quality 
and delivery time.   
4 Enforcing the production of manufacturers   
The QCs work on enforcing manufacturers’ production. The QCs’ experience and knowledge 
largely facilitate this procedure. Similar to Case A, ETC E also has a regular schedule for 
checking the production. During some peak time, some other staff, such as the owner, will 
participate in this process, as the involvement of more collaborative manufacturers. In 
addition, the owner also emphasized that this part is the most important one in whole 
transaction. 
5 Processing relevant documents  
This procedure is jointly finished by TMs, accountants and logistics member of staff. While 
the TMs process most exporting documents, the accountants complete the foreign exchange 
claim, and tax rebating task, the logistics staff process the shipment documents. 
6 Receiving payment from foreign buyers 
The payment methods, such as a letter of credit, are different according to the terms. 
Accountants will take charge of receiving payment from foreign buyers after shipping the 
products and sending the documents. It needs to go through the bank, local foreign 
exchange branches, and customs. This procedure usually takes one-month (mainly waiting 
for the receipt from customs) to finally receive these payments, as the payment and receipt 
of foreign exchanges are strictly monitored by the government. 
7 Tax rebating 
After completing the whole transaction and obtaining all official documents, the accountant 
will apply for the tax rebate from the local taxation office. The tax rebating rate is 9% for the 
products in this ETC. This application normally takes 3 months. This procedure is important 
for the ETC’s capital flow and profits. 
 
 
7.6.3 The institutional constraints and related transaction costs 
As in previous cases, this section aims to explore new and test known institutional 
constraints. The known institutional constraints on China’s export market, found in 
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previous cases are checked first, while additional attention is also paid to the 
emerging institutional constraints on export markets, which appear during the export 
transaction in this case.  
7.6.3.1 The side of domestic manufacturers  
7.6.3.1.1 The pre-export and post-export procedures  
 
Initially, it appears that the administrative approvals were required during pre-export 
and post-export procedures in this case. Therefore the proposed argument in pilot 
study A, that the bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals are mainly 
former formal institutional constraints and generate additional transactional 
procedures and costs for normal export transactions in China, is supported.  
 
The owner of ETC E revealed that there were a series of applications, registrations 
and approvals with many government departments for the start-up of his export 
business. This ETC also had a similar experience as ETC C, where ETC had to use 
one state-owned trading company’s title to operate export transaction to bypass these 
approvals in its start-up period. Such evidence witnessed the existence of these 
administrative approvals during pre-export in this case. He further admitted that his 
company found some administrative approvals to be complex, time-consuming and 
changing, such as export rebating. So he had to employ additional specific staffs to 
deal with these procedures and approvals. Moreover, the export transactional 
procedure 5 (Processing relevant documents), 6 (Receiving the payment from foreign 
buyers) and 7 (Tax rebating) showed that the administrative approvals during post-
export also existed in this ETC and were jointly finished by many different staffs. 
Therefore, the bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals did generate 
additional costs for normal export transactions in ETC E. 
7.6.3.1.2 The procedure for transacting with packaging materials suppliers  
 
The procedure for transacting with materials’ suppliers was initially found in case A 
and then confirmed in Case D. It showed that the long-term OEM trading method in  
China’s export market, as the current informal institutional constraints, generated 
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additional transactional procedures and related costs for domestic manufacturers in 
Case A and D. In this case, such situation was found in procedure 3 (Transacting 
with packaging materials suppliers).  
 
Similar to case A and D, it was found that long-term OEM trade method in China’s 
export market made domestic manufacturers lose independent supply function in 
case E. More specifically, the collaborative manufacturers for ETC D failed to offer 
suitable supply of packaging materials due to inadequate market information. From 
transactional procedure 3 (Transacting with packaging materials suppliers), it was 
clear that this ETC took the responsibility of packaging materials purchase to their 
manufacturers. The interview with the owner also supported that. When I asked the 
owner if and why they took care of this work, he replied that 
 “they [manufacturers] didn’t do that [packaging materials purchase]. They didn’t 
know how to do that. They didn’t have that sort of staffs, who could do this work…I 
am afraid of the quality of these packaging material. They would not give us the right 
things if we ask them to do that part……So we purchased these things on our own, 
and then give our manufacturers” 
As a result, the data do demonstrate that the manufacturers of ETC E were incapable 
of seeking suitable packaging materials for the ETC’s orders, as they got used to the 
simple manufacturing work under the OEM trade method. More specifically, these 
manufacturers only took care of production for different buyers, leaving the work of 
purchasing the packaging materials to these buyers. Thus, they did not master the 
information on packaging materials purchase. In other words, these manufacturers 
would not be able to find the suitable materials (quality), when foreign buyers 
directly sent orders to them. In the end, the long-term OEM trading method led to 
domestic manufacturers’ lack of packaging materials purchase, and generated 
additional costs on direct transactions between the domestic manufacturers and 
foreign buyers.  
7.6.3.2 The side of foreign buyers 




In previous case studies, it was proposed that enforcement costs would increase due 
to the inefficient legal system (current formal institutional constraints) and unique 
contract obligation (informal institutional constraints) on China’s export market. 
The data of this case considerably prove this proposition as well. First, procedure 5 
(Enforcing the production of manufacturers) obviously showed the enforcement costs 
that also appear in this ETC’s transaction. Then, the discussion with the owner and 
quality control manager also reflected their concerns on potential risks on 
manufacturers’ opportunistic behaviours in production, such as uncertain product 
quality and delivery time. In addition, one solution of this ETC also witnessed such 
concern. The owner mentioned that they regularly took trainings on production for 
these manufacturers’ staffs to enhance their capabilities and skills to stabilize product 
quality.   
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Table 7-30  The summary of institutional constraints and related transaction costs in ETC E. 










How  costs are 
increased 









Licences and registration from 
various government departments to 







Registration and approvals from 
various government departments 






procedures and policy 
By generating 
uncertainty 
Slow administrative procedures, 
such as tax rebating system 
By reducing the 
number of 
transaction 
The procedure for 
transacting packaging 
materials suppliers 




















The quality problems, delivery 
problems, freely breaking  
contracts, untruthful manufacturers 
etc., during manufacturing  











7.6.4 The ETC’s methods for reducing institution-related transaction 
costs 
7.6.4.1 The side of domestic manufacturers  
7.6.4.1.1 The pre-export and post-export procedures 
 
The findings from ETC E also proved the statements confirmed by previous cases 
that the ETC’s knowledge (experience) of administrative approvals procedures did 
reduce the costs related to administrative approvals during pre-export and post-
export procedures during the export transactions.  
 
First, the owner of this ETC believed that he had gradually learnt this kind of 
knowledge when he worked previously in a state-owned trading company. He also 
added that he and his staffs in current ETCs had to keep leaning this sort of 
knowledge during daily practice as these procedures often change. Then the data of 
export process of this ETC in 7.6.2 showed that TMs and accountant mainly worked 
on submitting/receiving these official documents to/from many administrative 
departments during the post-export procedures in this case. These members of staff 
had export-related educational backgrounds and many years’ experience in 
processing these administrative approvals. The interviews from the owner showed 
that this type of experience became one important requirement for recruitment of 
these positions in this ETC.    
 
7.6.4.1.2 The procedure for transacting with suppliers  
The discussion in 7.6.3.1.2 indicated that OEM trading method brought about 
domestic manufactures’ incompetence in supplying packaging materials, relying on 
the ETC’s supply in this case. Thus the proposition, that long-term OEM trading 
methods raise transaction costs of manufacturers’ direct export, was proven. 
Correspondingly, the ETC in this case proved that its knowledge of packaging 
materials supply helped to successfully process the export transactions and reduced 
this sort of institution-related transaction costs. From background information on 
ETC E, it was found that three purchasers, who took charge of this part of work in 
ETC E, had long-standing experience on packaging materials purchase. The owner 
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also expressed that this sort of experience became one important requirement for 
recruitment of these positions. Moreover, he further indicated that the quality, style 
and delivery time of packaging materials purchased by them became more reliable 
than manufacturers.   
 
Thus it was concluded that the professional purchasers had amassed a massive 
amount of knowledge on the supply of packaging materials during their long-term 
working experience in purchasing, which helped ETC E to find the appropriate 
materials with accepted quality, style and delivery time, compared with their 
collaborative manufacturers.  
7.6.4.2 The side of foreign buyers 
7.6.4.2.1 The procedure for enforcing manufacturers 
 
As stated in 7.6.3.2.1 in this case, the enforcement of collaborative manufacturers 
was also influenced by the inefficient legal system and contract obligations. Thus, 
these institutional constraints jointly increased manufacturers’ opportunistic 
behaviours and enforcement costs of export transaction. In turn, the data from 
interview showed that this ETC actively obtained the knowledge on production, more 
specifically on current production conditions, on production processes and products, 
and manufacturer’s’ characteristics. As a result, ETC E weakened domestic 
manufacturers’ potential opportunistic behaviours, and resulting transaction costs.  
 
As discussed in previous cases, the asymmetric information was one major reason for 
the buyers’ difficulty in enforcing domestic manufacturers’ production, while the 
ETC’s knowledge of production could ease such problems (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981). The same logic was supported by the evidence in this case. The 
background information showed that ETC E employed three professional quality 
controls (QCs) to specifically enforce collaborative manufacturers’ production. Then, 
transactional procedure 3 (Enforcing the production of manufacturers) demonstrated 
that the ETC E closely mastered and monitored the manufacturers’ production 
conditions. These QCs had many years’ experience in manufacturing, which also 
helped them understand and modify the problems during production. In addition, the 
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interview with owner reflected that he tended to master manufacturers’, especially 
new ones’, characteristics, including production and entrepreneurs. So that he was 
able to reasonably arrange orders to the “right” manufacturers and gradually filtered 
out the unreliable ones through trial orders. As a result, the current collaborative 
manufacturers became the long-term ones. Correspondingly, ETC E could reduce the 
potential problems related to enforcement before the production process. Thus ETC 
E’s acquisition of the knowledge of current production conditions, on the production 
process and products, and manufactures’ characteristics remarkably helped to 
reduce the information asymmetry between the domestic manufacturers and 





Table 7-31  The summary of ETC E’s methods and advantage in export transaction.   






Evidence in the case How to reduce 
costs 






Knowledge of administrative 
approval procedures 
Staff educational background and work 




Staff experience in such administrative 
procedures 
Regular routines for such administrative 
procedures during daily work in the ETC 
 
The procedure for 
transacting with 
suppliers 
OEM trading method  Knowledge on packaging supply 
Professional purchasers with long-term 
experience on purchases Advantages of 
economics of 
scale 
On-site visits to the suppliers and public 
markets 
regular contact with remote suppliers 
The procedure for 
enforcing 
manufacturers 
Inefficient legal system 
& unique contract 
obligation 
Knowledge of current production 
conditions 
Obtaining updated information on 





Close monitoring in the factory 
Knowledge of the production process 
and products 
Main staff knowledge and experience in 
production 
Knowledge of manufactures’ 
characteristics.   
Matching suitable collaborative 
manufacturers with the order, according to 
their productive capability before the 
delivery of order 






7.7 Case F analysis 
7.7.1 The background information on ETC E 
 
The sixth ETC is Aomeite Export company, another private ETC with 17 staffs in 
Qingdao (details of ETC F is shown in table 7-32 and 7-33). It exports wooden 
furniture, such as tables and chairs, to three regions: US, Spain and Australia. The 
foreign buyers of this ETC show various preferences, such as quality and amount, on 
the purchases of products in China.  
. 
The owner of this ETC used to work in another private ETC, which had long-term 
exporting business with IKEA, the Swedish furniture retailer. Therefore, this 
working experience helped the owner to master basic skills on export and 
particularly to establish the connections with several domestic manufacturers and 
foreign buyers. With these, he founded Aomeite in 2007.  
 
This ETC has three main domestic manufacturers with long-standing collaboration, 
which have 300-400 workers and are located in surrounding regions of Qingdao. 
They also work for many other trading companies. These manufacturers own 
different product styles, productivities, and management styles, with which this ETC 
can allocate them with different product orders. Moreover, this ETC also has many 
external manufacturers, which mostly work as backup for inadequate production of 
main manufacturers and special products.      
Table 7-32   Summary of background of ETC F. 





Product Wooden furniture 










  Amount NA 
Per capital NA 
Margin NA 
 
Table 7-33  Summary of staffs in ETC F. 
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This owner holds the most important position in this ETC. He generally 
managed and coordinated the whole export process in ETC. He used to 
work as a TM in domestic manufacturers, which is an OME 
manufacturer for IKEA. Then he opened this ETC in 2007.   
Salesmen (6) Salesmen generally taking responsibility for searching for new orders 
from new and existing buyers.  All salesmen have relevant experience 




TMs generally taking responsibility for exporting documentation, such as 
making exporting contracts and other documents for export. In particular, 
they also take parts of the work for submitting/receiving official approvals 
from government departments, including the local Administration of 
Industries and Commerce and Bureau of Quality and Technical 
Supervision. All TMs have relevant experience and educational 
backgrounds in exporting.  
Quality control 
(QCs) (4) 
QCs specifically take charge of core and collaborative manufacturers’ 
production, in terms of quality, lead-in time, amount, etc. Three QCs 
used to work in manufacturing, QCs’-related work in ETCs.  
Logistics (1) He mainly works to process all shipments of products, with the 
assistance of many external forwarders.  
Accountant (2) They mainly process the ETC’s corporate accounting, and also complete 
the tax rebating procedures, approvals of foreign exchange and 
receiving payment from foreign buyers in this ETC. Both of them have 
many years’ experience in exporting companies’ corporate accounting.  
 
Figure 7-10  Organizational structure of ETC F. 
 
In this case, three face-to-face interviews and one on-line conversation had been 
done, including three with the owner, one with the manager of QCs, between 2010 
and 2012. The owner offered most of the information about the company, 
manufacturers, suppliers, buyers and general export process, while the manager 
introduced the details of monitoring production. The owner is key person in this 
company, and fully understands the whole information and export process.  















The persons in red type are interviewees in this case 
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The general export transaction process of ETC F is illustrated step by step in order to 
identify those areas where the institutional constraints and related transaction cause 
further costs (shown in Table 7-34 and 7-35). In general, the transaction process in 
this ETC is quite similar to the Case A without the procedure of “Transacting with 
materials suppliers”. The owner provided the general flow of export transaction in 
this ETC. Then the details of each step were obtained and/or checked from relevant 
interviewees.   
Table 7-34   Summary of transactional procedures of ETC F. 
1 Sample making 
2 Negotiations  
3 Enforcing the production of manufacturers   
4 Processing relevant documents 
5 Receiving payment from foreign buyers 
6 Tax rebating 
 
Table 7-35  Details of transactional procedures of ETC F. 
1 Sample making and searching for buyers 
The salesmen search for new orders from new and existing foreign buyers.  According to 
these orders, which normally contain a series of technical requirements, a sample is made 
by collaborative manufacturers or other external ones. Then they are sent by logistics to 
foreign buyers for suggestions and potential modifications. In addition, the sample is also 
made for promotional purposes (called promotion modes) in trade shows, the B2B website or 
other marketing activities.  
2 Negotiations  
At the same time, the ETC negotiates with buyers and manufacturers, in terms of price, 
quantity, lead-in time, payment terms etc. In this procedure, the ETC has to choose one or 
several of the most suitable manufacturers according to this order’s quantity, quality, style, 
lead-in time, etc. Similar to case A, price is not the most important consideration for this 
ETC, as some manufacturers and suppliers could also give the competitive price, but without 
any guarantee. Thus the manufacturers, with whom this ETC has had collaborative 
experience, are the most trustworthy. By confirmation from the owner of ETC F, they did 
have an understanding of which manufacturers would able to finish this task when they knew 
the order’s requirements, according to their previous collaborative experience with these 
companies. The key factors are the manufacturers’ production schedule, availability of 
material, and so on.  
3 Enforcing the production of manufacturers   
The QCs work on enforcing manufacturers’ production, including their own core 
manufacturer. The QCs’ experience and knowledge largely facilitate this procedure. Similar 
to Case A, ETC F also has a regular schedule for checking the production. During some 
peak times, all staff will participate in this process, as the involvement of more collaborative 
manufacturers occurs.  
5 Processing relevant documents  
This procedure is jointly finished by TMs, accountants and logistics member of staff. While 
the TMs process most exporting documents, the accountants complete the foreign exchange 
claim, and tax rebating task, the logistics staff process the shipment documents.  
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6 Receiving the payment from foreign buyers 
The payment methods, such as a letter of credit, are different according to the terms. 
Accountants will take charge of receiving payment from foreign buyers after shipping the 
products and sending the documents. It needs to go through the bank, local foreign 
exchange branches, and customs. This procedure usually takes one-month (mainly waiting 
for the receipt from customs) to finally receive these payments, as the payment and receipt 
of foreign exchanges are strictly monitored by the government.  
7 Tax rebating 
After completing the whole transaction and obtaining all official documents, the accountant 
will apply for the tax rebate from the local taxation office. The tax rebating rate is 14% for the 
products in this ETC. This application normally takes 3 months. This procedure is important 
for the ETC’s capital flow and profits. 
 
7.7.3 The institutional constraints and related transaction costs 
This section aims to explore new and test known institutional constraints. The known 
institutional constraints on China’s export market, found in previous cases are 
checked at first, while additional attention is also paid to the emerging institutional 
constraints on export markets, which appear during the export transaction in this case.  
7.7.3.1 The side of domestic manufacturers  
7.7.3.1.1 The pre-export and post-export procedures  
 
First of all, the proposed argument in pilot study A, that “the bureaucratic 
procedures and administrative approvals are mainly former formal institutional 
constraints, which generates additional transactional procedures and costs for normal 
export transactions in China”, was supported.  
 
The owner of ETC E revealed that some administrative approvals, such as the tax 
rebating system, were complex, time-consuming and changing, and created problems 
in their daily business. He also admitted he had to obtain a series of applications, 
registrations and approvals with many government departments for the start-up of his 
export business, which supported the existence of these administrative approvals 
during pre-export in this case. According to the background information, ETC F did 
employ specific staffs, three TMs and two accountants, to deal with these procedures 
and approvals. Export transactional procedure 5 (Processing relevant documents), 6 
(Receiving the payment from foreign buyers) and 7 (Tax rebating) became the 
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evidence of existence of these administrative approvals during post-export in this 
ETC. Therefore, the bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals did 
generate additional costs for normal export transactions in case E. 
7.7.3.2 The side of foreign buyers 
7.7.3.2.1 The procedure of enforcing manufacturers 
 
This case also proved the proposition generated from previous cases, that inefficient 
legal system (current formal institutional constraints) and unique contract obligation 
(informal institutional constraints) increase enforcement costs of export transactions 
in China. Apparently, procedure 3 (Enforcing the production of manufacturers) in 
7.7.2 was the evidence of existence of additional enforcement costs in this ETC’s 
transaction. Then, the interviews with the owner and quality control manager also 
witnessed their worries on potential risks on manufacturers’ opportunistic behaviours 
in production, such as uncertain product quality and delivery time. In addition, they 
also expressed that one main reason why they kept many external manufacturers as 




Table 7-36  The summary of institutional constraints and related transaction costs in ETC F. 






Evidence in case 
Specific 
transaction costs 
How  costs are 
increased 










Licences and registration from 
various government departments to 







Registration and approvals from 
various government departments 






procedures and policy 
By generating 
uncertainty 
Slow administrative procedures, 
such as tax rebating system 
By reducing the 
number of 
transactions 




system   
 Current formal 
institutional 
constraints 
Quality problems, delivery 
problems, freely breaking contracts, 
untruthful manufacturers etc., 
during manufacturing  











7.7.4 The ETC’s methods for reducing institution-related transaction 
costs 
7.7.4.1 The side of domestic manufacturers  
7.7.4.1.1 The pre-export and post-export procedures 
 
In previous case studies, it was proposed that the ETC’s knowledge (experience) of 
administrative approval procedures did reduce the costs related to administrative 
approvals during pre-export and post-export procedures during the export 
transactions. The data of this case considerably proved this proposition as well. 
 
The owner of this ETC revealed that these administrative approvals were difficult to 
process for the companies without related knowledge, which only professional and 
experienced staffs could deal with efficiently. He also admitted that they also kept 
leaning certain new procedures due to governments’ regular changes on policies. 
Moreover, export transactional procedure 5 (Processing relevant documents), 6 
(Receiving the payment from foreign buyers) and 7 (Tax rebating) indicated that 
TMs and accountants jointly dealt with post-export procedures in this case. The 
interviews with the owner reflected that experience turn out be these staffs’ most 
important character.  
7.7.4.2 The side of foreign buyers 
7.7.4.2.1 The procedure for enforcing manufacturers 
 
In section 7.7.3.2.1, it was found in this case that the inefficient legal system and 
contract obligations increased difficulty and costs of enforcing collaborative 
manufacturers, which became more opportunistic. In previous case studies, it was 
proposed that ETC’s knowledge on production, more specifically on current 
production conditions, on production processes and products, and manufacturers’ 
characteristics, was an effective solution to reduce enforcement cost by mediating 





Previous case study had suggested that asymmetric information was a major reason 
for the buyers’ difficulty in enforcing domestic manufacturers’ production, while the 
ETC’s knowledge of production could ease such problems (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981). Such proposition was supported by the evidence in ETC F. First, four 
experienced quality control were employed to specifically enforce collaborative 
manufacturers’ production in this case. Then these professional staffs and owner 
together participated in transactional procedure 3 (Enforcing the production of 
manufacturers). In addition, the interview with owner and manager of quality control 
teams showed that they actively collected the information on collaborative 
manufacturers’ characteristics, including production and entrepreneurs, so that they 
could enforce transactions more efficiently. For instance, with the information on 
production, the owner introduced, they could reasonably arrange production orders to 
the “right” manufacturers. He also agreed that he often filtered out some “wrong” 
manufacturers when their production characteristics failed to match requirements of 
foreign orders. So that he could reduce the potential problems related to enforcement 
before the production. All these data supported the proposition generated in previous 
cases that ETC’s acquisition of the knowledge of current production conditions, on 
the production process and products, and manufactures’ characteristics considerably 
reduces the information asymmetry between the domestic manufacturers and 








Table 7-37  The summary of ETC F’s methods and advantage in export transaction.   





Evidence in the case How to reduce 
costs 






Knowledge of administrative approval 
procedures 
Staff educational background and work training 




Staff experience in such administrative 
procedures 
Regular routines for such administrative 
procedures during daily work in the ETC 
The procedure for 
enforcing 
manufacturers 
Inefficient legal system & 
unique contract 
obligation 
Knowledge of current production 
conditions 
Obtaining updated information on production at 




Close monitoring in the factory 
Knowledge of the production process 
and products 
Main staff knowledge and experience in 
production 
Knowledge of manufactures’ 
characteristics.   
Matching suitable collaborative manufacturers 
with the order, according to their production 
capability before the delivery of order 





7.6 Chapter Summary 
 
Applying the proposed analytical framework for the main field work, this chapter 
displays and analyses four cases. It initially describes characteristics of each Chinese 
ETC and their business practice, by illustrating their company profiles, export 
transaction process, trading partners, and relevant industrial and institutional 
background. Following transactional sequence from domestic manufacturers to 
foreign buyers, institutions and related transaction costs on China’s export markets 
are explored and analysed. Then, ETC’s methods, by which they are able to 
effectively and efficiently reduce these institution-related costs, are presented and 
discussed. In the end, three proposed and one emergent institutional constraint in 
China’s export markets, including the bureaucratic procedures and administrative 
approvals, inefficient legal system and informal contract obligation, and long-term 
OEM trading methods are tested and explored. In addition, it reveals that Chinese 
ETCs can reduce these institution-related transaction costs by a series of effective 
methods, such as acquirement of knowledge on administrative procedures, collection 
of information on production, vertical integration, and offering supplementary 

















Chapter 8 Cross- case analysis  
8.1 Introduction  
 
As stated in the methodology chapter, the cross-case analysis aims to enhance 
generalizability, and deepen understanding and explanation, through illustrating the 
same/similar patterns that repeatedly appear (Eisenhardt, 1989) across different cases 
(Miles & Huberman, 1999). Therefore, this chapter emphasizes that those patterns 
repeatedly appear across six cases following the integrative framework generated in 
chapter 3, namely the institutional constraints (including how they raise related 
transaction costs) in China’s export markets, and the main methods by which 
Chinese ETCs reduce these institution-related transaction costs. By doing these, this 
chapter answers two research questions generated in chapter 2. Correspondingly, 
section 11.2 illustrates four different institutional constraints (including how they 
raise related transaction costs), and the Chinese ETCs’ various corresponding 
solutions, which are found across six cases. Thirteen propositions are also generated 
as follow. Then section 11.3 further discusses the logic of how such methods help 
Chinese ETCs’ to prevail in the competition to reduce transaction costs.  
8.2 Institutional constraints and ETCs’ methods in China’s export 
market   
 
Following previous theoretical framework of this research in chapter 3 and findings 
in pilot study of chapter 6, this section concludes four significant institutional 
constraints across six cases, which generate different transaction costs by influencing 
transactional frequency, uncertainty and opportunism, and therefore increase 
difficulties for direct transactions between domestic manufacturers and foreign 
buyers. These institutional constraints include bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals (former formal institutional constraints; an inefficient legal 
system (current formal institutional constraints); inefficient informal contract 
obligation (informal institutional constraints); and long-term OEM trading methods 
(current formal institutional constraints). Correspondingly, this section also 
illustrates various methods adopted by Chinese ETCs to effectively solve these 
institution-related problems and transaction costs.  
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8.2.1 Bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals 
 
During pilot study A (1
st
 part), the bureaucratic procedures and administrative 
approvals were initially highlighted as the formal institutional constraints in China’s 
export market from practitioners’ interviews and secondary data. Then they were 
confirmed and proved as the most commonly reported institutional constraint, 
supported by all cases (Case A to F). Table 8-1 and Figure 8-1 show one summary of 
such situation in all cases. The specific evidence across cases refers to pre-/post-
export transactional procedures. The former one means a series of administrative 
procedures for applications for export authority and various business licences and 
registrations, which are compulsory for domestic exporters to start-up export 
businesses. In post-export transactional procedures, these domestic exporters have to 
submit/receive a series of official approvals and registrations to/from many different 
government departments for each of their export transactions. Therefore, this 
institutional constraint increases additional procedures, namely pre-/post-export 
transactional procedures within cases, beyond normal export transactions, where 
domestic exporters and foreign buyers only need to complete the buying-selling 
round. 
 
The discussion on theoretical framework of this research in chapter 3 and pilot study 
jointly show that unstable government policies and bureaucratic administrative 
procedures are able to reduce transactional frequency and increase uncertainty, and 
therefore increase transaction costs in transition economies. Administrative barriers 
are mentioned as obstruction of businesses in transitional economies by many studies. 
For instance, there are lengthy timescales and massive procedures for starting up 
businesses. They generate time costs and reduce efficiency of transactions (Meyer, 
2001a). More importantly, they also significantly increase uncertainty, as these 
bureaucratic procedures are unstable, non-transparent and unpredictable (Meyer et al., 
2005; Puffer & McCarthy, 2001).  
 
The findings across six cases echo such argument in this study. As stated in chapter 7 
within case analysis, these bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals are 
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complex, time-consuming and continuously changing for domestic exporters, and 
therefore increase transaction costs for export transactions in China. These 
procedures cost exporters’ resources (mainly human resources), cost time for 
domestic exporters, and reduce the frequency of export transactions. For example, 
the tax rebating procedure in China bears witness to how long only one of these 
bureaucratic procedures can take. Moreover, the continuous changes, sometimes 
called reform by the government, of these bureaucratic procedures and administrative 
approvals further confuse these domestic exporters with new procedures, generating 
uncertainty and potentially failed possibilities for export transactions.  
 
Existing studies on trading companies have suggested that the transaction costs on 
exports can come from the export processes (Peng, 1998; Peng & Ilinitch, 1998; 
Peng & York, 2001). However, such studies mainly focus on normative processes in 
export, such as export documentation, and fail to notice that the local institutions 
themselves might generate additional processes beyond normal export requirements. 
As argued in the chapter 2, these studies fail to pay attention at the institution-level to 
transaction costs. From the multiple cases in this study, bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals, as one sort of institutional constraint, generate two 
additional transactional procedures for the normal export process, and therefore 
increase transaction costs in terms of time, resource commitment, and uncertainty 
during the export process in  China’s export markets. 
 
These bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals bear the typical 
characteristics of the central-planning system, and therefore belong to the category of 
former formal institutional constraints. From the descriptions in Chapter 4, the 
transition, or sometimes called the reform, of institutions related exporting in China, 
such as the export authority, has been underway since 1949 and up to the present day. 
During the transition, export-related institutions were changing from that of a wholly 
central monopoly, to one of relative decentralization among the state-owned 
economies, and then to recently relatively open and fair administrative procedures 
within private economies. However, the transition and reform of these former formal 
institutional constraints is not completed, just relatively weakened, and has shifted 
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from being obvious to invisible. Due to the nature of central-planning institutions, 
these bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals still reduce the 
transaction efficiency on the current export market and generate additional costs for 
domestic exporters, especially for the emerging private and small-medium-sized 
exporters. Therefore, the first proposition is as follow.  
 
Proposition 1 The bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals, as the 
main former formal institutional constraints in China’s export market, generate 
additional transaction costs for domestic manufacturers. 
 
Related institutions  
Bureaucratic procedures and administrative 
approvals 
Procedures in export transaction The pre-export and post-export procedures 
Sorts of institutional constraints Former formal institutional constraints 
Evidence in case 
Licences and registration from various 
government departments to start export 
businesses 
Registration and approvals from various 
government departments for each export 
transaction 
Changing administrative procedures and policy 
Slow tax rebating system 
Specific transaction costs Administrative costs 
How costs are increased? 
By reducing frequency (generating additional 
procedures), and increasing uncertainty  
Supporting cases  CS-A,B,C,D,E,F 
 
Table 8-1  Summary of institutional constraints and related transaction 
costs- bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals. 
 
In turn, all ETCs in this study manage to efficiently process bureaucratic procedures 
and administrative approvals. Their major method is to amass and master specific 
and updated knowledge (including information and experience) on these bureaucratic 
procedures and administrative approvals, such as the knowledge on how and where 
to apply for and register these official approvals and licences; about how, when and 
where to prepare, submit and receive these necessary official documents to/from 
various government departments. This sort of knowledge helps ETCs to increase 




This point is supported by all six cases, as summarised in Table 8-2 and Figure 8-1. 
More specifically, this knowledge includes those about how and where to apply for 
and register these official approvals and licences as well as about how, when and 
where to prepare, submit and receive these necessary official documents to/from 
many different government departments. This type of knowledge is based on the 
presence of well-trained and experienced staff, and relevant routines embedded 
within the daily work of the ETCs. By mastering this sort of knowledge, these ETCs 
efficiently process these bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals with 
less time, resource-commitment and error rate. Thereby the transactional efficiency 
and frequency is increased. In addition, these ETCs frequently deal with these 
processes during their massive export transactions. Therefore they can also easily 
update their knowledge of the changes and new additions  of the bureaucratic 
procedures and administrative approvals that ultimately reduce relative uncertainty.  
 
Previous studies on trading companies have indicated that transaction-related 
knowledge is one main resource of trading companies for reducing transaction costs 
(Carlos & Nicholas, 1988; Peng, 1998; Peng & York, 2001; Roehl, 1983, 1998). 
Peng et al specifically indicate that the staff knowledge and experience of export 
processes is able to reduce the costs of export transactions (Peng, 1998; Peng & York, 
2001), though such export processes refer to normative processes involved in export 
transactions. By the same logic, the knowledge about the bureaucratic procedures 
and administrative approvals, which are necessary transactional procedures during 
the export process in China’s export market, are reasonably able to reduce relative 
transaction costs.  
 
In addition, the studies on transition economies also indicate that the acquirement of 
knowledge on these bureaucratic procedures helps companies to successfully 
undertake business by reducing uncertainty and increase efficiency in these transition 
economies. Amsden & Hikino (1994) argued that the capabilities of companies to 
obtain permits and licences for start-up businesses from government, reduce the 
entry costs to new industries in late-industrializing countries. Guillen (2000) also 
indicates that the specialized knowledge of government policies, and procedures, 
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such as the specific country-related advantages, helps business groups to reduce the 
uncertainty, and transaction costs, and to increase efficiency in establishing new 
ventures in these economies. As a result, the second proposition is generated below.  
 
Proposition 2 being equipped with specific and updated knowledge of 
bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals in China’s export 
market, Chinese ETCs are able to reduce relative transaction costs for 
domestic manufacturers. 
 
Table 8-2  Summary of Chinese ETCs’ methods for reducing institution-related 
transaction costs- bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals. 
Institutional constraints 
Bureaucratic procedures and administrative 
approvals 
Procedures in export transactions The pre-export and post-export procedures 
Sorts of institutional constraints Former formal institutional constraints 
Chinese ETC’s methods for 
reducing such institution-related 
transaction costs 
Knowledge (information and experience) of these 
bureaucratic procedures and administrative 
approvals 
Specific evidence in cases 
Staff educational background in exporting 
Staff experience in such administrative 
procedures 
Regular routines for such administrative 
procedures 
Specific transaction costs Administrative costs 









Figure 8-1 Integrative analytical framework with first institutional constraints
Former formal institutional constraints 
during institutional transition in China 
(including examples found from six cases) 
Main elements of transaction costs, 
which can be increased by institutional 
constraints and reduced by case 
ETCs 
Transaction costs in China’s 







(information and experience) of 
these bureaucratic procedures 
and administrative approvals 
 Staff educational 
background in 
exporting 
 Staff experience in 
such administrative 
procedures 




Findings from six cases to show 
by which way ETCs reduce 
transaction costs  
Former formal institutional constraints: 
Inefficient bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals  
 Licences and registration from 
various government departments to 
start export businesses 
 Registration and approvals from 
various government departments for 
each export transaction 
 Changing administrative procedures 
and policy 
 Slow tax rebating system 
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8.2.2 Inefficient legal system and contract obligation  
 
The inefficient legal system and contract obligations are another two institutional 
constraints from the findings of pilot study A. Analysis across the six cases further 
confirmed and proved this as the most commonly reported issue, as they appear in all 
cases (shown in Table 8-3 and Figure 8-2). The inefficient legal system is a matter of 
formal institutional constraints, while the latter one is informal. Since these two 
institutional constraints jointly appear in and have an influence on the enforcement of 
domestic manufacturers, they are discussed together in this section. 
 
The previous discussions about theoretical framework of this study and pilot study 
argue that inefficient legal system, such as formal law and legal enforcement (Meyer, 
2001b), may incur additional opportunistic behaviours, and increase costs of 
transactions, especially those related contract enforcement, in transitional economies 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Khanna et al., 2005; Meyer, 2001a).  
 
The findings across six cases do support such argument. All cases of this study show 
the huge difficulties of enforcing export transactions, which are generated by 
opportunistic behaviours of domestic manufacturers. More specifically, these 
opportunistic behaviours refer to product quality problems (in cases A-F), production 
and delivery delay (in cases A-F), and breach of contract (in case C), which appear in 
each case and become the most significant problems of purchase in China’s export 
market. But the local legal system fails to prevent it and turns out to be the most 
important cause of such situation, according to the interviews from the cases.  
 
In addition, legal system neither protects other related items with product from 
opportunistic behaviours. For instance, manufacturers could freely increase material 
price and illegally sell ETC’s branded products to other buyers in Case B. Because of 





As a result, relatively weak legal system raises actual and perceived transaction costs 
by increasing additional opportunistic behaviours in export transaction in China. The 
use of the formal legal system to enforce transactions, such as by court and 
arbitration, are costly, even in developed countries (Williamson, 1985, 1991), where 
the formal legal system is normally considered relatively more efficient.  In contrast 
to these developed countries, transition economies have the reputation of having an 
inefficient legally system. Influenced by such a situation, the enforcing costs of 
transactions are commonly reported high in these countries (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; 
Khanna et al., 2005; Meyer, 2001a, 2001b).  
 
In this study, one ETC (case C) used the legal system in China in an attempt to 
recoup the losses associated with one unsuccessful transaction where domestic 
manufacturers broke the export contract provoking their large loss. With the “help” 
of local court, case C had to accept one compromise solution with half of the 
compensation paid. Therefore, the legal system does fail to efficiently protect buyers 
from losses in export transactions in China, thereby increasing their enforcing costs.  
 
Moreover, the interviewees in pilot study A and rest of the cases show that the 
buyers in China’s export market, including ETCs and foreign buyers, are unwilling 
to use the legal system to safeguard their export transactions, as they are worried 
about the high costs (time and money) and unsatisfactory implementation. In other 
words, these buyers perceive the legal system as too inefficient to really use it to 
enforce their export transactions in China. As many studies have indicated, some 
types of transaction costs actually do not take place, as they are very high, or/and 
transactions cannot happen (Benham & Benham, 2000).  
 
In term of both actual and perceived transaction costs, therefore, the findings witness 
that local legal system fails to efficiently enforce the export transactions, control 
opportunistic behaviours and generates additional enforcement costs for buyers in 




Since the legal systems have been developed with institutional transition in these 
countries in order to fulfil the increasing need for emerging market transactions, they 
are classified into current formal institutional constraints in the analytical framework. 
Therefore this study proposed:   
 
Proposition 3 The inefficient legal system, as the current formal institutional 
constrains on China’s export market, generates additional enforcement 
costs for foreign buyers’ direct transaction with local manufacturers. 
 
Table 8-3  Summary of institutional constraints and related transaction costs- 
Inefficient legal system. 
Related institutions  Inefficient legal system 
Procedure in export transaction The procedure of enforcing manufacturers 
Typess of institutional constraints Current formal institutional constraints 
Evidence in case 
Quality problems     
Delivery problems  
Changed price 
Specific transaction costs Cost of monitoring manufacturers 
How to increase costs 
By generating opportunistic behaviour and 
uncertainty 
Supporting cases  CS-A,B,C,D,E,F 
 
As stated in theoretical framework in chapter 3 and chapter 6, some informal 
institutions may increase transaction costs for business in transition economies. 
Faced with an inefficient formal legal system in China, the informal contract 
enforcement, which is one complement of the formal institutions, should have been 
more efficient and prominent (Luo, 2002; North, 1990), so that the export 
transactions can be facilitated by informal contract enforcement in China’s export 
markets.  
 
From the findings across cases, however, it is clear that the informal contract 
obligations in China are also problematic, and leads to many opportunistic 
behaviours and additional uncertainty. In all cases and pilot study A, the domestic 
manufacturers fail to efficiently enforce the export transactions according to their 
promise in original export contracts. These domestic manufacturers often freely 
receive orders without considering their capabilities, ignore the quality control and 
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production schedule, and even intentionally raise prices, resulting in a series of 
problems during the enforcement of transactions.  
 
The potential explanation of domestic manufacturers’ inefficient contract obligations 
can be two fold. On one hand, the inefficient formal legal system actually magnifies 
the potential for opportunistic behaviours of trading partners. The manufacturers 
behave opportunistically, as they feel free from such an inefficient legal system in 
China. For example, the domestic manufacturers get used to changing the agreed 
price, and breaking the contract, as they seldom face punishment from the legal 
system, or as they often only need to make some compensation to the buyers when 
they break the contracts (Case C).  
 
On the other hand, affected by the tradition and culture, the contract obligation in 
China become distinct, and require trading partners to completely understand, and 
adapt to them, and therefore generate additional uncertainty for them. For instance, 
Wang (2005) indicates that Confucianism and communist ideology can cause 
citizens in China to ignore certain necessary institutions in marketing economies, 
such as private property rights.  In addition, Luo (2002) argued that the commercial 
contracts, as part of the inefficient legal system in China, fail to efficiently enforce 
contracts in China. Instead, the contract obligations largely rely on other social 
norms, such as personal relationships. However, the tradition of relying on personal 
relationships will result in inadequate contract obligations in normal cases,and 
newcomers’ will poorly adapt to such unique enforcement methods. As a result, it 
increases uncertainty and foreign buyers’ enforcing costs. In short, the inefficient 
contract obligations also fail to efficiently enforce export transactions in China’s 
export market.  
 
Like legal systems discussed before, contract obligation have also been developed 
from the beginning of the transition in these countries to fulfil the increasing need for 
emerging market transactions, thus they are classified into current formal 
institutional constraints in the theoretical framework. Therefore, the forth proposition 
is generated as follow.  
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Proposition 4 Inefficient contract obligation, as the current informal 
institutional constraints in China’s export market, generates additional 
enforcement costs for foreign buyers’ direct transaction with local 
manufacturers. 
 
Table 8-4  Summary of institutional constraints and related transaction costs- 
Inefficient contract obligation. 
Related institutions  Inefficient contract obligation 
Procedures in export transaction The procedures for enforcing manufacturers 
Types  of institutional constraints Informal institutional constraints 
Evidence in case 
Quality problems     
Delivery problems  
Specific transaction costs Costs of monitoring manufacturers 
How to increase costs 
By generating opportunistic behaviour and 
uncertainty 
Supporting cases  CS-A,B,C,D,E,F 
 
Facing the inefficient legal system and contract obligations, Chinese ETCs find other 
ways to solve these problems (shown in Table 8-5 and Figure 8-2). One of their main 
methods is reducing information asymmetry. Studies from transaction costs 
economics have indicated that the uncertain and complex information, which 
generates bounded rationality, is the  major reason for transaction costs (Williamson, 
1975, 1985). Moreover, asymmetric information is the  major reason for difficulty in 
identifying product quality and other resulting problems that stop transactions, such 
as adverse selection and moral hazards (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).  
 
Many studies indicate that the acquisition of information become an  effective 
method to counter opportunistic behaviours, uncertainty, and relative high 
monitoring costs generated by local deficient institutions, such as the inefficient legal 
system, in transitional economies. For instance,  Hoskisson et al (2000) believe that 
the information is useful for reducing monitoring costs in transition economies, 
where inefficient institutions increase opportunistic behaviours. Ahlstrom & Bruton’s 
(2006) study also indicates that accurate information on firms, which is vital for 
venture capitalists to monitor funded firms’ performance, is valuable and hard to 
obtain in emerging markets, along with the difficulties presented by the inefficient 




From the findings across the six cases, all ETCs acquire massive amounts of 
information on production, which definitely reduces the information asymmetry 
between manufacturers and buyers, decreases opportunistic behaviours and 
uncertainty, and reduces enforcement costs. The information on production generally 
contains three aspects: current production conditions, production processes and 
products, and manufactures’ characteristics; this was initially found and concluded 
in Case A, and confirmed by subsequent cases. The information on current 
production conditions, such as the progress of production, enables Chinese ETCs to 
better control the production, including product quality and production schedule, 
minimizing the problems, and reducing the manufactures’ opportunistic behaviours 
during the production process.   
 
Moreover, the information on the production process and products, such as the 
quality control points on products and during the production process, increases the 
ETCs’ capabilities for finding out and avoiding these opportunistic behaviours and 
uncertainty during whole production process. It is worth mentioning that the 
information on products does not only refer to the quality, types  and styles, but 
contains all characteristics of the product. For instance, in Case C,  pricing becomes 
rather important information, which is systematically collected, updated and used by 
the ETC to ease the uncertainty and manufacturers’ opportunistic behaviours,  and 
for re-negotiation post transaction.  
 
Finally, the information on manufacturers’ characteristics, which refer to the 
manufacturers’ product quality, capacity, credibility etc, makes ETCs choose the 
most reliable and suitable manufactures according to their different foreign orders. In 
general, the information on production helps Chinese ETCs to reduce the information 
asymmetry, to reduce the possibilities of opportunistic behaviours and uncertainty 
during production, and finally to reduce the enforcement costs.  
 
Existing studies that discuss trading companies’ acquisition of information on 
production mainly refer to large trading companies, such as former European CTCs, 
and Japanese GTCs. They acquire the information on production mainly for two 
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reasons. One can be for their diversification strategy, especially diversification into 
production. For instance, Roehl (1998) indicates that Japanese GTCs accumulate 
massive information on “unrelated” businesses, such as production, which is used in 
their further diversification, during their usual trading activities. Second, it aims to 
help domestic manufacturers, which lack some capabilities, such as technology, 
during the whole production process but fail to independently manufacture products 
for further export. Both Yoshino & Lifson’s (1986) study and Kojima & Ozawa’s 
(1984) study on Japanese GTCs mention the second situation. But the findings in this 
study suggest two differences. First, such activity does not only take place in large 
trading companies, but also in small trading companies, such as the CS-A,C,D,E,F in 
this study. Second, the acquisition of such information on production aims to better 
enforce manufacturers’ production, and avoid their opportunistic behaviours, at least 
in the countries where opportunistic behaviours are considerable. Chinese ETCs 
actually actively obtain information on production through employing staff with 
experience in production, in order to improve information asymmetry and reduce the 
enforcement costs on domestic manufacturers during export transactions.  
 
Apart from the acquisition of information on production, the findings from these six 
cases show that Chinese ETCs also adopt other methods to solve the enforcement 
problems, opportunistic behaviours and uncertainty, and resulting costs. These 
methods include vertical integration into production, the establishment and 
management of brand, application of special certificates for products, and the use of 
appropriate legal assistance in China.  
 
Vertical integration, such as into production, is one popular topic in the studies on 
trading companies, as they usually adopt a diversification strategy during their 
development. Scholars have stated many reasons for trading companies’ vertical 
integration. Jones (2002a) believes that multinational trading companies’ vertical 
integration aims to pursue new profitable opportunities and to make up the 
inadequate business supportive functions in underdeveloped/developing countries. 
Yoshino & Lifson (1986) state that Japanese GTCs’ vertical integration aims to 
support their core trading business. Hennart & Kryda (1998) added that Japanese 
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GTCs’ vertical integration is used to “secure the custom of manufacturers”. Casson 
(1998) includes several motives (advantages) and disadvantages for the vertical 
integration practised by the trading companies in production such as reselling (shown 
in table Table 8-5), and highlight the quality assurance is the most important one. 
Table 8-5  Integration of production and reselling. 
Advantages 
Quality control 
Better forward planning with less inventory 
Elimination of monopolistic or monopsonistic price distortions in the 
wholesale product market 
Improved coordination of irreversible investments 
Better information feedback for product and process development 
Opportunities for tax avoidance through ‘transfer pricing’ where there are 
differences in the fiscal regimes of the exporting and importing countries 
Disadvantages 
Economies of scale in production limited by internal marketing capacity 
Economies of scope in marketing limited by internal production capabilities 
Bureaucracy weakens employee incentives 
Potential 
compromise   
Use both internal and external markets 
 (Casson, 1998) 
 
The findings from the cases in this study show that efficiently enforcing 
manufacturers’ production and reduce of opportunistic behaviours and uncertainty 
are main motives for Chinese ETCs’ vertical integration. In the cross case analysis of 
the six firms, there are two ETCs (Case B & D), which adopt vertical integration. 
Both of them integrated into production. While Case B partly integrates one 
collaborative manufacturer with the original owners, Case D newly establishes one 
wholly owned manufacturer. In Case B, the vertical integration into production helps 
to obtain the information on production and reduce the information asymmetry, by 
placing three monitoring staff inside the manufacturers. In Case D, the vertical 
integration into production helps the ETC to flexibly arrange different orders and 
production between self-owned manufacturers and external collaborative 
manufacturers, so that parts of the process, which are more likely influenced by 
manufacturers’ opportunistic behaviours, are produced by the in-house, own 
manufacturers, and the other parts by the external collaborative manufacturers. Both 
of these help to solve the problems associated with the manufacturers’ opportunistic 
behaviours such as quantity, quality and punctuality problems, during the 




In addition, vertical integration into production also helps the ETCs enforce other 
related transactions and promises involved in export transactions, which are also 
vulnerable to the inefficient legal system and contract obligations in China. 
Intellectual property rights protection issues become the significant one in these two 
cases. Many studies have already mentioned that the inefficient legal system and 
certain informal institutions in transitional economies fails to effectively protect 
intellectual property (Luo, 2001; Wang, 2005), and therefore recommend the 
adoption of more hierarchical governance modes  in these countries in order to 
safeguard their intellectual property (Luo, 2001; Oxley, 1999). Such an argument is 
confirmed by the findings from Case B and D. More specifically, one main 
motivation for their vertical integration is respectively to protect the formula, brand 
and trademarks of welding electrodes  in Case B, and the skills to produce the spring 
pillow in Case D, from opportunistic behaviours and uncertainty in China. Apart 
from intellectual property protection, the ETC B’s vertical integration also helps 
them to avoid their manufacturers illegally selling products to other exporters. Thus, 
vertical integration into production can achieve effective enforcement in many 
different relative transactions and promises during export transactions in China.  
 
Finally, the findings across the cases also indicate that Chinese ETCs adopt many 
other methods to solve the opportunistic behaviours and uncertainty related to 
enforcement on domestic manufacturers. In case B, the ETC manages to establish the 
brand and to apply for well-known industrial certificates for their products, which 
act as quality guarantees, and reduce foreign buyers’ enforcement costs. In cases C, 
the ETC uses appropriate legal assistance, which are effective in China, to save their 
losses from the manufacturers’ breach of contract.  
 
In short, Chinese ETCs try their best to help foreign buyers to reduce enforcement 
costs by mastering information on production, vertical integration into production, 
establishing brand and applying for well-known industrial certificates for their 
products, and effectively using appropriate legal assistance in China. Therefore, four 




Proposition 5 By mastering the information on production, Chinese ETCs are able 
to reduce institution-related enforcement costs for foreign buyers. 
 
Proposition 6 By vertical integration into production, Chinese ETCs are able to 
reduce institution-related enforcement costs for foreign buyers. 
 
Proposition 7 By establishing brand and applying for well-known industrial 
certificates for tradable products, Chinese ETCs are able to reduce institution-
related enforcement costs for foreign buyers. 
 
Proposition 8 By effectively using appropriate legal assistance in China, Chinese 
ETCs are able to reduce institution-related enforcement costs for foreign buyers. 
 
It is worthy noticing that these two institutional constraints (the inefficient legal 
system and contract obligations) and Chinese ETCs’ corresponding methods support 
the proposed modification of transaction costs economics (TCE) analysis of trading 
companies referred to in previous parts of this study. In Chapter 2, the critique is 
made that existing studies on TCE analysis of trading companies fail to pay enough 
attention to other players, especially foreign buyers or importers, involved in 
international trade. Then in chapter 3, the author re-develops a both-sided TCE 
analysis of trading companies to integrate the perspective of foreign buyers. The 
findings across cases strongly support such a proposed modification. The inefficient 
legal system and contract obligations in China’s export market magnify the domestic 
manufacturers’ opportunistic behaviours and related enforcement costs. Such 
problems became the most important consideration of foreign buyers’ import or 
international purchase decisions (Kannan & Tan, 2002; Katsikeas & Dalgic, 1995; 
Leonidou, 1999), especially when they import from China (LFRC, 2010; Nassimbeni 
& Sartor, 2006). In order to solve such significant problems for foreign buyers, the 
Chinese ETCs had to develop corresponding methods and characteristics, which 
further emphasise the distinction with existing TCE analysis of trading companies.  
Therefore, the proposed both-sided TCE analysis of trading companies in order to 
integrate the perspective of foreign buyers in chapter 3 is significant and supported.  
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Table 8-6  Summary of Chinese ETCs’ methods for reducing institution-related 
transaction costs- Inefficient legal system and contract obligations. 
Institutional constraints 




Procedures in export 
transactions 
The procedure for enforcing 
manufacturers 
Types of institutional 
constraints 
Former formal and informal institutional 
constraints 
Chinese ETC’s methods for 
reducing such institution-
related transaction costs 
Information on production, including 
current production conditions, production 




Information on updated prices of product Case C 
Vertical integration Case B, D 
Brand, special certificates Case B 
Specific transaction costs Cost of monitoring manufacturers 
 


















Figure 8-2 Integrative analytical framework with second and third institutional constraints 
 
 
Institutional constraints during 
institutional transition in China 
(including examples found from 
six cases) 
Main elements of transaction costs, 
which can be increased by institutional 
constraints and reduced by case 
ETCs 
Transaction costs in China’s 
export markets (Direct/Indirect 
markets) 





Information on production, including 
current production conditions, 
production processes, products, 
and manufacturers’ characteristics 
Case: C 
Information on updated prices of 
product 
Case: B & D 
Vertical integration 
Case: B 
Brand, special certificates 
  
Findings from six cases to 
show by which way ETCs 
reduce transaction costs  
Current formal institutional constraints: 
Inefficient legal system  
 Quality problems   
 Delivery problems  
 Changed price 
Informal institutional constraints: 
Inefficient contract obligation  
 Quality problems   
 Delivery problems  




8.2.3 The OEM trading method  
The previous discussion of theoretical framework in chapter 5 states that some 
formal institutional constraints were inherited from the previous planned economy 
system (Estrin, Meyer, & Bytchkova, 2008), but still exist in many ways in the 
transition economies. These former formal institutional constraints, such as 
bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals discussed in previous section, 
may hamper business and raise transaction costs in these countries. In this study, The 
OEM trading method is found as another former formal institutional constraint in 
China’s export market (shown in Table 8-7 and Figure 8-3). 
 
Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) is  a transactional arrangement between 
brand name company (OEM buyer) and the contract supplier, where the OEM buyer 
offers detailed technical blueprints and most of the components to allow the contract 
supplier to produce according to specifications (Ernst, 2000; Kang, Mahoney, & Tan, 
2009). Process trade is another OEM-like arrangement. It enables manufacturers to 
receive export orders, then to produce and export according to the requirements of 
orders. These two trading methods are commonly used in China since the 1970s. 
They were estimated to make up half of the export amount in China until recent years 
(Fu, 2008; Yu, 2012).  
 
In general, these two types of OEM trading methods incur additional uncertainty and 
raise transaction costs for export transactions in China. Domestic manufacturers, as 
part of the global value chains, only take responsibility for the processing of products 
in these two types of OEM trade. Under such trading methods, they, especially the 
SMEs, are able to quickly participate in international trade (by global supply chain) 
without developing the entire range of production and marketing functions. At the 
same time, these manufacturers also lose some functions, which are necessary for 
their direct exporting. As a result, export transactions are faced with significant 
uncertainty in China, and therefore transaction costs are raised. Such institutional 
constraint is initially found in Case A and then confirmed in Case B and Case D.  
More specially, in both cases A and D, the manufacturers fail to search for suitable 
materials’ suppliers, in terms of price, amount, style, etc, and relies on the ETC’s 
300 
 
supply. In other words, under long-term OEM trading methods, these manufacturers 
lose independent supply function. In Case B, long-term OEM methods interfere with 
manufacturers obtaining, learning and improving their capabilities to manage brands 
and to apply for certain special certificates, which can considerably facilitate product 
export. Without these capabilities, the domestic manufacturers fail to directly 
transact with foreign buyers, and have relatively higher costs.  
 
Together with the previous statement that long-term OEM trading method is found as 
another former formal institutional constraint in China’s export market, this study 
proposes that:   
 
Proposition 9 The long-term OEM trading method, as the main former formal 
institutional constraints in China’s export market, generates additional transaction 
costs for domestic manufacturers. 
 
Table 8-7  Summary of institutional constraints and related transaction costs- 
long-term OEM trading method. 
Related institutions  Long-term OEM trading method 
Supporting 
cases 
Procedure in export 
transaction 
The procedure for transacting  with 
materials’ suppliers 
Case A, D 
The procedure of managing brands and 
applying for special certificates 
Case B 
Types of institutional 
constraints 
Former formal institutional constraints  
Evidence in case 
The manufacturers could not find suitable 
suppliers, in terms of price, amount, style, 
etc 
Case A, D 
The manufacturers could not manage 
brands and apply for certain special 
certificates 
Case B 
Specific transaction costs 
Cost of organizing production Case A, D 
Costs of branding and applying for special 
certificates 
Case B 
How to increase costs By generating uncertainty  
Regarding ETCs’ solutions, the findings from Case A, B and D show that Chinese 
ETCs obtain these capabilities in order to reduce such uncertainty and relative 
transaction costs for these incompetent domestic manufacturers. These ETCs master 
adequate knowledge on material supply (Case A,D), on establishing and maintaining 
brands, and applying for those  well-known industrial certificates, and finally 
successfully fill in these missing functions and complete export transactions.  
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As discussed in Case A, much of the existing literature on trading companies 
indicates that some trading companies did help manufactures to supply the materials. 
For instance, both Yoshino & Lifson’s (1986) study and Kojima & Ozawa’s (1984) 
study mention that the Japanese GTCs organize and coordinate the whole productive 
system in Japan, including the material supply. But the findings in this study have 
one difference from these existing explanations. The organization of material supply 
appears in two small ETCs, rather than in those large trading companies. In the case 
of Japanese GTCs, they normally have more resources, capabilities and experience of 
production than relatively weak manufacturers, due to their large scale. According to 
Roehl’s (1982, 1998) explanation, these large trading companies undertake such 
activities mainly because they are trying to make full use of the “unrelated” 
information, which is obtained through long-term trading business. Cases A & D are 
not, as least, larger than their manufacturers. Their activities can be considered as 
make-up or salvage activities, as they want to finish the export transactions. In other 
words, the institutional constraint, the long-term OEM trading method, pushes these 
ETCs to obtain unrelated capabilities, and fill in these missing functions, so that they 
can finish the export transactions. Thus the tenth proposition is generated as follow 
Proposition 10 By undertaking some non-trading activities, Chinese ETCs are able 
to organize/coordinate domestic production and reduce institution-related 
transaction costs for domestic manufacturers.  
 
Table 8-8  Summary of Chinese ETCs’ method for reducing institution-related 
transaction costs- long-term OEM trading method. 
Institutional constraints Long-term OEM trading methods 
Supporting 
cases 
Procedure in export 
transaction 
The procedure for transacting material 
suppliers 
Case A, D 
The procedure for managing brands and 
applying for special certificates 
Case B 
Types of institutional 
constraints 
Former formal institutional constraints  
Chinese ETC’s methods for 
reduinge such institution-
related transaction costs 
To take the work of materials’ supply Case A, D 
To establish and maintain the brands for 
the products 
Case B 
To apply for special certificates for the 
products 
Case B 
Specific transaction costs 
Cost of organizing production Case A, D 







Figure 8-3 Integrative analytical framework with third institutional constraints
Institutional constraints during 
institutional transition in China 
(including examples found from 
six cases) 
Main elements of transaction costs, 
which can be increased by institutional 
constraints and reduced by case 
ETCs 
Transaction costs in China’s 





Case: A, B & D 
 
Knowledge (information and 
experience) of these 
bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals 
 
 To take the work of 
materials’ supply 
 To establish and 
maintain the brands 
for the products 
 To apply for special 
certificates for the 
products 
  
Findings from six cases to 
show by which way ETCs 
reduce transaction costs  
Former formal institutional constraints: 
Long-term OEM trading method  
 The manufacturers could not find 
suitable suppliers, in terms of price, 
amount, style, etc 
 The manufacturers could not 
manage brands and apply for 
certain special certificates 
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8.3 Chinese ETCs’ advantages on economizing these institution-
related transaction costs  
 
During the within-case analysis, it emerged that the Chinese ETCs adopt efficient 
methods to solve the institution-related problems and costs, which are generated by 
institutional constraints in China. However, why these methods are efficient on these 
institution-related costs becomes another question. In other words, the question is 
why the indirect markets operated by Chinese ETCs is more efficient, and can 
process export transaction with lower costs, than direct markets between domestic 
manufacturers and foreign buyers?  
 
The literature review of Chapter 2 has discussed current transaction costs analyses on 
trading companies’ advantages on economizing traditional transaction costs in 
international trade. The historical analysis in Chapter 4 has highlighted some distinct 
features of Chinese trading companies. Taking advantage of the ideas from these two 
parts, this section further discusses the logic behind the ETCs’ methods of 
economizing institution-related transaction costs, which are pointed out in section 8.2 
by comparing and contrasting the findings from the cases. As a result, three 
explanations of Chinese ETCs’ advantages in achieving economies in institution-
related transaction costs are generated. They are economies of scale, the long-term 
monopoly of export authority and the reselling system in China.  
 
8.3.1 Economies of scale  
 
Economies of scale refer to that the unit price of products  can be reduced through 
large scale production (Hill, 1998). It “exist(s) when a firm's operating costs increase 
at a lower rate than its output” (Katrishen & Scordis, 1998). From the perspective of 
transaction cost economics, Spulber (1999; 2007, p101-113) stated that the 
economies of scale (and scope) is one reason why firms can reduce the transaction 
costs. By processing a higher volume of transactions than individual buyers and 
sellers, the intermediary (firm) is able to reduce the number of transactions or/and 
increase transaction efficiency. He further stated that  actually “consolidating 
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transactions through intermediaries can yield returns to scale in producing and 
distributing this information” (Spulber, 1999, p23) .  
  
From discussion in chapter 2, the extant studies indicate that economies of scale are 
one key reason why trading companies are able to reduce transaction costs. Carlos & 
Nicholas (1988, 1996) argue that the European CTCs can achieve economies of scale 
through their large volume of transactions, and further reduce the costs per 
transaction. Similarly, Roehl et al (Roehl, 1983, 1998; Roehl et al., 1984) also 
indicate that the Japanese GTCs enjoy economies of scale to reduce the transaction 
costs when they recurrently process similar transactions.   
 
The findings across the six cases prove that the economies of scale can also explain 
how Chinese ETCs reduce the institution-related transaction costs. Firstly, the costs 
related to the bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals mainly result 
from a series of complex and time-consuming administrative procedures, which are 
compulsory for Chinese exporters’ start-ups of export business and each of their 
export transactions. Therefore, specific staffs are needed to take charge of the job of 
applying for these licenses, and of the daily processing of these official documents 
and approvals for each export transaction.  
 
In practice, these staff can be employed by domestic manufacturers as well, but the 
costs are different between manufacturers and ETCs. Analysis across the six cases 
shows that each ETC has more than three domestic manufacturers and three foreign 
buyers (shown in Figure 8-1). As they have more in-house manufacturers and buyers 
who can process more exporting deals than individual manufacturers and buyers, 
these ETCs are able to achieve economies of scale, and then reduce costs per deal. 
From Figure 8-1, compared with the direct market between domestic manufacturers 
and foreign buyers, the fewer “lines” in indirect markets operated by the ETCs show 
the latter one is more efficient than former one.  
 
In addition, the findings from the interviews with the practitioners about their actual 
decisions also support such an argument. During the pilot study A, the manufacturer 
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states that they gave up employing these staff as the costs of employing them are too 
high. In turn, across the cases, the ETCs express the view that they didn’t feel that 
the costs were too high for them. Their different statements on the same costs come 
from their different volume of transactions. For the manufacturers, the costs of 
employing one ETC are lower than that of doing this on their own.  
 
 
Figure 8-1  The comparison of efficiency between direct market and 
indirect market. 
                               Adapted from (Spulber, 2007) 
 
Second, it also helps Chinese ETCs to reduce the enforcement costs related to the 
inefficient legal system and contract obligations. These two institutional constraints 
mainly result in some problems, generated by manufacturers’ opportunistic 
behaviours, during the enforcement of export transactions. To avoid these problems, 


























Direct market  
Indirect market  
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manufacturers’ transaction enforcement. It requires extensive specific knowledge and 
resources (Barzel, 1982; Spulber, 1999, p198) to reduce the information asymmetry 
and related measurement costs (Barzel, 1982). As with the logic in figure 8-1, 
compared with individual foreign buyers, the ETCs have the advantage of the 
resource commitment required by these enforcement costs, based on their large 
volume of export transactions.  
 
Spulber (1999) stated that the intermediary has more economic incentives than the 
individual buyer and seller for investing in monitoring quality and building a 
reputation, as the larger the volume of transactions and the longer time of trade leads 
to more return from trade. He recommends that buyers can depend on intermediaries’ 
reputation to avoid any investigation of suppliers’ information, and later enforcement 
and adaptation of production. He further argues that “The greater the gains from 
trading high-quality goods, the higher the value of the intermediary’s intervention”.  
 
Moreover, the greater the proportion of low-quality goods, the more likely it is that 
the market-for-lemons condition is satisfied and thus the more likely an expert will 
enter the market. With a relatively low discount rate or relatively low set-up costs for 
experts, the intermediary will be profitable and the welfare gain from quality 
certification by the intermediary will be increased. (Spulber, 1999, p196). Such a 
situation does exist in the cases in this study. Across the six cases, it is found that 
Chinese ETCs actively learn and employ resources and capabilities in order to 
effectively enforce manufacturers’ production and all export-related transactions, 
such as the acquisition of knowledge of production (Case-A to F) and of product 
price in the markets (Case C), management and maintenance of brands and industrial 
certificates (Case B), and vertical integration into production (Case A, D). Therefore, 
this study offers one proposition as follow. 
 
Proposition 11 By taking advantage of economies of scale, Chinese ETCs are able 
to more effectively reduce the institution-related transaction costs in China, 




8.3.2 The monopoly of export authority and the reselling system in 
China 
 
The monopoly of export authority enables Chinese ETCs to accumulate extensive 
knowledge, which is then used to reduce institution-related transaction costs. As 
stated in chapter 4 about the “history of Chinese trading companies”, export authority 
has been monopolistically granted to Chinese trading companies since the 1950s. 
With the reform of the trading system in China in the 1980s, export authority has 
been gradually granted to other exporters, including the manufacturers. But the 
applications for such authority are still complicated and time-consuming for new 
exporters, especially the SMEs.  
 
Roehl (1998) indicates that the “history” of Japanese GTCs is one important element 
in their success. The long history of JGTCs, mainly referring to their long-term 
participation in businesses, enables them to accumulate information and experience, 
which further supports their diversification in term of products, regions and 
businesses.  
 
In a similar vein, the long-term monopoly of export authority has enabled Chinese 
ETCs to have longer experience of the export business, compared with other 
domestic exporters. This history is shown in the ETCs’ earlier establishment, and 
practitioners’ experience inside the ETCs in these cases. Across the six cases, the 
earliest established ETC is Case B, which was founded in 1955, whilst the second 
one, Case D, has 13-year history. Cases A and C respectively have 5 and 6 years 
history. More importantly, the key staff in these ETCs such as owners, main 
managers, accountants, etc, have long-term working experience in export and export-
related sectors (details are shown in table 8-9), which normally predates the 
establishment of the ETC. These “histories” help Chinese ETCs to obtain “first 
mover advantages” on the acquisition of information, compared with the new 
exporters, as export authority has been gradually decentralized. Moreover, the 
existing information, accumulated through “history”, also helps Chinese ETCs to 
learn more information. For instance, knowledge of the changes in export 
administrative procedures during the pre-/post-export steps, have been accumulated 
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and updated during the ETCs’ daily communication and participation in export 
transactions. In addition, knowledge on domestic manufacturers’ characteristics, 
which helps the ETC to filter reliable manufacturers and to match orders with them, 
has also been accumulated through long-term and multiple co-operations with these 
manufacturers. Therefore, this study generates one proposition as follow. 
Table 8-9  Summary of key staffs’ experience on export in cases. 




Manager of TMs 5 
Purchaser 10 




 export process departments 13 
Case C 
Owner 1 12 




Manager of QCs 6 
Purchaser  10 
Case E 
Owner 15 
Manager of QCs 8 
Accountant  5 
Case F 
Owner 6 
Manager of Salesmen 5 
Accountant 4 
 
Proposition 12 The monopoly of export authority helps Chinese ETCs to more 
effectively reduce the institution-related transaction costs in China, compared with 
domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers 
8.3.3 Reselling system in China 
 
In chapter 4  the “history of Chinese trading companies”, it is also highlighted that a 
reselling system is the majority trading method adopted by Chinese ETCs from 
the1950s to the present time. The reselling system means that ETCs firstly purchase 
outright the ownership of products from domestic manufacturers by means of a 
buying contract, and then sell it on to foreign buyers through a selling contract. The 
reselling system facilitates Chinese ETCs in reducing institution-related transaction 




First, the reselling system in China enables ETCs to take the whole responsibility, 
rather than partial responsibility, for coordinating with every  part in a transaction, 
and monitoring the quality, time and other related issues in the contract. Across the 
six cases, it can be seen that the Chinese ETCs act as the co-ordinators of export 
transactions, rather than the “agent” of manufacturers or foreign buyers, which is 
commonly considered as their role during export transactions (Bello & Lohtia, 1995; 
Peng, 1998; Peng et al., 1998; Peng & Ilinitch, 1998; Peng & York, 2001). They 
search for new buyers, products, and domestic manufacturers, effectively organize, 
coordinate and enforce production, and efficiently process various export procedures. 
These activities do not only conclude simple exports, but also refer to many export-
supplements and export-facilitated ones, such as materials’ supply (Case A &D|), 
brand management, technology support (Case B), vertical integration  (Case B & D), 
searching for alternative suppliers and export methods (Case C) and so on.     
 
Moreover, such a reselling system in China enables ETCs to become the neutral 
third-party. In traditional international trade, traders usually act as agents of 
manufacturers or foreign buyers, and therefore represent interests of one party. 
However, reselling system make Chinese ETCs work as resellers with neutral 
interests to both sides in export transactions.  Thus they are in the position of neutral 
third-party. Compared with trading companies’ brokerage trading methods, 
Casson(1998) argues that their reselling trading method is more likely to make more 
commitments to the buyers, given the whole transfer of risk and ownership.  
 
Some studies from economics offer some explanations on third-party enforcement. 
For instance, Spulber (1999) argues that the involvement of a third-party is able to 
increase efficiency of transacting. Barzel (1997, 1998, 2001) highlights that the third-
party is more effective in transactions’ enforcement. Certainly the most powerful 
third-party is the state according to Barzel’s state theory. But he also indicates that 
many organizations have the advantages of undertaking a third-party role, as the state 
often lack enforcement power (Barzel, 1997, 1998, 2001). Such arguments also help 
to explain the situation in this study. From the earlier discussion, it can be seen that 
the inefficient legal system and contract obligations fail to enforce export 
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transactions in China, and generate additional enforcement costs for buyers. 
Therefore Chinese ETCs, as one more effective third-party, more efficiently enforce 
the export transactions than domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers.  
 
Finally, the reselling system in China also enables ETCs to become the hub of 
information, which is further used in their transaction-costs-economizing activities. 
As stated above, the ETCs act as the co-ordinators of export transactions under the 
reselling system. As a result, the reselling system actually places the ETC in the 
central position of the export transaction not only between domestic manufacturers 
and foreign buyers, but also all organizations involved in export, such as government 
departments during the pre-/post-export procedures, materials suppliers, international 
classification societies, external agents for off-shore companies, and so on. These 
connections help the ETC to accumulate extensive information about export 
transactions, especially on these export-related institutional constraints. In addition, 
export-supplements and export-facilitated activities also increase the ETCs’ 
information resource. In previous parts of this study, this kind of information has 
already been proved to be of great value to these ETCs’ methods for solving 
institution-related problems and costs in China’s export markets. In the end, the 
information, which is commonly considered as the most important resource for 
trading companies (Peng, 1998; Peng et al., 1998; Peng & Ilinitch, 1998; Roehl, 
1982, 1998), is considerably enhanced in the Chinese ETC by this reselling trading 
system. As a result, the last proposition is generated as follow.  
 
Proposition 13 The reselling system helps Chinese ETCs to more effectively reduce 
the institution-related transaction costs in China, compared with domestic 
manufacturers and foreign buyers 
 
Table 8-10 Summary of propositions in this study 
No. Proposition 
1 The bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals, as the main former formal 
institutional constraints on China’s export market, generate additional transaction costs 
for domestic manufacturers 
2 Being equipped with specific and updated knowledge of bureaucratic procedures and 
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administrative approvals in China’s export market, Chinese ETCs are able to reduce 
relative transaction costs for domestic manufacturers 
3 The inefficient legal system, as the current formal institutional constrains on China’s 
export market, generates additional enforcement costs for foreign buyers’ direct 
transaction with local manufacurers 
4 Inefficient contract obligation, as the current informal institutional constraints on 
China’s export market, generates additional enforcement costs for foreign buyers’ 
direct transaction with local manufacturers 
5 By mastering the information on production, Chinese ETCs are able to reduce 
institution-related enforcement costs for foreign buyers. 
6 By vertical integration into production, Chinese ETCs are able to reduce institution-
related enforcement costs for foreign buyers 
7 By establishing brand and applying for well-known industrial certificates for tradable 
products, Chinese ETCs are able to reduce institution-related enforcement costs for 
foreign buyers 
8 By effectively using appropriate legal assistance in China, Chinese ETCs are able to 
reduce institution-related enforcement costs for foreign buyers 
9 The long-term OEM trading method, as the main former formal institutional constraints 
in China’s export market, generates additional transaction costs for domestic 
manufacturers 
10 By mastering the capabilities, which the domestic manufacturers miss, Chinese ETCs 
are able to reduce institution-related transaction costs for domestic manufacturers 
11 By taking advantage of economies of scale,  Chinese ETCs are able to more 
effectively reduce the institution-related transaction costs in China, compared with 
domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers 
12 The monopoly of export authority helps Chinese ETCs to more effectively reduce the 
institution-related transaction costs in China, compared with domestic manufacturers 
and foreign buyers 
13 The reselling system helps Chinese ETCs to more effectively reduce the institution-
related transaction costs in China, compared with domestic manufacturers and foreign 
buyers 
 
8.4 Chapter Summary  
 
In this chapter, the findings of the cross cases analysis are included, in order to 
comprehensively answer the research questions in this study. In section 8.2 four 
unique institutional constraints and mechanisms that generate difficulties and 
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additional costs for exporters and foreign buyers in China’s export market, are 
highlighted. In the meanwhile, the proposed analytical framework is supported by 
these findings as well. Following the description of these institutional constraints, 
Chinese ETCs’ countermeasures in different cases are included and compared with 
existing studies. By doing these, it is found that these unique countermeasures 
developed by Chinese ETCs effectively and efficiently ease these institution-related 
problems and costs. Section 8.3 sets out the three explanations of Chinese ETCs’ 
advantages in achieving economies in institution-related transaction costs in China. 
Moreover, thirteen propositions are developed after the conclusion and discussion of 















Chapter 9 Conclusion  
9.1 Introduction    
 
This final chapter aims to develop the conclusion of this study. Silverman & 
Marvasti (2008) suggest that the final chapter of a PhD thesis can include the 
relationship between the new findings and existing works, the contribution to 
knowledge, the implications for policy and practice, the limitations and lessons for 
further research from the current study (Shown in table 9-1). Therefore, this chapter 
is organized as follows:  9.2 is a review of this study, while section 9.3 summarizes 
the main findings in this study. Then the main contribution  of this study is 
elaborated in section 9.4, which is followed by the practical implications in 9.5. At 
the end, 9.6 discusses the limitations of this study and suggestions for further study.  
9.2 Thesis overview 
 
Trading companies have played and continue to play significant and strategic roles in 
past and current international business (Jones, 1998b). They efficiently facilitate and 
mediate international trade, by offering a series of cost-reducing services and 
functions (Peng, 1998). But while most extant studies on trading companies are 
about the developed countries, less attention has been paid to the transitional 
economies, such as China, which have become the most important players in 
international trade. Therefore, this study aims to undertake one original study on 
trading companies from one of these regions and countries, China.   
 
Among all the studies of trading companies, a couple of research studies use the 
agency theory and resource-based view. However, the transaction costs’ economics 
(TCE) is the most important theory indicating that the role of trading companies in 
trade is to reduce the transaction costs in international trade (Casson, 1998). The 
extant TCE analysis on trading companies only focuses on trading companies and 
their manufacturers, but overlooks another important stakeholder, the foreign buyers. 
More importantly, transition economies have a reputation for institutional problems, 
which generate some different transaction costs (Estrin et al., 2008; Meyer, 2001a, 
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2001b), which have not be referred to in previous studies. Therefore, the institutional 
perspective should be added into the TCE analyses, when new studies try to explore 
trading companies from these countries. As a result, the research questions in this 
study are 1) what are the institutions, which generate transaction costs for domestic 
manufacturers and foreign buyers, in China’s export market? And 2) how do Chinese 
exporting trading companies respond to such institution-related costs as an 
intermediary between domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers?  
 
In order to fill in these gaps and explore the two research questions on Chinese ETCs, 
one new analytical framework is developed by adding the buyers’ perspective and 
the institutional perspective. This framework integrates the institutional perspective 
into the TCE analysis. Under the TEC analysis, the direct market operated by 
manufacturers and buyers, and the indirect market operated by ETCs, are indicated 
as two different export channels. The ETCs must manage to reduce the transaction 
costs on the indirect export market in order to compete with direct export market. 
From the institutional perspective, these transaction costs are influenced by three 
main institutional constraints, which are included by Peng and Heath (1996) and 
other studies on emerging markets and transition economies. In the end, one 
integrative analytical framework is developed, whilst the institution-related 
transaction costs are highlighted.  
 
Following such a analytical framework, six ETCs constituting the sample of cases, 
are explored and analysed to seek the answers to the research questions. The specific 
institutional constraints in China’s export markets and resulting methods, by which 
Chinese ETCs are able to reduce these institution-related costs, are explored and 
analysed according to the ETCs’ specific export transaction processes in each case. 
In the end, four specific institutional constraints in China’s export market, the 
various unique countermeasures undertaken by Chinese ETCs, and three relevant 
explanations are found. Afterwards, a summary of general structure of this thesis is 
presented.  
 




Chapter two offers an overview of trading companies in extant literature. It initially 
reviews the trading companies’ history, characteristics and methods for facilitating 
exports according to three main countries and areas. Then three related theories on 
trading companies are discussed and critiqued, followed by a statement of the gaps in 
the research and the research questions.  
 
Chapter three develops a new analytical framework, based on the TCE and 
institutional perspective in international business, in order to guide the subsequent 
explanation of institutional constraints in China’s export market and Chinese ETCs.  
 
Chapter four is an overview of the history of Chinese trading companies since 1949. 
This chapter offers an original introduction to unknown Chinese trading companies. 
Within each historical account, the main developmental periods, significant events, 
relevant institutions are described in detail.    
 
Chapter five is the research strategy and methodology, which offers the logical link 
between the evidence and research questions in this study. It includes the 
philosophical stance in this study, the justification for the use of qualitative case 
studies, and detailed case study design.  
 
During chapter six, the first part of pilot study A, is presented. By interviewing ten 
experienced practitioners from the domestic manufacturers, foreign buyers and ETCs, 
this chapter aims to pre-test and modify the previous integrative framework, and to 
specify the institutional constrains on China’s export market. In the end, three formal 
and informal institutional constraints, which influenced export transactions in China, 
are identified.  
 
Applying the proposed analytical framework for the main field work in chapter seven, 
the within case studies of Cases A, B, C and D are presented and analysed. During 
each case, three proposed and one emergent institutional constraint are tested and 
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explored, while ETC’s different countermeasures are stated according to the export 
transaction process inside each case.  
 
Following that, the chapter eight is the cross-case analysis, which aims to include and 
consolidate the findings from the previous parts, and to further generate patterns 
about China’s export-related institutions and ETCs. As a result, thirteen propositions 
are generated according to the four main institutional constraints and the mechanisms, 
that generate difficulties and additional costs for exporters and foreign buyers in 
China’s export market. Moreover, this chapter also discusses three explanations of 
Chinese ETCs’ advantages for economizing institution-related transaction costs in 
China.  
 
Finally, the chapter nine is the conclusion of this study. It summarizes the whole 
research, main findings and contributions, practical implications, limitations and 
suggestions for further study.  
9.3 Summary of main findings  
 
There are two research questions in this study: 1) what are the institutions, which 
generate transaction costs for domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers, in China’s 
export market? And 2) how do Chinese exporting trading companies respond to such 
institution-related costs as an intermediary between domestic manufacturers and 
foreign buyers? 
9.3.1 Answers to research question one  
 
In this study, four main institutional constraints in China’s export market were found, 
including, bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals (former formal 
institutional constraints), the inefficient legal system (current formal institutional 
constraints), inefficient informal contract obligations (informal institutional 





The bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals specifically represent a 
series of administrative procedures for applications for export authority and many 
other business licences and registrations before normal export transaction, which are 
compulsory for domestic exporters wishing to start-up an export business.  Moreover, 
it also refers to the necessary submissions to and registration with many different 
official approvals, which are compulsory for domestic exporters’ for each export 
transaction. Due to the involvement of many different government departments, 
these procedures are inevitably complex, time-consuming and continuously changing. 
Therefore they cost domestic exporters both in resources and time.  
 
The inefficient legal system and contract obligations are anther two institutional 
constraints, which jointly influence enforcement of export transactions for domestic 
manufacturers. The legal system in China fails to efficiently enforce manufacturers 
to keep to original export transactions. The actual execution of the lawsuit is 
unsatisfactory in the context of manufacturers’ breach of transactions. The buyers are 
unwilling to use the legal system to safeguard their export transactions, as they are 
worried about the high costs (time and money) within the legal system and 
unsatisfactory implementation. Under such legal systems and lack of the tradition of 
contract spirit in China (Luo, 2002), the domestic manufacturers fail to efficiently 
self-enforce the transactions. They often freely receive orders without considering 
their capabilities, ignore the issue of quality control and production schedule, and 
even intentionally raise prices. As a result, the inefficient legal system and contract 
obligations in China’s export market jointly generate considerable problems of 
enforcement of export transactions, and increase enforcing costs for buyers.   
 
The long-standing OEM trading method became the last institutional constraints in 
China’s export market. OEM trade is one major trading method in China and makes 
up half of China’s export volume (Fu, 2008; Yu, 2012). It enables domestic 
manufacturers, especially the SMEs, to quickly participate in international trade 
(global supply chain) without developing the whole range of necessary production 
and marketing functions. But these manufacturers also lose some functions, which 
are necessary for their direct export. In some cases, their main missing functions 
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include the supply of materials, branding and application for some industrial 
certificates. Without these capabilities, the domestic manufacturers fail to directly 
transact with foreign buyers, or where there are relatively higher costs.    
 
These four institutional constraints bear the typical characteristics of transition 
economies, where formal and informal institutions are comprehensively and 
fundamentally changing, particularly from central planning to the market-based 
economic reform (Peng, 2003, p275). The bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals and OEM trading method represent the formal institutions, 
which were inherited from the previous planned economy system (Estrin et al., 2008), 
but still exist in many forms during the period of the collapse of previous institutions 
under the central planning system, and therefore belong to the former formal 
institutional constraints in the previous analytical framework. The inefficient legal 
system and contract obligations represent the lack of market-supporting institutions, 
which are hard to establish quickly, during the stage of the emergence of new 
institutions corresponding to the marketing system in these countries, and therefore 
falls into the current formal and informal institutional constraints in the previous 
analytical framework. 
9.3.2 Answers to research question two  
 
Faced with these institutional constraints in China’s export market and related costs 
on export transactions, Chinese ETCs design efficient and effective methods to 
reduce these institution-related transaction costs. First of all, Chinese ETCs are able 
to reduce the costs, generated by bureaucratic procedures and administrative 
approvals, by mastering knowledge of these procedures in China’s export market.  
 
Second, Chinese ETCs are able to reduce the costs of enforcing the domestic 
manufacturers’ opportunistic behaviour during export transaction despite the 
inefficient legal system and informal contract obligations by utilizing information on 
production, vertical integration into production, establishing brand and applying for 
well-known industrial certificates for tradable products, and effectively using 




In addition, by offering certain supplementary functions, Chinese ETCs are able to 
help dysfunctional domestic manufacturers to successfully finish export transaction, 
when they fail to independently finish whole production process due to long-standing 
work under the banner of “OEM trading method” described in earlier chapters  
 
Compared with the direct market trading between domestic manufacturers and 
foreign buyers, Chinese ETCs are able to more efficiently operate an indirect market 
due to three advantages: economies of scale, the monopoly of export authority, and 
reselling trading methods. Specifically, Chinese ETCs are able to achieve economies 
of scale in the processing of export transactions. As they have more in-house 
manufacturers and buyers, and process more exporting deals than individual 
manufacturers and buyers, and so they reduce the costs of each transaction. These 
costs include human resources and time costs related to bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals, and enforcement costs related to the inefficient legal 
system and contract obligations. Then the historical monopoly of export authority 
enables Chinese ETCs to accumulate extensive knowledge, which is then used to 
reduce institution-related transaction costs. Finally, the long-standing reselling 
system in China enables ETCs to take comprehensive responsibility for export 
transactions, thus becoming a neutral third-party, and the “hub” of information. By 
assuming the whole responsibility, Chinese ETCs are able to coordinate with each 
part, even including those non-trade units, in one export transaction. As the neutral 
third-party, Chinese ETCs are able to more effectively enforce the export 
transactions than are domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers. By gathering 
massive information related to export transactions in China, Chinese ETCs develop 
their various transaction-costs-economizing activities.   
 
By answering question two, this study illustrates the unique characteristics of 
Chinese ETCs, which are developed to bypass institutional constraints in China’s 
export market and to reduce related costs of export transactions for domestic 
manufacturers and foreign buyers.  
9.4 Contribution to knowledge  
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9.4.1 Practical contribution  
This study extends the extant knowledge on trading companies to one of transition 
economies. These countries and areas make up considerable proportion of 
international trade, yet their export-related institutions and organizations have 
remained a mystery. In order to fill in this gap, this study chooses China as one 
representative of these countries and areas, given its significant economic power and 
quick growth.  
 
In general, this study presents Chinese ETCs’ characteristics and export processes, 
and developmental history, and export-related institutions and institutional change in 
China’s export market. Specifically, Chapter 4 in this study describes the history of 
Chinese trading companies and related institutional change during three sequential 
periods since 1949. It displays the entire historical development of Chinese trading 
companies that is in line with related institutional change and reform since the 
establishment of the new China. In chapter 6, the interviews from ten practitioners, 
which have long-standing involvement in the export business in China, further 
describes more specific export-related institutions during their business practice in 
China’s export market, especially those institutional constraints which disturb their 
export transactions in China. Then chapter seven and eight jointly offer detailed and 
practical illustration of Chinese ETCs’ current characteristics, export transaction 
processes and methods for facilitating their export transactions. In the end, the 
practical findings in this study contribute to one historical and contemporary picture 
of Chinese ETCs and export-related institutions in China.  
9.4.2 Theoretical contribution  
 
First of all this study contributes to extant transaction costs economics (TCE) 
analysis of trading companies. TCE is the dominant theory in the field of trading 
companies due to its powerful explanation of how trading companies’ exist and 
conduct business (Casson, 1998). It clearly indicates the transaction-costs-
economizing role of trading companies in international trade. However, the extant 
TCE analysis on trading companies only includes the domestic manufacturer and 
trading company, and overlooks the foreign buyer, which is reported as another 
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important player during export transactions by many export-related articles (Perdue 
& Summers, 1991; Quintens et al., 2005). In order to modify such a shortcoming, 
therefore, this study designs a two-sided TCE analysis, which subsequently 
constructs the analytical framework together with an institutional perspective for this 
study, by including three main participants in the export transactions: domestic 
manufacturers, foreign buyers and ETCs.  
 
Second, this study contributes to the extant studies using an institutional perspective 
in the field of international business. The institutional perspective has prevailed in 
recent literatures in international business, suxh as its adaptation in cross-institution 
studies (Peng et al., 2008). However, the concepts, terminology and classifications in 
these studies, especially those related to transition economies, are disorganized, 
ambiguous and overlapping. Such problems seem to be inherited from higher-level 
institutional research. Scott (2008) has found that the institutional research in social 
science, economics and political studies show large distinctions and conflicts, and 
lack a general framework. Based on Peng & Heath’s (1996) institutional framework 
and other studies, therefore, this study classifies the institutions in transition 
economies into three main institutional constraints appearing in two stages during 
institutional transitions. Such classification also offers one feasible framework for 
future institutional studies on transition economies.  
 
Furthermore, this study theoretically integrates institutional perspectives into the 
transaction costs economics, and therefore combines their strengths, and offsets 
different weaknesses. As it emerged from western countries with sound marketing 
institutions, TCE is not effective in the study of transition economies, where 
institutions are singular, complex and uncertain, at least different (Gelbuda et al., 
2008; Meyer, 2001a, 2001b; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Peng, 2001, 2006). As Peng 
stated, these extant theories need modification when  applied to these countries (Peng, 
2006). In turn, the institutional perspective has the advantage of possessing powerful 
explanatory capacity in the study of transition economies, as local unique institutions’ 
exert considerable influence on involved firms  (Child, 2009; Hoskisson et al., 2000; 
Meyer, 2001a, 2001b; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Peng, 2005). As referring to all 
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environmental and contextual factors, however, institutional perspectives have too 
broad a scope, though this study has simplified institutions into three groups. 
Therefore it is more likely to include excessive and unnecessary institutional factors, 
or/and to overlook the most significant ones. The inadequate extant literatures on 
Chinese ETCs and the inexperience of the PhD researcher in this study increase such 
a risk of losing control of the research.  As a result, the integration of the institutional 
perspective and TCE has two advantages. First, the institutional perspective enables 
the TCE to become adaptable to the study of transition economies. Second, the TCE 
enables the institutional perspective to focus on the institutions related to export 
transaction costs.   
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that this study uses an origianl way of integrating 
institutional perspectives into TCE analysis. This study attempts to logically integrate 
the institutional perspective into TCE analysis, by illustrating institutional influence 
on transaction costs, and thereby further develops the concept of institution-related 
transaction costs. In the end, the integrative framework of the institutional 
perspective and TCE, and the invention of institution-related transaction costs jointly 
offer a new approach for future studies on TCE-related topics in transition economies.  
9.5 Practical implications  
Practitioners involved with exporting/importing from/to China and other transition 
economies can benefit from this study. For the practitioners from the ETCs, this 
study benefits them in many ways. They can capitalize on the significance of their 
existence in international trade activities; consider how they can improve and 
enhance their capabilities and what threats exist for them. The finding of institution-
related transaction costs helps these ETCs to clarify the significance of their 
existence in international trade. They should treat these institutional constraints as 
business opportunities rather than obstacles, which are reflected in these ETCs’ 
complaints during the interviews. The findings relating to the various methods of 
reducing transactions costs and the three reasons why Chinese ETCs’ indirect 
markets are more efficient than direct markets, clarify their advantages and direction 
of progress. Moreover, they also have to realize that these advantages are also 




This study also benefits the practitioners from domestic manufacturers and foreign 
buyers. Being the “merchant” between domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers, 
trading companies are playing strategic roles (Jones, 1998b) for manufacturers’ 
export (Peng & Ilinitch, 1998) and purchasing companies’ import (Quintens et al., 
2005). The findings from this study also support this statement. From this point, this 
study has some implications for domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers’ 
exporting/importing channel choice. In particular, these implications are helpful for 
the firms with different transaction amounts, products and industries and also the 
ones facing challenges from formal and informal institutions.  
 
First of all, the transaction amount is one fundamental consideration for the 
exporting/importing channel choice of domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers. 
The economies of scale on large amount of transactions have been proved to be one 
significant advantage of ETCs in this multiple cases study, particularly on 
economizing institution-related transaction costs. This finding is consistent with and 
extends the explanation in previous studies on trading companies’ advantages on 
economizing normal transaction costs (Carlos & Nicholas, 1988, 1996; Roehl, 1983, 
1998; Roehl et al., 1984). It implies that both domestic manufacturers and foreign 
buyers with less export/import transactions should consider ETCs as their 
exporting/importing channel choices, which are able to economically bypass the 
unfamiliar and unfavourable local institutions. When they have more transactions, in 
turn, they should use in-house exporting/importing departments, which enable them 
to reduce costs of each transaction and avoid some disadvantages of employing 
trading companies, such as additional monitoring costs of agents (Peng, ) . Several 
additional implications for domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers with fewer 
transactions are given in next several paragraphs.  
 
The local bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals should be another 
consideration for domestic manufacturers with less export amount. This study finds 
that there are many bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals on Chinese 
exporting markets, which obstruct exporting transactions. These procedures are 
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issued by central and local governments and official departments at all levels, and 
tend to be bureaucratic and uncertain. Such situation requires direct exporters to 
invest more resource to finish transaction costs, which are difficult and uneconomic 
for large number of small exporters and start-up businesses in China. In turn, ETCs 
are able to process export transactions through these institutions with lower costs via 
professional and updated knowledge on these bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals, because of their larger amount of transactions, professional 
staff and long-term participation in trading industry. Even if the employment of 
professional staff is available, these small manufacturers still face with disadvantage 
on costs due to fewer transactions. By comparison with two costs of direct and 
indirect (through ETCs) transactions, the indirect export channel become more 
economic choice for these domestic manufacturers.  
 
In addition, the foreign buyers with less importing amount from China should take 
local informal institutions into account in their import channels decision. This study 
finds that weaker legal system and informal contract obligation largely interfere in 
export transaction enforcement, resulting in the problems with quality and delivery, 
and therefore increasing their costs of importing directly from local manufacturers. 
The use of ETCs inclined to be one solution for them. These ETCs master 
information to reduce information asymmetry and manufactures’ opportunistic 
behaviours, such as those on production, current production conditions, on 
production processes and products, and manufactures’ characteristics. Many foreign 
buyers are usually unfamiliar with, lack of resource to adapt to, or difficult to master 
and use these unique institutions.  Due to economies of scale from larger number of 
export transaction, and long-time participation in both exporting and related 
industries, such as manufacturing, Chinese ETCs are able to obtain these knowledge 
and experience with lower costs than these foreigners. As a result, it is more 
economic for these foreign buyers to adopt local ETCs’ service than newly 
establishing own importing departments.   
 
In particular, one situation should be considered for the foreign buyers importing 
certain special products. As found in this study, weaker legal system and informal 
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contract enforcement jointly lead to more serious opportunistic problems for the 
exporting of the products with intellectual property from China, including trademark, 
patent and special certificates. Both this and previous studies have proven that the 
intellectual property protection turns out to be difficult and costly in China for the 
owners. The foreign buyers with fewer import transactions face with a dilemma, 
which is finding and monitoring reliable manufacturers on their own being less 
economic trades off the risk of uncertain intellectual property protection from 
distrustful manufacturers. The ETCs are able to help these foreign buyers in this 
situation. The long standing reselling system on China’s export market enables ETCs 
work as more responsible trading partners, the interest-neutral third-party and the 
hub of information, which make them enforce these special terms on export 
transactions more effectively and efficiently. As a result, the author advices the small 
foreign buyers with the issue of protection IP to choose reliable ETCs as their trading 
partners rather than unfamiliar manufacturers.  
 
Last, the domestic manufacturers, which are currently working under the OEM-like 
trading method, should consider ETCs as one helpful mean for their exporting 
channel choice.  As stated previously in this study, Original Equipment 
Manufacturing (OEM) is the most important trading method and makes up to half of 
total export until recently in China (Fu, 2008; Yu, 2012). It enables a lot of 
incompetent small and medium-sized manufacturers  participate in international trade 
much earlier, as they only need to concentrate on partial and essential production 
(Hobday, 2000). Nevertheless, it also makes manufacturers lose some important 
functions (Hobday, 2000), such as material purchase, which are necessary for direct 
exporting, and thereby generate problems for their direct export. In turn, ETCs are 
able to effectively and efficiently fill in these missing functions by leveraging their 
knowledge, which accumulated through their long stand in exporting industry. 
Therefore, this study suggests the domestic manufacturers, which are unable to 
independently finish whole production process, especially the small and medium-
sized manufacturers and manufacturers from the industries with long history of OEM 




Policymakers in these transition economies can also benefit from this study. The 
discovery of institutional constraints show them that these institutional constraints do 
generate additional transition costs in export transactions in China, which further 
consume the total gains from export transactions. Therefore, future policies should 
lead to the withdrawal of these institutional constraints. In addition, new policies 
should encourage ETCs’ development in these countries, as they increase efficiency 
and gains of export transactions through effective methods, and therefore facilitate 
domestic exports.  
 
 
9.6 Research implication  
The theoretical analysis and empirical findings in this study can benefit the relevant 
researches in other economies, such as emerging markets and developing countries. 
First, this study mainly focuses on the transition economies, which is typically 
considered as one subset of emerging markets and developing countries (Peng, 2003). 
Second, this study takes China as the context of research, which is also commonly 
accepted as the most important and representative country of emerging markets and 
developing countries (Child & Yuan, 1996; Peng, 2005).   Therefore, similar context-
related factors, especially institutional factors among these countries enable the 
theoretical analysis and empirical findings from this study to offer one general 
reference to relevant researches on emerging markets and developing countries, 
where the institution-related problems also influence the involved firms’ business 
activities (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005). 
In the end, from institutional perspective, this study can benefit more researches, 
even those on developed countries. North(1990) indicated that the institutional 
change takes place in all countries. Moreover,  Khanna et al (2005) mentioned that 
the institution-related problems, such as institutional voids, could appear in any 
country, including developed countries like US, only varying in the extent. Thus the 
theoretical analysis and findings in this study, especially the ones related to 




9.7 Limitation and future direction  
Like all research, this study has several limitations as well. First of all, as a 
qualitative study, this study has limited generalizability. It adopts a qualitative 
approach, in order to explore the unknown Chinese ETCs, especially their transaction 
processes, and complex institutions in China’s export market. However, qualitative 
study has the reputation of lacking generalizability (Creswell, 2008). To improve 
such a weakness, this study adapts multiple cases study that do enhance 
generalizability (Yin, 2003b) to the best possible extent. But it is still not as 
statistically significant as a quantitative study. In addition, the limited resources and 
time at the disposal of a PhD thesis also contribute to this situation.  
 
Many studies recommend that qualitative and quantitative approaches are 
complementary, as the former one is useful for generating new propositions, while 
the latter can test significance. Therefore, a quantitative study on the propositions 
developed in this study is recommended for the further in order to consolidate and/ or 
critique the findings from this study.    
 
The second limitation related to the case selection, which could not encompass all 
trading institutions in China. As stated in chapter four, the trading companies in 
China are classified into three groups: large centrally state-owned trading companies 
with diversified businesses, state-owned trading companies with pure trading 
businesses and private trading companies. The cases involved in this study mainly 
come from the last two groups. The reasons for avoiding the first group are threefold. 
First, these trading companies have gone far from traditional export business, which 
is the target in this study, due to considerable diversification. Second, their export 
businesses mainly concentrate on several commodities, which have monopoly power 
in China. Therefore, the competitive framework in this study is not suitable for these 
export businesses. Finally, though the case study approach does not aim to seek the 
most representative ones (Yin, 2003b), this study attempts to offer most and most 
significant knowledge on Chinese trading companies. Considering the majority of 
trading companies fall into the last two groups and given the limited space in this 
study, the lower number of these centrally state-owned trading companies does not 
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become problematic. However, the recommendation for future study is to undertake 
a new investigation on these trading companies to complete the whole picture of 
trading companies in China. In particular, the comparison between Chinese large 
state-owned trading companies and Japanese GTCs could be most attractive.   
 
Finally, this study has another limitation in so far as little attention is given to 
informal institutions. The introduction of the institutional perspective is one key 
contribution of this study. The institutions include formal and informal ones (North, 
1990). This study highlights three formal institutions, while only one is informal. 
Apparently, more attention is paid to formal institutions.  More importantly, some 
informal institutions, such as the popularity of personal networks, have been 
considered important for studies on transition economies. This is partly because the 
limited data cannot show these informal institutions, which are normally hard to 
detect compared with formal institutions (North, 1990). Moreover, the institutional 
economics, which generates analytical framework in this study, mainly focuses on 
the formal institution (Scott, 2008), though the recent research has  begun to turn to 
informal institutions. In other words, in order to effectively explore the informal 
institutions in China’s export market, some other relevant institutional theories, such 
the legitimacy of institutions from a social science perspective (Scott, 2008), should 
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Appendix 1: Multiple case studies protocol  
1. Purpose of case studies  
Research objectives and research questions:  
First objective: this study aims to explore and investigate the export-related 
institutions, which generate costs for export transactions in China.  
1) What are the institutions, which generate transaction costs for domestic 
manufacturers and foreign buyers, in China’s export market?  
 
Second objective: this study aims to explore and investigate how Chinese ETCs 
operate a more efficient indirect export market compared with a direct market 
between domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers.  
2) How do Chinese exporting trading companies respond to such institution-related 
costs as an intermediary between domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers? 
 
2. Research design  
The unit of analysis  
The unit of analysis is the Chinese ETCs’ business activities, which are institution-
related transaction costs during their export transaction process. The exporting 
transaction process inside ETCs is chosen as the embedded unit. Therefore, the data 
related to export transaction processes and institutions, which can generate costs 
during the transaction process, should be collected in each case.  
 
Case selection criteria  
Cases are selected according to following criteria:  
1. Location: Mainland China 
2. Ownership: Chinese-owned companies 
3. Function: The main business of these companies must be exports: the 
turnover from the export business must be over 50%; according to their own 
assessment, exporting is their main businss 
4. Maximum variation strategy: pure and hybrid export trading companies; 




Informant selection criteria  
 
Key informant: the owners and CEOs in the case, who are clearly the individuals 
more likely to have acquired knowledge on trading companies and export 
transactions.  
 
Ordinary informants: department managers, ordinary staff, who can offer information 
on specific transaction unit procedures, and on their related parts in the case; relevant 
staff from external organizations, such as manufacturers, who can offer 
supplementary information from a  non-ETC’s perspective.  
 
Data collection  
Methods for data collection are as follows:  
Observation: This is mainly used in pilot study B (Case A). Content includes the 
ETC’s working site, each staff’s daily work, the transactional process, 
communications and business transactions with external organizations. In addition, 
formal interviews and informal chats were processed during the observation period. 
   
Interviews: This is the main method across cases. They are in-depth and semi-
structured interviews. The interviews are guided by a series of question lists and brief 
structure guide, and open-ended questions at the same time.  
 
Documentation: this contains background documentations related to the company 
and relevant documentation for triangulation.  
3. Field procedure  
The place and time of interviews are largely arranged according to the informants’ 
convenience, but a quiet place is preferred in order to avoid interruption and for the 
purposes of digital recording. As a result, the informants’ work places, such as 
offices, are mainly chosen. Then the interview normally lasts about two hours. The 
interview guide offers the general flow, while some new questions emphasise 
emergent items. All interviews are recorded by digital recorder, assisted by some 
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notes. Before the interview, the research content is briefly introduced to the 
informants.  
 
The process of the field research is as follows:  
As a general rule it is to timely to update all information in documents throughout the 
whole data collection process. The information refers to the formal interviews and 
informal chats, enquiries by email and telephone, secondary data from the internet 
and published works.  
 
Pre-interview  
 Establish connection and obtain permission for the interview with 
interviewees by email and/or telephone  
 Process the preliminary investigation of the case company and relevant 
industry by considering the company website, articles, journals, reports and 
news  
 Book a specific time and place for the interviews with interviewees 
 Ask for permission for recording interview with interviewees 
 
Post-interview  
 Re-listen to the record in case of any failure  
 Store and copy the record into specific files in the computer for each case  
 Transfer records and field notes into transcripts, which are then also stored in 
the same file 
 Translate transcripts into an English edition, which is then also stored  
 Process early data analysis 
 List new questions according to certain data, if any  
 Ask back the current and previous interviewees for any new questions by 
email or telephone, or make notes on new questions for the next round of 
interviews with the same interviewee  





Appendix 2: Interview guide  
Interview 
No…………Organisation/department:……………………………………………  
Name of interviewee and title:…………………….………………………………  
Date & Time of Interview:………………………………………….  
Duration of Interview:………….………….. 
 
The questions below are only trigger ones 
2. Firm information   
2.1 Can you briefly introduce the firm?  
 Date of establishment?  
 How was it established? 
 What is the nature of its ownership, state-owned or private? 
 How many departments/staff are there, their names/titles and responsibilities?   
 For SMEs, can you tell me about the owners’ working experience?   
 What are the important periods and events in the development of your firm? 
 
2.2 Can you tell me about your export products?  
 What are your main products and their percentage of the total exporting 
volume? 
 Do you have other products and what is their percentage of the total exporting 
volume? 
 Do your products have any unique features? Such as brands, certificates, 
standard, special technical ?approvals?requirements?,etc  
 
2.3 Can you  tell me something about your manufacturers? 
 Do you know the number of the manufacturers? 
 Do you know the amount of supply from each manufacturer and their 
percentage of the total export volume?  
 Information about the main manufacturers? 
 Location of the main manufacturers? 
 Scale (number of employees)  
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 Their production capability?  
 Information about their products, including the quality and style? 
  The punctuality of the product delivery?  
 How long have you collaborated with these manufacturers? 
  
2.3 Can you tell me about foreign buyers?  
 The number of foreign buyers?  
 The percentage of each foreign buyer’s purchase amount in the total export 
volume of the company?    
 Information about the main foreign buyers?  
 Their location?  
 The information about the purchased products, including the quality and style?  
 The preference of purchasing, such as delivery time, punctuality, quality?  
 How long have you collaborated with these foreign buyers?  
 
3.  Export transaction information  
3.1 Can you generally describe the whole export transaction process in your 
company, step by step?  
 -who or which departments in your company are involved in this part?   
 -what are their responsibilities?   
 
3.2 I have one brief export transaction flow chart (developed from Case A). Is it the 
same as the export transaction in your company? What are the differences between 
your transaction process and the one in this flow chart? And why and how do you do 
it this way?  
 
3.3 Pre-/post-export procedures  
 
 Some people would say that exporters had to apply for many different official 
approvals for the start-up of an export business, that these applications are 
quite complex and time-consuming, and that the government policy on these 
procedures has been changing. What is your opinion about that?  What other 
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problems did you encounter in these procedures? How do you deal with these 
problems?   
 
 Some people would say that exporters had to submit/receive/register different 
official approvals to/from/with many departments, and that these applications 
are quite complex and time-consuming, and that the government policy on 
these procedures has been changing. What do say about that?  What other 
problems did you encounter in these procedures? How do you deal with these 
problems?   
 
 
3.4 Can you briefly introduce how to transact with foreign buyers, step by step? (3.4 
and 3.5 depending on how detailed his/her response to 3.1) 
 how did you find the foreign buyers?  
 how did you negotiate and sign contracts with them?   
 how did you monitor their enforcement of your contracts?  
 
3.3 Can you describe how   you transact with domestic manufacturers, step by step?  
 How did you find the manufacturers?  
 How did you negotiate and sign contracts with them?  
 How did you monitor their enforcement of your contracts?  
 Some ETCs would say that there were always some problems with these 
manufacturers, such as poor product quality, postponement of delivery times, 
etc.  What do you say about that?  What other problems did you encounter in 
transactions with your manufacturers? How do you deal with these problems?   
 Some people would say that they would not appeal for the legal assistance, if 
their manufacturers fail to comply with the contract, as they do not trust the 
legal system in China, and believe that the costs of doing it is too high. What 
is your view about that?   
4 What problems did you encounter when processessing export transactions, apart 
from the ones you have mentioned before?  
 
